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ABSTRACT 
This thesis draws analogies between three twentieth-century ideologies - the Holocaust, 
Communist Czechoslovakia and South African Apartheid -, examining ways in which 
particular literary texts deconstruct the political and ethical consequences of 
philosophical closure and open up the possibility of a recovery of theological language. 
The Introduction places my argument within the context of contemporary ethical 
thinking and discusses the work of philosophers from both the 'analytic' and 
I continental' traditions who are reacting against the philosophical search for a non- 
aporetic ethical code. I argue for the inadequacy of some contemporary 'narrative ethics' 
and the importance of an 'ethics of reading', drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida and 
J. I-Ellis Miller. I argue that J-F Lyotard's concern that we ý wage war on totality' and be 
I witnesses to the unpresentable' is fundamentally an ethical concern and that here the 
novelist and creative writer have a crucial role to play. 
Chapter 1 is a methodological chapter, which considers the consequences of ideological 
and evolutionary thinking in terms of memory and forgetting. The chapter draws in 
particular on Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of the Enlightenment and 
I Jacques Derrida's reading of Emmanuel Levinas , 
Violence and Metaphysics'. I argue 
that Derrida's understanding of 'writing' is significant if we are to avoid the negative 
consequences of ideology and, in the name of justice, pursue a genuine anamnesis. 
Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of the ideology of the 'Final Solution' and examines 
the ethical issues raised by Holocaust testimony. These issues are explored in terms of 
film and, in particular, the writing of Elie Wiesel. I argue that the incomprehensibility of 
the Holocaust is not rendered in mimetic terms but through the textures and devices of 
texts which seek to be responsible witnesses to the unpresentable. It is for this reason 
that much Holocaust testimony has drawn on the Jewish tradition of midrash, where 
meaning is produced in the relationship between texts. 
In Chapter 31 reflect on the relationship between law and justice, taking as my starting- 
points Vaclav Havel's essay 'The Power of the Powerless' and Ivan Klima's novel Judge 
on Trial. I argue that these works, written under the pressure of Soviet Communism, call 
for an aporetic or paradoxical relationship between law and justice such as that envisaged 
in Derrida's recent writing. 
Chapter 4 explores the ideology of Apartheid and, in particular, its use of scripture. As 
in the preceding chapters, I explore the ethical possibilities of literature in destabilising 
the artificial boundaries set in place by Apartheid, and offer readings of Derrida's essay 
on Nelson Mandela,, Nadine Gordimer's None to Accompany jWe and Andr& Brink's A 
Dry White Season. 
The Conclusion revisits the central themes of the thesis and explores in a preliminary 
way possible implications for democracy, national identity, philosophy and the 
university, as well as the theological resonances in postmodern discourse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A decision which didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable 
application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal; it 
would not be just. I 
We are speaking here with names (event, decision, responsibility, 
ethics, politics ... ) of 'things' that can only exceed (and must exceed) 
the order of theoretical determination, of knowledge, certainty, 
judgment, and of statements in the form of 'this is that', in other 
words, more generally and essentially, the order of the present or of 
presentation. Each time they are reduced to what they must exceed, 
error, recklessness, the unthought, and irresponsibility are given the so 
very presentable face of good conscience. 2 
Jean-Francois Lyotard's influential study Ae Postinodern Condition: A Report on 5 
Knowledge (1979) concludes with a now famous characterisation of 'the postmodern' 
which is crucial to my own understanding of postmodernism, its ethical concerns and 
possibilities: 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modem, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself-, that which denies itself the solace 
of good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible 
to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which 
searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order 
to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. 3 
1 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), p. 24. 
2 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 8 1. 
3 Jean-Franjois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), tr. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 9 1. 
2 
Although the key tenn of 7-he Postmodern Condition was 'legitimation', Lyotard's concem 
that we 'wage war on totality' and be'witnesses to the unpresentable'4 is fundamentally an 
ethical concern. The dominant traditions in normative ethical theory, at least since the 
Enlightenment, have presupposed that moral phenomena exhibit a unity or totality that can 
be adequately represented by hierarchical arrangements of moral principles. Traditionally, 
ethics,, as the investigation of the nomos of conduct, has been seen as a branch of 
philosophy. It has had to offer a theory which would provide a basis for the principles 
, giliding our moral 
behaviour. The theory was to start from a particular perspective 
(humankind, nature, God, reason) transcending the inconsistency of individual practices. 
It would thus be able to generate universal normative principles to correct the many 
imperfections of individual existence. Frans De Wachter distinguishes two types of such 
theory, characterising them as an 'ethic of discovery' and an 'ethic of design or 
arrangement'. ' An ethic of discovery involves a search for an already existing foundation, 
an aspect of reality which can serve to ground an ethical relation. Particular empirical 
criteria are sought, such as Bentham's famous 'hedonistic utilitarianism' - 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them to point out what we ought 
to do, as well as to determine what we should do. 6 
- or particular ontological criteria -a Thomist sense of the rationality of the created order, 
an ordo rerum. According to an ethic of design or arrangement, we do not seek the 
rationality in things as they are, but as we arrange them. In this view, we must seek a 
world which everyone would seek, were they not contaminated by particular prejudices or 
parochial interests. Frans De Wachter writes, 
In these two versions, it makes little difference whether reason is 
situated in the subject or the object, or whether we discover or design. 
4 fbid., p. 82. 
5 Frans De Wachter, 'Post-Modem Challenges to Ethics', in Ethical Perspectives 1 (1994), 78. 
6 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation (1789), ed. J. H. Burns and 
H. L. A. Hart (London: Methuen, 1982), 1.1 
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Searching for what a person is, the laws of being human, searching for 
the way of living that is acceptable to every way of living, searching 
for a bond that surpasses all individual interests, a humanity that 
surpasses social roles, wanting a world that everyone would want, or, 
even, being addressed by the language of suffering, a language 
surpassing every local usage: whoever can do all this - the Christian 
personalist or Kantian humanist, the existentialist, the utilitarian 
humanist - thinks that the moral person must be oriented toward 
super-personal principles and that ethics has the duty to justify these 
principles. Today, we call all these forms 'modernist' or 'rationalist' 
ethics. Ethical insights are then the insights with which all rational 
people, under ideal circumstances, would agree. 7 
According to such theories, actions are seen to be right or wrong in terms of a prior 
stipulation as to what is to count as 'the good'. Deontologists follow the Platonic tradition 
of assuming some things to be good in their own right whereas consequentialists assume 
that some things are good because of what happens later because of them. Even many so- 
called 'narrative ethicists' believe some stories are more worth heeding than others and 
they offer criteria for distinguishing good from bad stories. 
In all such theories,. the concern is for conflict-resolution, and about adnýtting of no 
contradictions,, except conflicts amenable to, and awaiting, resolution. 8 The 
Enlightenment search for firm rules and solid foundations drew its impetus from a faith in 
the feasibility and ultimate triumph of the humanist project. The hope was that a society 
free from irremovable contradictions, a society pointing the way to correct solutions, 
could be built eventually, given enough time and good will. In other words, the moral 
thought and practice of the Enlightenment was based on the belief in the possibility of a 
non-ambivalent,. non-aporefic ethical code. 
7 Frans De Wachter, op. cit. 
8 In a series of books, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) Modernity and 
Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 199 1) and Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 
Zygmunt Bauman explores the illusions and dangers of the Enlightenment project, in terms of 'the belief 
that the "messiness" of the human world is but a temporary and repairable state, sooner or later to be 
replaced by the orderly and systematic rule of reason' (p. 32, Modernity and the Holocaust). 
4 
This search for an overarching view of human nature or moral action, as a foundation for 
ethics, has recently been subject to sustained critique from a variety of quarters - Anglo- 
American analytic philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams and Martha 
Nussbaum., French 'post-structuralists' such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois 5 
Lyotard, Pragmatists such as Richard Rorty, feminists and liberationists. 9 
Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, describes the way in which contemporary moral debate 
is characterised by interminable disagreements based on conflicting, and incommensurable, 
moral theories - for example, an impasse between deontologists and consequentialists, the 
right to life versus the fight to choose, public morality versus freedom of expression, 
individual freedom versus the good of all. 10 There seems to be no rational way of securing 
agreement. Every one of the arguments is logically valid, the conclusions following from 
the premises, but the rival premises are such that there seems no rational way of weighing 
the claims of one against another. Thus, according to MacIntyre, contemporary culture is 
characterised by a kind of emotivism in ethics, where argument relapses quickly into 
prejudiced disagreement. II 
My thesis, particularly influenced by writings of Derrida and Lyotard12, is that 'ethics, 
conceived as a non-aporetic moral theory, not only assumes an impossible objectivity (in 
9 Dwight Furrow's recent bookAgainst 7-heory: Continental andAnalytical Challenges in Moral 
Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 1995) examines features shared by Analytic and 
Continental ethical theories. 
10 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (London: Duckworth, 198 1). 
II fbid., chapter 2. Maclntyre describes the way in which, with the Enlightenment, ethics became 
distinguished from the theological and the aesthetic and a central concern became establishing an 
independent rational justification of morality. What our culture has witnessed is the inevitable breakdown 
of this project. 
12 Particularly Derrida's recent writings on law and justice, democracy, apartheid in South Africa, and 
education. 
See 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority', in Drucilla Comcll (ed. ), Deconstruction and 
the Possibility ofJustice (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 3-67. 
The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1992) 
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Derrida's terms, it assumes an hors-texte, or neutral perspectIve), but threatens the 
singularity of the ethical encounter, as the singular obligation is preconceived and 
dissolved in the universal. Such an understanding of ethics involves an imposition of 
preconceived notions rather than engagement with specific obligations. In these terms, 
ethics is not a matter of decision - it is merely a 'programmable application or unfolding of 
a calculable process' - and as such is irresponsible. 13 Such theories are essentially 
reductive, eliminating ambivalence, or conflict between two decisions,. making the moral 
. n-aent secure by providing her with a way of defirling and limiting obligations to others, 15 
who become subject to conceptual categories. Such theoretical approaches therefore fall 
to do justice to the immediacy and incomprehensibility of the ethical demand. 14 As John 
D. Caputo has written: 
'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration', in For Nelson Mandela, ed. Jacques Derrida 
and Mustapha Tlili (New York: Seaver Books, 1987). 
Specters ofMarx (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 
'The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils', in Diacritics, Fall 1993,3-20. 
Jean-Franpis Lyotard, Heidegger and 'the jews', tr. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 
1 am indebted to the following works which pursue the possibility of a 'postmodern ethics': 
Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 
Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 
John D. Caputo, Against Ethics (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993) 
Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) 
Simon Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 
Dwight Furrow, Against Theory: Continental andAnalytic Challenges in Philosophy (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1995) 
Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds. ), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999). 
J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics ofReading (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) 
Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1) 
Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990) 
13 See footnote 1. 
14 This has been the case with regard to the tradition of theodicy, which has sought to dissolve the 
"problem of evil" by producing a justificatory narrative. The scandal of suffering is dissolved in the 
general discourse. It is a tradition ironised, for example, in Voltaire's Candide and Dostoevsky's The 
Brothers Karamazov, literature which refuses to allow the suffering of innocents to be "justified" by some 
overall plan or future resolution. To "resolve" the problem of evil in this way is essentially forgetful and, 
as I shall argue in chapter 2, calls for an appreciation of "textuality" or the excess of experience over 
interpretation. The example of Holocaust testimony, such as that of Elie Wiesel, with its sense of the 
ongoing and inexhaustible responsibility to tell stories, precisely runs counter to traditional theodicy. 
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Let us take the case - let us 'begin with' the case - of a disaster, of a 
damaged life, of an irretrievable loss, of innocent avoidable suffering, 
a case where we cannot easily blame the victim for his or her destitute 
condition, say, of a child born with AIDS. Such a child, on my 
accounting, 'lays claim' to us, 'seizes' us, without needing (and 
without having) a prior theory of the Good in virtue of which we can 
adjudicate this to be (an) evil. 15 
Such prior theories of 'the Good' imply the possibility of objectivity - the belief that it is 
possible to judge from a point of view representing all moral agents. For example, Kant 
reduced the contingency of experience by positing a part of the self that is independent of 
space and time, and thus not dependent upon contingent private ends. Utilitarianism 
achieved similar results by claiming to speak from the point of view of an ideally 
clairvoyant, disinterested observer. As Dwight Furrow, following Heidegger, points out, a 
number of basic presuppositions made by most ethical theories are also basic to traditional 
scientific methodology. 
Most important among these is the notion that the object domain can 
be understood to exhibit a relatively fixed, unified nature. This 
presupposition motivates the adoption of three methodological 
assumptions: (1) that diverse phenomena can be ultimately understood 
or explained by a few integrated, fundamental principles or laws; (2) 
the principles or laws must be universal; and (3) the credibility of 
inquiry depends on the duplication of results by any competent 
observer. 16 
The assumption here is that the world can match, and be encompassed by, our reasoning 
aboutit 17, that it is possible, for example, adequately to represent 'justice' or 'morality'. In 
See, for example, David Jasper, The Study ofLiterature and Religion: An Introduction (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), chapter 9. 
15 John D. Canuto- A Ewinst Ethics. DD. 3 6-3 7. 
16 Dwight Furrow, op. cit., p. 3. 
17 There has been a distinctive emphasis in modernity on a particular way in which human beings should 
relate to the world. In early modem thinkers such as Descartes and Hobbes, one sees this relation 
beginning to emerge clearly. The individual subject is conceived as an isolated mind and will, whose 
vocation is to bring the world under the control of reason and thus make it available for human projects. 
The modem world, according to Descartes, stands under the imperative of giving a rational account of 
everything or, as Foucault puts it, of interrogating everything. 
7 
these terms, to say that an action is justified is to say that it conforms to what morality or 
justice really is. Ajustified action is one which represents an ideal model or essence. This 
assumes that morality and justice can be characterised independently of what moral agents 
actually do. 'The description which the theorist provides is of a largely absent state of 
affairs that agents are enjoined to make present through their actions. '18 According to 
Judith Shklar, the dominant tendency in philosophy has seen justice as the datum of 
analysis and injustice as a secondary, or derivative, phenomenon. She argues that this 
tendency should be reversed - that injustice should be seen as the central and ineliminable 
feature of the world because 'we simply cannot know enough about men or events to fulfil 
the demands ofiustice'. 19 
Literature and Ethics 
I shall argue that literature has the capacity to register this excess of experience over 
interpretation, since it starts 'from below', concerned with particular narratives of 
particular JiVeS. 20 Caputo writes, 
We seem to have been forsaken by both Being and the Good and we 
toss back and forth between incommensurable discourses and 
interminable disputes about the Good. That is why I want to start 
from below, with the multiple disasters (evils) by which we are daily 
visited, with broken bodies and damaged lives, with the sort of things 
that are more manifest to our batlike eyes. Whether or not there is 
some supreme Good up the deep ascent, one that would give us the 
logos to define Evil as its privative lack whether there is some 
transcendental high ground from which we could survey the multiple 
evils that everywhere beset us, from which we could point our 
accusatory, transcendental fingers - those are questions for which I 
have neither the time nor the patience. It is like waiting for the master 
plan of the city to come in while freezing to death in the meantime'. 21 
18 Dwight Furrow, op. cit., p. 2. 
19 Judith Shklar, 'Giving Justice its Due', Yale Law Journal, vol. 98, April 1989, p. 1135. 
20 Which is why, for example, John Caputo prefers to speak of a' poetics of obligation' rather than 
I ethics'. See Caputo, Against Ethics. 
21 John D. Caputo, op. cit.. pp. 32-33. 
Hcidegger's refusal, in his Letter on Humanism, to complete his thought with a work on ethics, 
witnesses an ethical refusal of ethics, since philosophical ethics becomes anthropocentric or subjectivist by 
definition. if we confirm something as value, it becomes an ob ect of 'human's estimation'. We rob it of j 
8 
The task of Holocaust testimony, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, is to bear witness 
to the events in such a way that particular memories are rescued from the anonymity of the 
Nazi discourse,, without trivialising these events or imposing narrative order upon them. 
In such testimony, what is not said is often as important as what is said. Elie Wiesel has 
stated that in each of his novels 'I take one character ... and give him a refuge, a 
book, a 
tale, a name, a destiny of his own ... '22 He insists that one cannot tell the story of the 
Holocaust; all one can do is registerftagments of memory, the stories of particular 
I personalities and particular events. He begins one of his articles , 
Let us tell tales. Let us 
tell tales, all the rest must wait. Let us tell tales - that is our primary obligation. 
Commentaries will have to come later, lest they replace or becloud what they mean to 
reveal'. 23 In Lyotard's terms, the Holocaust writer seeks to 'put forward the unpresentable 
in presentation itself, to register an excess of experience over interpretation. 24 A feature 
characteristic of much Holocaust writing, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, is its 
rhetorical use of midrashic intertextuality -a subtle and jarring allusion to biblical 
narratives, which serves to register horror and incomprehensibility -a sense that the 
Holocaust cannot be integrated into antecedent perspectives. 25 
Chapter 3 will discuss the importance of dissident literature in the former Soviet bloc, 
focusing on Vaclav Havel's and Ivan KliMa's experiences of Czech Communism. 
Following in the tradition of Dostoevsky and Bakhtin, they celebrate the novel as 
I polyphony', characterised by a multiplicity of voices, none of which is subjected to the 
its 'worth: valuing does not let beings be'. In other words, for Heidegger, ethics involves establishing false 
objectivity and distancing oneself from beings. 
22 Harry J. Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), p. 3. 
23 Elie Wiesel, 'Art and Culture after the Holocaust', in Eva Fleischner (ed. ), A uschwitz: Beginning of a 
New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1974), p. 403. 
24 Footnote 3. 
25 See, for example, David Roskies, Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Ctastrophe in Modern Jewish 
Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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control of an authoritative authorial voice. 26 The novel can offer a variety of time, space, 
action, character, and perspective, which problematise the absolutism of ideology. As 
Milan Kundera has written, one of the virtues of the novel is that it fosters the wisdom of 
uncertainty. Characters are not all-good or all-bad, situations can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives. Kundera writes, 
Man desires a world where good and evil can be clearly distinguished, 
for he has an innate and irrepressible desire to judge before he 
understands. Religions and ideologies are founded on this desire. They 
can cope with the novel only by translating its language of relativity 
and ambiguity into their own apodictic and dogmatic discourse. They 
require that someone be right: either Anna Karenina is the victim of a 
narrow-minded tyrant, or Karenin is the victim of an immoral woman; 
either K. is an innocent man crushed by an unjust Court, or the Court 
represents divine justice and K. is guilty. 27 
Reading works of literature may promote consciousness of a surplus of meaning, 
awareness that a text offers more than the mind can absorb and interpret. Metaphor and 
inter-textuality epitomise this surplus, joining meanings together, adding to the excess. 
This is the significance of Derrida's style. He composes rich, lush 'overfull' texts which 
overlap with other texts, an excess of allusion and multi-lingual pun. 
Robert Detweiler writes: 
The text in this view is seen as an incredibly rich cache of meaning 
from which we are able to grasp and project only small portions at a 
time. Yet because we sense that there is much more than we can 
receive and channel, we remain always dissatisfied with our 
knowledge and interpretation of the text: in a crucial way it remains 
hidden and uninterpreted. 28 
26 See Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, tr. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984) 
27 Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, tr. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 1988) 
Kundera follows Husserl in his characterisation of the crisis of European humanity. He describes the 
Scientific Revolution of the 17"' century, '-which reduced the world to a mere object of technical and 
mathematical investigation and put the concrete world of life, die Lebenswelt, as he called it, beyond their 
horizon (p. 3, The Art of the Novel). Kundera sees Cervantes, that other founder of the modem era, as 
representative of 'a great European art ... that 
is nothing other than the investigation of this forgotten 
being' (ibid., pp-4-5). Kundera contrasts what he calls 'Totalitarian Truth' with the spirit of the novel 
(ibid., p. 14). 
28 Robert Detweiler, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p-39- 
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In J. Hillis Miller's terms, becoming a good reader implies genuflecting before 
N unreadability' as the universal law of language . 
29Miller argues that the study of literature 
(much as the study of ethics) has often been an attempt to find objectivity, or gain mastery 
over the text,, seeking determinate readings through, for example, study of historical and 
social contexts, I measuring and ascertaining ... the meanIng of the text by something 
nontextual outside that text: God or some other transcendent power, society, history, 
economic conditions, the psychology of the author, the "original" of the text in "real 
life"'. 30 Yet it is impossible to get outside the limits of language by means of language. 
For Hillis Miller,. following Paul de Man, the reader therefore has the "impossible", though 
no less necessary, task of reading unreadability. 
Literature, then,, may foster a sense of mystery, the incomprehensible, the undecidable,. 
which,. though suppressed by traditional ethical theory, may be the very responsibility of 
ethics. As Derrida writes, 
A decision which didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable 
application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal; it 
would not be jUSt. 31 
29 J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics ofReading (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) 
cf. Lyotards notion of the 'Postmodern Sublime' -a recognition of the painftd inadequacy of our faculty 
for presentation and pleasure in our capacity to imagine ideas beyond their direct presentation. He argues 
that in the sublime we find a form of anamnesis of the relation of all thought to the unknown. 
See Lyotard, 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde', in Thomas Docherty (ed. ), Postmodernism: A Reader 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 244-257. According to Kant's Critique of 
Judgement, we experience the sublime when the imagination cannot find forms of representation adequate 
to its conceptions, or when we find ourselves confronting an idea for which we can find no adequate 
example. These circumstances produce the ambiguity of a pleasure that derives from the painful 
experience of reason when faced with its own limit; they generate a shudder of pain which is a source of 
elevation See also Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject of1fodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 289-90 
30 j. Hillis Miller, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
31 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), p. 24. 
11 
In chapters 2,3 and 41 shall explore the ethical consequences of three twentieth-century 
political ideologies - the Nazi 'Final Solution', Communist Czechoslovakia and Apartheid 
South Africa -,. all of which were attempts to unify human society according to hierarchical 
arrangements of moral principles, assuming an objective perspective from which 'justice' 
and 'injustice' n-ýight be presented. I shall argue that these ideologies, which were 
premised on a meta-language, bring into focus the need for a post-structuralist 
understanding of writing as a practice which is endless and irreducible to some single 
perspective. 
The 'Final Solution',, Communism and Apartheid may all be regarded as utopias which, 
like all utopias, become dystopic in the attempt at their realisation. Utopia was originally 
a fundamentally satirical notion (utopos' meaning 'no place), highlighting the 
impossibility of a 'perfect' social order. This is true of Plato's Myth of Atlanta in Timaeus 
and of Thomas More's classic 1516 Utopia. While Marx and Engels emphasised 
utopianism's positive function of relativising existing social reality, they nevertheless 
criticised its lack of a thorough comprehension and analysis of current society that alone 
would make concrete political action possible. It is the fact that it has been believed 
possible to realise utopia which has made qýstopia inevitable. In his discussion of 
Rousseau in Of Grammatolqýy, Derrida exposes the utopian assumptions of Rousseau's 
I social contract',, where writing is viewed as a 'dangerous supplement', an addition to the 
natural' resources of speech. 32 According to Rousseau, the living community of face-to- 
face contact had given way to a vast, impersonal network of social relations, a degenerate 
state of which writing is the product. As is well known, Derrida shows that Rousseau's 
small-scale organic community, where writing would not have worked its effects, is 'no 
place', since there is no hors-texte, no 'non-textual' or uninterpreted ground or 
32 Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1974). pp. 141-164. 
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perspective. In his recent Specters ofMarx (1994), Derrida contrasts the utoplan with the 
messianic. The apostles of Marx, he argues, eliminated from Marxism a sense of the 
messianic, or a recognition that justice is always 'to come, they confused law with 
Justice. 33 In an interview with Richard Kearney, Derrida says that 'It is possible to see 
deconstruction as being produced in a space where the prophets are not far away ... I am 
still looking for something... [in a] search without hope for hope ... Perhaps my search 
is a 
twentieth-century brand of prophecy? But it is difficult for me to believeit". 34 
Zygmunt Bauman has argued that genocide is rooted in a particular construction of human 
virtue, a utopian vision desiring the elimination of chaos and disorder. 31 He sees the 
Holocaust as a rare test of the hidden possibilities of modern society. Racism comes into 
its own only in the context of a design of the perfect society and intention to implement 
the design through planned and consistent effort. 36 'In the case of the Holocaust, the 
design was the thousand-year Reich - the kingdom of the liberated German Spirit. It was 
that kingdom which had no room for anything but the German Spirit. It had no room for 
the Jews., as the Jews could not be spiritually converted and embrace the Geist of the 
33 See Derrida, Specters ofMarx and'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', op. cit. 
34 Richard Kearney (ed. ), Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984), p. 119. See also John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofJacques Derrida: Religion 
without Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997). Caputo writes, 
'deconstruction works the provocation of what is to come, a venir, against the complacency of the present, 
against the pleasure the present takes in itself, in order to prevent it from closing in on itself, from 
collapsing into self-identity' (p. xx). There is an important connection between justice and the notion of 
prophecy, which can be seen as a resistance to narrative closure and an affirmation of transcendence. 
There can thus be no prophets in utopia. 
35 See Modernity and the Holocaust, op. cit. 
36 In this view, the Holocaust was premised on a scientific reductionism. Bauman writes, 'Science was 
not to be conducted for its own sake; it was seen, first and foremost, as an instrument of awesome power 
allowing its holder to improve on reality, to re-shape it according to human plans and designs, and to 
assist it in its drive to self-perfection. Gardening and medicine supplied the archetypes of constructive 
stance, while normality, health or sanitation offered the archmetaphors for human tasks and strategies in 
the management of affairs. Human existence and cohabitation became objects of planning and 
administration; like garden vegetation or a living organism they could not be left to their own devices, lest 
should they be infested by weeds or overwhelmed by cancerous tissues' (p. 70, Modernity and the 
Holocaust). 
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German Volk'. 371n this conception of social engineering as a scientifically founded work 
aimed at the institution of a new and better order (a work which necessarily entails the 
containment and preferably elimination of any disruptive factors) racism was indeed 
resonant with the world-view and practice of modernity. 
This is why for Emmanuel Levinas Auschwitz represents the failure of Western morality. 
He writes- 
The essential problem is: Can we speak of an absolute commanciment after Auschwitz. 
Can we speak of morality after the failure of morality? 38 
Levinas: The Trace of the Other 
My thesis is premised upon a definition of ethics found in the writings of Emmanuel 
Levinas and developed, for example, by Jacques Derrida. 39 
For Levinas,, ethics is not concerned with our capacity for understanding or representation. 
As Richard Cohen puts it,, 
,... ethics never was or is anything. Ethics does not have an essence, its 
flessencelf, so to speaV, is precisely not to have an essence, to unsettle 
essences. Its "identity" is precisely not to have an identity, to undo 
identities ... Ethics 
is precisely ethics by disturbing the complacency of 
being (or of non-being, being's correlate). "To be or not to be, " 
Levinas insists, is not the question. 40 
It is in recognising the extent to which morality lies beyond our capacity for 
comprehension and understanding, in the claim imposed upon each moral agent by the 
incomprehensibility of suffering, that we sustain our capacity for moral judgement. To the 
37 Ibid., p. 66. 
38 Emmanuel Levinas, in The Provocation ofLevinas: Rethinking the Other, eds. Robert Bernasconi and 
David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 156. 
39 See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne, 1969) and Ethics and b1finity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1985); Jacques Derrida's engagement with Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics' in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 79-153; Derrida, 'Force of Law: The 
"Mystical Foundation of Authority"', op. cit; Jean-Francois Lyotard. Heidegger and the Jews, op. cit. 
40 Richard A. Cohen. in his introduction to Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infini ty, op. cit., p. 10. 
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extent that human beings see themselves as autonomous subjects, able to bring reality 
under rational control,. they are diminished in their capacity to respond ethically. 
Levinas'writing involves a recognition of the'hermeneutic circle'. Our conceptual 
framework means that we can only be affected by the world in ways that we have already 
anticipated and understood. Reality is, in a sense, possessed by the subject prior to its 
encounter with it. According to Levinas, Western ethical thinking since the Enlightenment 
has attempted to reduce moral experience to understanding by supplying a unified moral 
perspective. In Levinas'terms, understanding is a form of self-assertion, which 
misconstrues our capacity for moral judgement. Against this 'egology', as he calls it, he 
argues that we find ourselves always confronted by something that escapes the grasp of 
our concepts and undermines the autonomy of our actions - the 'other', that is one's moral 
relationship with another person. 
Levinas' perspective involves a reappraisal of our understanding of time and memory. 41 
Traditionally, our experience of time has been understood as a synthesis of protentions and 
retentions,. anticipations of a future linked to memories of the past, all of which are given 
coherence by a subject which experiences these moments in the present. The past is 
reduced to knowledge, a memory of what once happened represented in the current 
understanding of a subject. Yet for Levinas this understanding of time cannot account for 
the fact that when we encounter another person, we do not meet as contemporaries. 
... time 
is not a simple experience of duration, but a dynamism which 
leads us elsewhere than toward the things we possess. 42 
The time of the other is not the same as our own temporality. The alterity of the Other 
opens us up to an infinite future beyond our projections and reveals an infinite past beyond 
41 See LcNrinas, Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987). 
42 Lcvinas. Ethics and Infinity, p. 6 1. 
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memory. The past of the Other, as well as the past of the subject, is something that in 
principle can never be recovered by consciousness, despite our best recollections. This 
dimension of the past that cannot be recovered by consciousness is referred to as the 
immemorial. Thus, we in effect live within two temporal frames - that of retention and 
protention, giving the illusion of synchrony and simultaneity, and the duration of 
diachronic time which leaves its traces but can never be fully represented. Beyond our 
powers of interpretation lies the alterity of an unrepresentable past and an unpredictable 
future recognisable only by its trace, which Levinas will argue is ultimately the trace of the 
other. 43 So time for Levinas is not merely part of consciousness. Time is a dimension that 
transcends experience and comprehension. It is only the encounter with the Other that 
brings into proximity the infinity of past and future. It is our encounter with others that 
gives rise to the meaning of time as not our own - as the infinite future and the 
immemorial past. 
The ideologies I shall be discussing in the following chapters present time as a single 
narrative - the progress of the German Reich, the Communist class struggle, or the 
I official' Afrikaner history of South Afiica. Such historical narratives are a way of 
banishing difference and preconceiving the future. Ethically it becomes necessary to 
combat these narratives, in a writing which bears witness to the immemorial, a future of 
infinite renewal and a past of infinite obfigation. 
For Levinas altenty presents itself in the face of another human being. When we define 
others in terms of the roles they perform within societies (which in ideologies are carefully 
defined and prescribed), or describe them in physical or aesthetic terms, these are all ways 
of looking at another person as an instance of our understanding, as modifications of 
43 'Trace' here means that something is deposited in experience but not clearly denotated. 
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ourselves, as actors within our particular social world. Levinas argues that the face of the 
Other also expresses something completely alien, other than me and other than all others. 
It expresses itself as radical singularity and absolute alterity. As an expression of absolute 
alterity and radical singularity, the Other cannot be grasped by familiar categories and is 
beyond my capacity for assimilation or comprehension. 
The face is signification, and signification without context. I mean 
that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a 
context. Ordinarily one is a "character": a professor at the Sorbonne, a 
Supreme Court justice, son of son-and-so, everything that is in one's 
passport, the manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all 
signification in the usual sense of the term is relative to such a context: 
the meaning of something is in its relation to another thing. Here, to 
the contrary, the face is meaning all by itself. You are you. In this 
sense one can say that the face is not "seen". It is what cannot become 
a content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable, it 
leads you beyond. 44 
The face of the Other confronts me as the face of a stranger who disrupts my ordinary 
ways of experiencing the world. When confronted with the vulnerability of the Other, the 
self-interested,, dominating ego is placed in question, dispossessed, and the Other appears 
not as an instance of my capacity for understanding but as a genuine Other, 
incomprehensible to the structures of rational thought. 
For Levinas,, the meaning of the ethical relation is that it exists in the capacity to resist any 
completion, to oppose what is with a future of infinite renewal and a past of infinite 
obligation. In these terms, ethical theories which seek to define the nature of obligation 
according to firm rules and solid foundations are fundamentally misconceived. Our 
obligations are inexhaustible, and only this recognition preserves our capacity to resist 
complicity with the dominion of evil. To resist naked self-interest is the practical 
expression of the resistance to the discovery of the Same in the Other. The burden of 
ethics, - then 
is to express in our conduct this capacity for resistance '> and transcendence, 
44 Levinas, Ethics andInfinity, pp. 86-87. 
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which ultimately involves acting on the value of love without reward. Such resistance and 
transcendence, akin to religious faith, involves acting independently of self-interest, giving 
without expectation of return. The Other is never the object of knowledge but is a 
perpetual questioning, and as such there can be no limit to the scope of responsibility. 
Levinas' ethics represents an affirmation, an act of faith in the fundamental value and 
mystery of each human being. He affirms a value which transcends all experience, which 
is other than Being. Mystically, he indicates an absent presence, which is neither a 
phenomenon nor a product of cognition and must, by definition, resist logical 
demonstration. He posits the ethical imperative prior to the emergence of a constituted 
world - an irrecoverable past. Any attempt systematically to represent, or ground, ethics 
as the origin of subjectivity will therefore necessarily be self-refuting. 
Derrida: Ethics and Writing 
It is clear that Levinas'work has exerted a powerful and continuous influence on 
Derrida. 45. What Derrida finds in Levinas is an attempt to think the limits of the Western 
philosophical tradition. Against those who would dismiss Derridean'deconstruction' as a 
form of relativistic and nihilistic free-play, Derrida's writings, like those of Levinas, 
represent an affirmation, an act of faith in the fundamental value and mystery of each 
human being, and a recognition of the violence which is the inevitable consequence of 
seeing the particular in the general. 46 
45 For a study of this relationship, see Simon CritchIcy, The Ethics ofDeconstruction: Derrida and 
Levinas, op. cit. 
46 It is significant that so many of Derrida's works are 'occasional' pieces, and the marks of the occasion 
arc often retained. This is true of the works I shall be discussing -a symposium on Dcconstruction and 
the Possibility of Justice, a tribute to Nelson Mandela, a colloquium on European Cultural Identity. An 
occasion is always both an irreducibly singular event and that which necessitates comparison, 
contextualisation and analysis. 
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Derrida's claim that there is no hors-texte (no outside to the text) has frequently been 
misrepresented as a claim that there is nothing beyond language. 47 Deconstruction is often 
seen as essentially negative, playfully undermining interpretations without being prepared 
to make any positive affirmations or political commitments. As Terry Eagleton puts it in 
his introduction to literary theory, 
One advantage of the dogma that we are the prisoners of our own 
discourse, unable to advance reasonably certain truth-claims because 
such claims are merely relative to our language, is that it allows you to 
drive a coach and horses through everybody else's beliefs without 
saddling you with the inconvenience of having to adopt any yourself. 48 
The fact that most philosophers and theologians have failed to take Derrida seriously is 
partly because literary critics, for example, the influential 'Yale School', have 
professionally annexed him as an anti-theologian and anti-philosopher. 49 However, when 
Derrida argues that there is no hors-texte, or outside to the text, the word 'text' is being 
used in the semiological sense of extended discourses, that is, all practices of 
interpretation which include, but are not limited to, language. In other words, Derrida is 
arguing that there is no uninterpreted perspective which will guarantee the legitimacy of a 
given philosophy or interpretation. 50 Thus, in the first chapter of Of Grammatology 
47 For example, in a recent issue of the Heythrop Journal Hugo Meynell writes: 'To sum the matter up, 
deconstruction is intrinsically and comprehensively subversive, fundamentally opposed to reason or God, 
destructive of objectivity outside the self, and undermining of the capacity of language to refer to anything' 
('Archdeconstruction and Postpostmodernism', in The HevthLQp Journal April 1995, Vol. 36, No. 2,128). 
48 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: an introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 144. 
49 Critics of Postmodernism often fail to take account of the diversity within 'Postmodernism'. For 
example, in Saints and Postmodernism, op. cit., Edith Wyschogrod distinguishes between two kinds of 
post-structuralist theory - the heteromorphic kind represented by Deleuze, Guattari and Baudrillard, on 
the one hand, and that of Derrida and Lyotard, who have been influenced by the heteronomism of 
Levinas, on the other hand. 
Deleuze, for example, defends a philosophy of Nietzschian pure affirmation, the affirmation of affirmation 
itself rather than of something else. This unencumbered willing and affirming means the free creation 
and invention of new values. The essence of willing and of the free spirit is to stay clear of heavy burdens 
For Deleuze, totalisation is destroyed from within, by an uncontrollable dispersion which the system is 
helpless to contain, whereas for Levinas totalisation is destroyed from without, by an unencompassable 
other which throws the same into confusion. 
50 See 'Declarations of Independence', where Derrida discusses the act of violence involved in the 
founding of any State or Constitution (Derrida, 'Otobiographies', in The Ear of the Other (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1985, pp. 1-38). 
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(1967), he argues for the end of 'the book', with its implication of narrative closure, and 
the beginning of writing. In Derrida, traditional commentary or hermeneutics - the search 
for a determinate meaning (or hors-texte) - is replaced by a characteristically Jewish 
emphasis on writing as an activity which is endless and irreducible to some supreme, self- 
evident truth. The point is that the emphasis on writing represents an affirmation of the 
excess of experience over interpretation, a recognition of the need to do justice to 
individuals while recognising that one is constrained by the structures of linguistic systems, 
which are about concepts and repetition. " Nevertheless human beings have a 
responsibility to witness to 'otherness' in and through language. John D. Caputo 
expresses this Derridean problematic as follows: 
On the one hand, we cannot speak about the individual, because the 
individual is ineffable and falls beneath the repeatable, universal terms 
in which language trades. On the other hand, we must talk about 
individuals - about people with proper names, e. g. - because the 
individual is the only thing that exists, and from time to time we desire 
that our discourse have something to do with what eXiStS'. 52 
Derrida's perspective therefore provides us with a re-characterised sense of universal 
moral agency (ironically, in view of the frequent charges of relativism). 53 
The responsibility towards the other involves the struggle to create openings within which 
the other can appear beyond any of our programmes or predictions, can come to destroy 
I what we know or think we know. Derrida has commented ,I never cease to 
be surprised 
by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we 
51 Derrida often speaks in theological terms of writing as a condition of the Fall. 
52 John D. Caputo, op. cit., p. 73. 
53 Such a perspective will have an impact on an understanding of the language of identity and gender. 
For example, Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of1dentity (London: 
Routledge, 1990), argues for the importance of disrupting gender categories in unexpected and 
imaginative ways, so that they do not become solidified into permanent truths. In her view the project of 
feminism is to embody the fact that human life exceeds the bounds rational man has sought to impose, and 
to remind us of the sheer complexity and indefinability of human identity. 
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are imprisoned in language; it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite. The critique of 
54 logocentrism is above all else the search for the 'other' and the 'other of language". 
'Deconstruction' is an ongoing recognition of provisionality and excess, a concern to 
maintain the memory of that which is forgotten in the act of representation. The 
denseness and elliptical style of Derrida's writing, its allusiveness and use of pun are a 
celebration of excess and super-abundance, an act of faith in the redemptive power of 
language. Derrida's writing is thus, in Lyotard's words, testimony to the unpresentable in 
presentation itself It is clear that Derridean deconstruction is far from value-neutral. He 
has written recently that 'nothing seems ... 
less outdated than the classical emancipatory 
ideal'. 55 and while deconstruction represents an awareness that the language in which 
'justice' and 'democracy' are formulated may fail to prevent injustices and oppression, 
Enlightenment values remain significant, as can be seen in Derrida's recent writings on 
justice and law, South Affica, MarxiSM. 56 
In his recent work, Derrida has been particularly concerned to explore the ethical 
implications of deconstruction. Richard Kearney points out that, whereas before about 
1972 Derrida's writings were more concerned with epistemology (though ethical 
implications were implied), since 1972 his intent has been more self consciously 'ethical'. 57 
Derrida is suspicious of the word 'ethics' because it implies a system of norms, rules, laws 
or values, which can be codified in a rigorous way and he is concerned with the violence 
involved in trying to construct a fully realised ethical form of life. Yet for Derrida there is 
54 Derrida, 'Deconstruction and the Other, in Richard Kearney (ed. ), Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 
p. 123 
55 Dcrrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., p. 28. 
56 See footnote 12. 
57 See Richard Kearney. 'Derrida's Ethical Re-tum', in Gary B. Madison (ed. ), Working Through Derrida 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 28-50. 
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a kind of ethical need to be self-conscious about language and recognise its 
conventionality and insecurity. As we have seen in the various fn orms of totafitaria ism this 
century, a language which is too secure can be extremely evil. According to Derrida,. the 
Western politico-philosophical tradition of idealism has sought to construct a secure 
language and exclude, dominate or repress that which is different or other. Totalitarianism 
of the left and the right are political expressions of this governing ideology. 58 Language 
can mask, suppress, 'smooth over'. Since we perceive the world 'through' language, to 
allow language too great a security is to become morally blind. 
All Derrida's work is an attempt to break away from the fatalism of philosophy built on 
static foundations, towards affirmation of possibility. As, again, he insists in his now 
famous interview with Richard Kearney, I Deconstruction is not an enclosure in 
59 nothingness but an openness towards the other'. 
Ethics and Narrative 
Where Derrida's understanding of ethical responsibility differs from Alasdair MacIntyre's 
I narrative ethics' or Richard Rorty's pragmatism, is that he provides us with a re- 
characterised sense of universal moral agency. Approaches like those of Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum offer diagnoses of the 
N postmodem condition', each of them reacting against the Enlightenment quest for a 
unified ethical system However, their narrative approaches are unable to avoid the 
problems of relativiSM. 60 The concern of these scholars is to abandon the quest for a 
unIfied ethical system, to recognise the difficulties in finding a consistent account of 
58 There is a close relationship between post-structuralism and the collapsing parameters of twentieth- 
century totalitarianism. Derrida sees structuralism - concerned with the codes and conventions of societal 
structures - as a form of philosophical totalitarianism, as an attempt to account for the totality of a 
phenomenon by reduction of it to a formula which governs it totally. 
59 Derrida, 'Deconstruction and the Other', op. cit., p. 124. 
60 Dwight Furrow, in his comparison of continental and anaIN-tic challenges in moral philosophy, makes a 
similar observation. See Dwight Furrow, op. cit. 
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morality which coheres with lived experience, while at the same time seeking criteria for 
judgement. The problem is posed in Bernard Williams'Ethics and the Limits Of 
Philosophy (19 8 5). 61 For Williams, the absence of a neutral standard of comparison 
against which competing moral beliefs can be measured means that we can never get 
outside the set of moral dispositions we have acquired through living in a particular 
culture and gain a genuinely independent perspective. Moreover, the attempt to find such 
neutral ground on moral questions might ultimately be destructive, in that it threatens to 
become an alien,. dominating ideology destroying our capacity to exercise moral 
dispositions. Williams is committed to the belief that there are no moral facts independent 
of the beliefs of particular moral agents. However, if there is no external point of view 
from which to proceed, the only criteria available for the assessment of moral views will 
be drawn from the very beliefs and principles that are in question. There is no non-circular 
defense,. no ultimate recourse to justifying one's moral beliefs. Williams, MacIntyre, 
Nussbaum and Rorty seek to address this problem through discussion of narrative. They 
believe that moral life takes the form of narrative and they emphasise the role of historical 
understanding or imaginative identification in recognising and acting upon moral 
obligations. 
As we have seen,, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the history of philosophy since the 
Enlightenment is largely a history of interminable, unresolved disagreement. He describes 
the way in which contemporary moral debate is characterised by interminable 
disagreement based upon numerous conflicting, or incommensurable, procedures of 
justification. Every one of the arguments is logically valid and the conclusions follow from 
the pretnises, but the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing 
the claims of one against another. Incommensurability here refers to a disruption in 
61 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy (London: Fontana Press, 1985). 
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COMmunication across theories, vocabularies or perspectives which renders rational 
assessment difficult or impossible, and the absence of a set of criteria independent of the 
competing viewpoints being assessed . 
62 According to MacIntyre, it is the interminable 
nature of such debate which has led to the present climate of ethical/political cynicism. He 
argues that contemporary culture is characterised by a kind of emotivism in ethics, where 
argument relapses quickly into unargued disagreement. If there can be no rational way of 
judging between different philosophies, moral reasoning ends up being maintained by 
power, a kind of Nietzschian nihilism of conflicting and self-destructive power struggles. 
Furthermore, Maclntyre is concerned that theory tends to disconnect reasons from 
motivational states. He is critical of the belief that ethics can be pursued outside the good 
life. For example, whereas deontology and consequentialism are concerned with the 
legitimation of individual acts, MacIntyre argues for a re-reading of Aristotle's ethics of 
virtue. 63 
That particular actions derive their character as parts of larger wholes 
is a point of view alien to our dominant ways of thinking and yet one 
which it is necessary at least to consider if we are to begin to 
understand how a life may be more than a sequence of individual 
actions and episodes. 64 
According to MacIntyre the Aristotelian virtues appreciate the habitual character of 
human action,, that character, personal and social identity, depend upon inhabiting an 
historical narrative (and the commitments made over time) and a set of values. He 
believes that the emergence since the Reformation and the Enlightenment of the liberal 
individual, conceived of as abstracted from the particularities of character, history and 
circumstance, is fundamentally misguided. Obligation for MacIntyre is defined, at least in 
62 The term 'incommensurability' gained currency in connection with the work of Kuhn and Feyerabend 
in the philosophy of science. 
63 One of the difficulties with such re-habilitations of 'Virtue Ethics' is that contemporary thinkers do not 
have available to them a credible version of the natural teleology which provides the basis for Aristotle's 
account of the virtues. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Firtue: a study in moral theory (London: Duckworth, 
198 1), p. 196. 
64 Maclntyre, After Virtue, p. 204. 
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part, in terms of the demands of social roles that make reference to the past. IFEs principal 
complaint against modern individualism is the ease with which we put into question our 
attachments to the past. Desirable character traits will be those which allow us to 
recognise our place within the various social spheres and relationships which make up a 
particular form of life. He asserts that if we are to 'make sense' out of our lives - if we 
are to have moral integrity -, we must acknowledge that our aims and purposes are 
inherited from the social roles we occupy as a consequence of our history. That our 
individual narratives are embedded in the narratives of others,, in part accounts for the 
unity of moral character. Thus, in MacIntyre's view, to be embedded in history is to 
discover the range of possibilities which inherited social roles make available, as well as 
the actions and qualities of character appropriate in the context of these social roles. Part 
of the point of this emphasis on narrative identity is to argue that social roles inevitably 
impose constraints on our choices, and to fail to take these seriously is to invite a loss of 
personal identity, a sense of meaninglessness and alienation from one's community. 
Maclntyre writes: 
We cannot ... characterise 
behaviour independently of intentions, and 
we cannot characterise intentions independently of the settings which 
make those intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to 
others. 65 
Thus,, in MacIntyre's perspective, to understand the binding character of morality, I need 
not discover or design anything; I am already in what I seek, I already have an ethical 
home. I cannot be bound by the abstraction 'humankind' or 'reason', but I am bound by 
the practices, codes and images which organise the historical life in which I am 
anchored. 66 
65 Ibid., p. 206. 
66 This emphasis on the importance of communal identity can be found, for example, in German 
hermeneutics (Gadamer's students), in American neo-pragmatism (Richard Rorty), in narrative theology 
(Stanley Hauerwas), in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, in communitarianism (Sandel, 
Walzer), in Bernard Williams' moral psychology, in Oakeshott's political philosophy, and the many 
authors, including Maclntyre and Nussbaum, who call upon Aristotle's concept of phronesis in their 
criticism of ethical rationalism. 
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My concern about MacIntyre's emphasis on narrative identity, the search for a coherent 
historical narrative regarding one's life and culture, is that it may lead to a form of moral 
blindness. In Levinas' terms, MacIntyre's understanding of history relies upon an 
essentially linear view of history. MacIntyre makes this explicit on page 219 of After 
Virtue: 
The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest ... the only 
criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the criteria 
of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest. 67 
Surely, though, such a view of narrative is ideological. How are we to understand 
obligations to 'the other', or those who owe allegiance to a different community or 
narrativ6l. Moreover, the difficulty with any moral perspective taking history and tradition 
as the source of moral commitment is that it is open to the charge of relativism and 
narrowness of vision. Such approaches seem too parochial to capture the positive 
intuitions of our Enlightenment heritage, with its ideals of equality and justice for all. It is 
not clear how such narrative approaches avoid circularity and find resources for self- 
criticism and correction. If the only criteria available for judging which ends are 
appropriate are the very social roles at issue, it is not clear that MacIntyre allows room for 
the critical judgement required to open traditional social roles to new possibilities. Dwight 
Furrow puts the point like this- 
The notion of immemorial time and the secret history concealed 
therein makes availing oneself of a preunderstanding of who one is in 
relation to a given social world implausible. The self, whether we 
understand it individually or collectively, is a topography of lost and 
missing pieces cobbled together by a systematically distorted narrative 
of the remains. The quest for social identity is just one more vain 
search for the solace of origins, perpetually contested and itself the 
source of injustice. 68 
67 Similarly, on page 205 he writes of '... a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative 
which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end'. 
68 Dwight Furrow. op. cit.. p. 192. 
Richard Kearney reminds us that 'Narrative memory is never innocent. It is an ongoing conflict of 
interpretations. A battlefield of competing meanings. Every history is told from a certain perspective and 
in the light of specific prejudice (at least in Gadamcr's sense). Memory ... can as easily 
lead to false 
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MacIntyre's critique of the Enlightenment tradition has been received very positively by 
many Christian ethicists'. among them Stanley Hauerwas who develops a Christian 
N narrative ethics'. 69 
Robin Gill begins an article on 'Moral Communities and Christian Ethics',. 
For the moment the battle seems to have been largely won. Most 
exponents of Christian ethics today seem to agree that morality has a 
firm communitarian basis. The understanding of Christian ethics 
which was often held a generation ago - that it is a discipline 
concerned primarly with individual moral decision-making - seems to 
have been routed. The outrageous individualistic paradigms offered by 
I situation ethicists' are now a dim memory. Most agree that it is virtue 
and character within Christian communities that should be the main 
concern of Christian ethics. There is even a new confidence within 
Christian ethics. After decades of being patronized by moral 
philosophy, Christian ethicists have become distinctly more apologetic 
and polemical. Christian ethicists also express increasing scepticism 
about the ability of moral philosophers to be able to resolve dilemmas 
with universally convincing rational arguments. In short, the key 
contentions of After Virtue have triumphed. 70 
However, Hauerwas' approach suffers from a similarly impoverished view of narrative. 
He tends to produce a theological understanding of churches as moral communities which 
underestimates the plurality of Christian resources, over-estimates the unity and 
cohesiveness of Christian communities, and takes insufficiently seriously the extent to 
which churches are influenced by the secular communities around them. The emphasis on 
community and cohesion through scripture tends to forget, as feminist and liberation 
consciousness and ideological closure as to openness and tolerance. This distorting power is sometimes 
ignored by contemporary advocates of narrative ethics - MacIntyre, Nussbaum, Booth - who tend to 
downplay the need for a hermencutic of critical suspicion... ' (Richard Kearney, 'Narrative and the Ethics 
of Remembrance', in Questioning Ethics, op. cit., p. 27). 
69 See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Ungdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) and A Community of Character. - Toward a Constructive 
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
70 Robin Gill, 'Moral Communities and Christian Ethics', in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 10, No. I 
1997,1. Robin Gill goes on to argue that this picture often under-estimates some of the theological and 
sociological problems involved. 'It tends to produce a theological understanding of churches as moral 
communities which underestimates the synchronic and diachronic plurality of Christian resources' (2). 
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theologians remind us, that the stories of scripture may be told in different ways. 71 As 
Sharon Welch points out, the most powerful, and potentially violent, forms of community 
are those shaped by a single, coherent narrative- the Christian Right and those advocating 
a single global culture of technological innovation and consumerism. She agrees with 
Hauerwas that without a meaningful narrative people are adrift, but adds that 'Without 
listening to and learning from many narratives, people are captive to violence and 
72 coercion'. 
Edith Wyschogrod has written, 
Although the move to the use of life story is an important step, the 
idea of narrative as the encompassing framework for moral philosophy 
is captive of the same naivet'ý as moral theory, if it is conceived, as 
Lyotard points out, as master narrative. Like the metaphysical 
presuppositions of theoretical thought, the philosophical biases in 
which narrative has heretofore been grounded must be brought into 
critical perspective. Postmodern literary theory highlights the traits of 
narrative such as the multiplicity of its voices and its openendedncss 
by exposing narrative's grammatical, semiotic, and lexical tactics. 73 
The novels I shall be discussing in the following chapters precisely register these traits of 
narrative - its open-endedness and multiplicity of voices - exposing the myth of objectivity 
and the tyranny of official versions of events. The question of which individual or group 
authorises or supports a particular discourse is of considerable importance. 
As Edith Wyschogrod states, '... philosophers like MacIntyre or Bernard Williams, despite 
a richness of argumentation, remain phenomenologist s of the failure of moral theory rather 
71 For a critique of Hauerwas' narrative ethics, see, for example, Maurice Wiles, 'Scriptural Authority and 
Theological Construction: the limitations of narrative interpretation', in Garrett Green (ed. ), Scriptural 
Authority and Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); 
Janet Martin Soskice, 'Community and Morality "After Modernity": A Response to Robin Gill', in Studies 
in Christian Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 1,1997,14-19; Sharon Welch, 'Communitarian Ethics after Hauerwas', 
in Studies in Christian Ethics, ibid., 82-93. 
72 Sharon Welch, 'Communitarian Ethics after Hauerwas', op. cit., 83. 
73 Edith Wyschogrod, op. cit., p. xvii. 
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than thinkers who forge a new ethic in response to the radical transformation of historical 
74 circumstance'. 
Janet Martin Soskice agrees: 'it is often said that the communitarians are better at 
diagnosing the ills of liberalism than themselves providing alternatives'. 75 
Richard Rorty: Ethical Pragmatism 
Richard Rorty shares with MacIntyre the pragmatic concern that moral 'knowledge', of 
the kind envisaged by Plato and the theorists of the Enlightenment, does not result in 
moral actions. 76 As MacIntyre recognises, if there is no common frame of reference in 
terms of which moral disputes can be settled, argument can continue without altering 
moral dispositions. Like MacIntyre, Rorty argues for a return to an Aristotelian tradition 
%which sees moral education as an education of the sentiments. Rorty writes, 'We 
pragmatists argue from the fact that the emergence of the human rights culture seems to 
owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everything to hearing sad and sentimental 
stories, to the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort Plato envisaged'. 
The particular kind of aesthetic sensibility Rorty wants to endorse is that of the novelist, 
with her 'taste for narrative, detail,, diversity, and accidents'. 77 
Pragmatists believe that there is no truth apart from what suits our present practical needs. 
According to William James, truth must be defined as that which is 'good in the way of 
belief 
. that 
is, good insofar as it promotes the interests of a given community or culture. 
74 fbid., p. xxv. 
75 Janet Martin Soskice, op. cit., p. 18. 
76 See, for example, Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989); and 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality', in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley 
(eds. ), On 11timan Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: BasicBooks, 1993). 
77 Rorty, 'Philosophers, Novelists and Intercultural Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens', 
Paper Presented to the Sixth East-West Philosopher's Conference, Honolulu, July 31 - August 11,1989, 
P. 19. 
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While I endorse Rorty's view of the importance of literature for moral reflection, there is, - 
as Christopher Norris argues, a danger that Rorty's position produces 'a consensus-view 
of truth which simply reaffirms the current self-image of "North Atlantic bourgeois liberal" 
culture'. 78 Ultimately, like MacIntyre, Rorty's account cannot avoid the problems of 
relativism. A consensus-view of truth tends to endorse the political status quo and 
preempt any form of rational critique. For example, Rorty writes in Nietzschean terms, 
I the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather than being adequately or 
inadequately expressed in a vocabulary'. 79By contrast, Derrida's 'deconstruction' affirms 
such universal values as 'justice' and 'democracy, even as he interrogates particular 
cultural embodiments of these ideals. 80 John Caputo argues that Rorty, despite his 
account of the 'contingency of the self, 81 operates within the most classical assumption of 
individual, subjective autonomy,, which misconceives Derrida's understanding of 'writing,. 
Caputo writes. 
The very idea of thinking of language in terms of a language game or 
of a play of signifiers is to get over the idea of a game invented. and 
played by the players, which is the familiar, common-sensical, 
classical, subjectivist, and 'metaphysical' model of language, one 
which in other respects Rorty seems intent on abandoning. The idea is 
rather to think of language as a game which plays the players, which 
precedes and overtakes, which precedes and antedates, the interiority 
of a private subjectivity. 92 
Such an understanding of writing prevents 'self-creation' in any strong sense, since the 
self is the effect of linguistic play, but Derrida's po st- structuralism creates a new context 
for ethical reflection in which writing, and a concern with the ethical effects of language, 
becomes the responsibility of ethics. 
78 Christopher Norris, Derrida (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 157. 
79 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 7. 
80 Rorty adopts a Nietzschean vocabulary which emphasises autonomy and 'self-creation' which contrasts 
with Derrida's distinctively Jewish and messianic language. 
81 Rorty, Contingency, lrotýv and Solidarity, pp. 23f. 
82 John D. Caputo, 'On Not Circumventing the Quasi-Transcendental- The Case of Rorty and Derrida', in 
Working Through Derrida, op. cit., p. 162. 
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Martha Nussbaum: The Fragility of Goodness 
Such an understanding of writing provides a context in which to discuss Martha 
Nussbaum's notion of theftagility of goodness. It seems that Derrida's notion of the 
I undecidable' bears comparison with Nussbaum's discussion of tragic choice. 
Nussbaum distinguishes between 'luck', as our subjection to life's contingencies, and 
ethics' as the domain of the 'controllin power of human reason'; luck is the riskiness of 9 
life, ethics tries to make life 'safe'. 83Whereas traditional moral theory has sought to guard 
against vulnerability, inconsistency and pain, irresolvable conflicts and suffering occur 
precisely through attempts to live the good life, and Nussbaum argues that part of the 
beauty of human goodness is its vulnerability. She argues for the importance of the 
tradition of tragedy for moral reflection, because such literature highlights two prominent 
features of moral experience - our subjection to contingency and the incommensurability 
of conflicting moral demands. The good person may conscientiously fulfil his or her 
responsibilities but things still turn out badly. Life regularly places conflicting moral 
demands upon us, and in acting to do the right thing we may be forced to do harm. 
Tragic literature is important because it dramatises moral conflict. In such conflict, an 
agent is confronted with two alternative courses of action, each of which he or she is 
morally obliged to pursue. The conflict arises because the agent confronts circumstances 
that prevent the satisfaction of both claims. In situations of tragic conflict, an agent 
cannot avoid doing harm, and because goods are incommensurable there is no way of 
assessing which harm is greater. 
83 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 3. 
cf. Hannah Arendt's notion of the 'frailty of action' which 'political philosophy' tries to counteract. See 
The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 188ff. 
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According to Nussbaum, what is important in situations of tragic conflict is that the agent 
emerge with his or her character and moral integrity intact. For Nussbaum, this means 
that the agent should not try to solve the dilemma by revising his or her commitments to 
the people and ideals in conflict, for to do so would be to discount something of 
extraordinary and irreplaceable value. She writes, 
If we were such that we could in a crisis dissociate ourselves from one 
commitment because it clashed with another, we would be less good. 
Goodness itself, then, insists that there should be no finiher or more 
revisionary solving. 84 
Instead of thinking of tragic conflict as a puzzle to be solved, Nussbaum argues that the 
demands of morality can be satisfied by genuinely expressing the appropriate moral 
response to one's inevitable moral failure. In doing so, moral agents maintain the force of 
the value not acted upon, because it is by expressing emotion that we recognise and 
express the value things have. This conception of moral failure and moral integrity is also 
a theme within tragic literature, which makes it an important vehicle for moral reflection. 
Nussbaum argues that when tragic heroes meet their demises, their failure is often in part a 
moral failure - for in their attempts to solve their dilemma, they revise their commitments, 
thereby suffering a loss of integrity. She illustrates this thesis using Aeschylus' 
Agamemnon as an example. In this play, Agamemnon is torn between piety to the Gods 
and love for his daughter. He cannot act without destroying something he values deeply. 
According to Nussbaum, Agamemnon's dilemma is not of his own making - it results from 
contingent circumstances over which he has no control. Agamemnon chooses what he 
judges to be the lesser of two wrongs. According to Nussbaum, Agamemnon's failure is in 
failing to show the appropriate remorse for his act. He behaves as if the correct resolution 
of the dilemma has been discovered. He oversimplifies his moral situation, to suppress the 
confusing and conflicting emotions that would complicate his choices and induce doubt 
about his chosen course of action. It is this problem-solving approach which Nussbaum 
84 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 50. 
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finds objectionable about moral theory for moral theory assumes there must be a right 
answer to moral questions. However, assessing alternative courses of action on the basis 
of independent criteria, such as degree of utility, would violate the qualitative distinctness 
of the conflicting goods by reducing differences in quality to differences in quantity. 
Attempts to solve moral dilemmas by employing hierarchical arrangements of antecedently 
formulated moral principles will be excessively reductionist. Tragic literature emphasises 
our openness to fortune, in contrast to a theoretical approach to moral conflict, which will 
advocate a course of action that regulates an agent's exposure to moral conflict by 
discounting something the agent values. It treats a particular kind of moral conflict as a 
salient and irrepressible component of life rather than a puzzle to be solved. In Furrow's 
words ,I tragic literature reveals the need for a more complex form of cognition, in which 
judgement and emotion conspire to sustain as much as possible of what is valuable in 
lifel. 85 
This introductory chapter ends, then, where it began, with Derrida's notion of the 
N undecidable': 86 
The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or tension between two 
decisions, it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, 
foreign to the order of the calculable, the rule, is still obliged ... to give itself up to the impossible decision while taking account of law and 
rules. A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable 
application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal, it 
would not be just. 87 
85 In Whose Justice? "ich Rationality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), MacIntyre 
argues against Nussbaum, who holds (in The Fragility of Goodness) that Aristotle's account of the virtue 
of practical reason is open to the Sophoclean picture of an individual's having to choose between rival 
goods. MacIntyre now endorses the Thomist thesis that, if someone feels herself to be confronted by 
conflicting moral claims, she must be guilty (however understandably) at some point (however far back in 
her moral history) of some error or flaw (however deepseated) to which she is (however excusably) blind. 
In other words, human sinfulness generates the moral conflicts that we call tragic. 
86 See also Derrida, 'Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility', in Kearney and Dooley (eds. ), Questioning 
Ethics, op. cit., p-66. 
87 Derrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., p. 24. 
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As Martha Nussbaum recognises, traditional moral theory has sought to thematise choice, 
but., as I shall argue in the succeeding chapters, a recognition of the undecidable, or the 
excess of experience over interpretation, is necessary if we are to sustain a capacity to 
respond to suffering. Such a recognition is sustained in literary terms and where, as in 
moral theory or political ideology, undecidability is erased, barbarism or barbarity are not 
far away. 
cf Lvotards notion of the 'differend' -a difference between two parties which cannot be reduced to I 
neutral categories of consensus or universality. It is this sublime irreducibility of'the thing'which for 
Lyotard is the concern of ethics and aesthetics. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Nfinneapolis: 
UniversitV of Minneapolis Press, 1988). 
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Chapter I 
WRITING AND MEMORY 
'The task of a historical and interpretative memory is at the heart of deconstruction' 1 
'Perhaps art seeks to give face to things, 
and in this its greatness and deceit simultaneously lie. 12 
I 
...... 
language can only indefinitely tend toward justice 
by acknowledging and practicing the violence withinit. '3 
'The day that there will be a reading of the Oxford card, 
the one and true reading, will be the end of history'4 
"The task of a historical and interpretative memory is at the heart of deconstruction". 
I begin with this seemingly contradictory remark by Derrida, which is at the heart of my 
thesis. The quotation may at first sight seem surprising, given the popular association of 
deconstruction and amnesia - the view that deconstruction threatens scholarly tradition 
and the writing of history. As we have seen, Derrida is frequently charged with relativism, 
of claiming that any reading of text or history is valid. However, I will argue that 
,e Derrida's understanding of ecriture (which can be translated as both "writing" and 
IýC scripture") is crucial if we are to avoid the negative consequences of ideology and, in the 
name ofjustice, pursue a genuine anamnesis. It is for this reason that in each chapter I 
I Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (London and New 
York: Routledge), p. 19 
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. SeaOn Hand (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1990), p. 8. 
3 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics", in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 
1978), p. 117. 
4 Jacques Derrida, The Postcard, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987). p. 115. 
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examine particular examples of writing which have emerged under the pressure of 
twentieth-century political ideologies. 
The thesis examines, alongside each other, three such ideologies - 'the Final Solution, 
Communist Czechoslovakia and Apartheid South Affica - which are all to be seen within 
the traditions and structures of the Enlightenment, and in each case I am concerned with 
the ways in which literary texts deconstruct the political/ethical consequences of 
philosophical closure and open up the possibility of a recovery of a theological language. 
In Lyotard's terms, these ideologies may be described as attempts at totalising 
5 metanarratives. , which 
in their abstraction necessarily deny the specificity of the local and 
traduce it in the interests of a global homogeneity, a universal history - the Thousand-Year 
-6the myth of 'separate Reich; the great narrative of emancipation proposed by Marx, 
development' envisaged by the South Affican National Party. Such narratives operate like 
Enlightenment reason- in order to accommodate widely diverging local traditions and 
histories, they abstract the meaning of those traditions in a 'translation' into the terms of 
the master code, a translation which leaves the traditions simply unrecognisable. As 
metanarratives,, they also become coercive and normative. Lyotard argues that they 
effectively control and rnisshape the local under the sign of the universal. 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror 
as we can take. We paid a high enough price for the nostalgia for the 
whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the 
sensible. 7 
5 See J-F Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), p. xxiv. 
6 As we shall see, according to Derrida followers of Marx misconceived the nature of the 'messianic', so 
eager to make the mystical idea of justice immediately present that they often ignored the finite historical 
conditions in which justice, as an ethical responsibility, is a task which always remains to be done. 
See Derrida, Specters ofMarx (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) 
7 Lyotard, 'What is Postmodernism? ' Appendix to The Postmodern Condition, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
In The Differend (1983) Lyotard explores the notion of the 'differend -a difference between two parties 
which cannot be reduced to neutral categories of consensus or universality. It is this sublime irreducibility 
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An idyll or utopia is conceived which, inevitably, becomes dystopic in the attempt at its 
realisation. The novelist Milan Kundera has written of Communist utopia,, 
People have always aspired to an idyll, a garden where nightingales sing, a 
realm of harmony where the world does not rise up as a stranger against man 
nor man against other men, where the world and all its people arc molded from 
a single stock and the fire lighting up the heavens is the fire burning in the 
hearts of men, where every man is a note in a magnificent Bach fugue and 
anyone who refuses his note is a mere black dot, useless and meaningless, 
easily caught and squashed between the fingers like an insect. 
From the start there were people who realised they lacked the proper 
temperament for the idyll and wished to leave the country. But since by 
definition an idyll is one world for all, the people who wished to emigrate were 
implicitly denying its validity. Instead of going abroad they went behind bars. 
They were soon joined by thousands and tens of thousands more ..., 
8 
The novelists I shall be discussing in the following chapters are self-consciously 
contesting, or deconstructing, this Enlightenment tradition. 9, exploring the role of writing 
as testimony. By concentrating on the lives and histories of individuals subject to the logic 
of the system, they produce writing which deconstructs that system, refusing to allow 
ideological readings, problematising grand historical narratives, and exposing such 
readings as forgetful and reductive. Such writing is an act of anamnesis, situating itself in 
what John Caputo has called the 'im/possible attempt to write proper names, the 
im/possible attempt to remember them'. Caputo is here appealing to the characteristically 
Jewish emphasis on 'the name', 10 or the absolutely singular and ineffable; the individual 
human being who may never finally be comprehended in conceptual terms. This is a 
problematic of language, which, of course, is about structures and repeatability (what 
Derrida calls "iterability"). "The name" signifies that which exceeds "isness" (our ability 
to describe in positive terms). However, - in a paradox, or aporia, to which we will 
of 'the thing' which for Lyotard is the concern of ethics and aesthetics (The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
8 Milan Kundera, The Book o Laughter and Forgetting (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), pp. 8-9. 
9 See, for example, Ivan Klima's literary essays, The Spirit ofPrague (London: Granta Books, 1994), esp. 
'Our Tradition and the Limits of Growth', pp. 146-155. 
10 See, for example, Derrida, On the Name, tr. David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and Ian McLeod 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
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continually return - in thinking and communicating, concepts are unavoidable, writing a 
necessary evil. As in Romanticism, the task of the poet or artist assumes a particular 
importance, that of bearing witness to singularity, or of registering the excess of 
experience over interpretation (in a way that calls for all the resources of poetics). In 
other words,. recognition of the necessary tension between the general and the particular 
requires an ethics of reading and writing. 
If you let difference have its way in ethics, you would never stop 
writing, because you would have to write down the names of everyone, 
one by one, and say what is happening with them ... Deconstruction 
situates itself on the threshold between the universal and the singular, 
the common and the proper, in between ... Deconstruction situates itself in the im/possible attempt to write proper names, the im/possible 
attempt to remember them'. 11 
Only such a sense of the incomprehensible or 'unreadable' can finally sustain our capacity 
to respond to suffering, for when language becomes ideological this necessary paradox is 
smoothed away and the singular forgotten within the universal. 12 
In Derridean terms, the political ideologies I shall be discussing failed to recognise writing 
as a condition of the Fall, seeking instead 'the one and true reading". These ideologies 
constituted a different 'fall% what Derrida has called a 'fall of language into 
representation"; they sought an hors-texte, or objective view, a realisable framework for 
justice; they posited a non-aporefic model for ethics, and denied the necessary violence of 
representation. As Derrida maintains in Memoirs of the Blind, the first consequence of 
the Fall is a looking that leads to a covering up, a linguistic 'fall' which reduces the other 
II John D. Caputo, Against Ethics (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 72. 
12 For example, in Glas Derrida uses the image of the 'eagle', "the soaring eagle of speculative knowledge 
which swoops down on every unsuspecting particular, lifts it up into the universal and carries it back in its 
grasping conceptual claws to its cold mountain top of absolute knowledge' (John D. Caputo, 'On Not 
Circumventing the Quasi-Transcendental: The Case of Rorty and Derrida', in Gary B. Madison, ed., 
[Vorking Through Derrida, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 152). 
13 See footnote 4. 
14 Derrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., Chapter 2. 
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to concept, a gaze obscured by preconceived images. In these termsI, the nearest we may 
get to the truth is to recognise our blindness to the truth, or our entrapment within 
language. II 
As Derrida's playful deconstructive readings continually remind us, any discourse or 
interpretive system which is allowed to develop without admitting ambivalence, 
contradiction or remainder is in danger of becoming destructive and forgetful. A non- 
aporetic ethical code or a 'perfect' society are simply not a viable project, while attempts 
to prove the contrary result in more cruelty. 
In "Plato's Pharmacy' (1969), Derrida focusses on Plato's Phaedrus, in which writing is 
described as a pharmakon for memory and wisdom. As Derrida notes, pharmakon is a 
specially ambiguous word, meaning both cure and poison. Writing is therefore 
undecidable, refusing a single determinate meaning. It is this condition of writing which 
ideologies or ethical systems fail to recognise. 16 
In this chapter, with particular attention to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's 
critique of modernity, Dialectic of the Enlightenment, and Derrida's reading of Emmanuel 
I Levinas 
, 
Violence and Metaphysics', I shall argue for an ethics of reading and writing, self- 
consciously acknowledging the violence of representation and pursuing a language of 
names. As Richard Kearney has written, one of the morals of the story of deconstruction 
17 is that language is ethics , writing as an obsession with the 
irreducible other, 
acknowledging the necessary evil of its production, and bearing witness to the 
unpresentable. 
15 See Derrida. Allemoirs of the Blind (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
16 See Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy'. in Dissemination (London: Athlone Press, 1981). 
17 Richard Kearney, 'Derrida's Ethical Re-turn', in Working Through Derrida, op. cit., p. 50. 
39 
Legacies of the Enlightenment 
'"at does exiled language mean? It refers to the distance between words and what 
they mask'(Efie Wiesel). 18 
A deep formative influence lying behind much contemporary thinking, is the legacy of the 
Frankfurt School19,, most specifically in Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944)20, a work written when the Nazi death factories were working at 
full capacity. Their provocative claim was that 'Enlightenment is totalitarian" 21 by which 
they meant that the representational assumptions of the Enlightenment were reductive and 
essentially exploitative, seeking to think the natural world in an abstract form. The 
modern dominance of the principle of reason went hand in hand with the interpretation of 
the essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation, an object positioned 
before a subject. The subject, the 'P, a self-contained ego,, thus ensures a technological 
mastery over the totality of what is. A particular understanding of representation, 
repraesentatio, is involved here. An object is made present, by bringing it to the subject 
of representation, the knowing self As a result, the material content of the world 
becomes a merely formal set of conceptual categories. Reason becomes a formal 
category, which reduces the specific contents of material realities into rational concepts. 
From now on, matter would at last be mastered without any illusion of 
ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities. For the Enlightenment, 
whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is 
suspect. 22 
18 Elie Wiesel, From the Kingdom of. kfemory: Reminiscences (New York: Schocken Books, 1990), p. 3 1. 
19 For example, Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference: The Wound ofReason (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993) makes the comparison between Derrida's critique of 
logocentrism and Adorno's critique of idealism. 
20 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: 
Verso, 1979). 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 6. 
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A certain forgetfulness or 'disenchantment' is at issue here. 23 I use "disenchantment" in 
the sense coined by Max Weber - the objectification of nature in terms of rational 
calculation and control. Enlightenment becomes the locus of ideology, the assumption that 
the world can match, or be encompassed by, our reasoning about it, the belief that nothing 
escapes the concept. Paul de Man called ideology the confusion of linguistic with natural 
reality, or reference with phenomenaliSM, 24and Terry Eagleton has written- 
Ideology seeks to convert culture into Nature, and the 'natural' sign is 
one of its weapons. Saluting a flag, or agreeing that Western 
democracy represents the true meaning of the word 'freedom', become 
the most obvious, spontaneous responses in the world. Ideology, in this 
sense, is a kind of contemporary mythology, a realm which has purged 
itself of ambiguity and alternative possibility. 25 
Such ideology produces the illusion of absolute knowledge, abstract and utilitarian, 
conceived as power over nature. 26 To quote Adorno and Horkheimer, 'Enlightenment 
behaves towards things as a dictator toward man. He knows them in so far as he can 
manipulate them. The man of science knows things in so far as he can make them. '27 
Knowledge is reduced to technology, a technology which enables the illusion of power 
and domination over nature. This kind of knowledge does not give actual power over 
nature,, for that which is unarnenable to its formal or conceptual categories simply escapes 
consciousness entirely. 
23 Max Weber: "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization, and, 
above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have 
retreated from public life" ("Science as Vocation", quoted in Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject of 
. Allodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 16. 24 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 11. 
25 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 135. 
By contrast, for Eagleton the healthy linguistic sign is one which draws attention to its own arbitrariness, 
which in the very moment of conveying its meaning communicates something of its own relative, artificial 
status as well. 
26 According to Derrida, the role of the university is to challenge the notion of knowledge as technological 
power. See 'The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils', in Diacritics 13, Fall 
1983,7f. 
27 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 9. 
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Zygmunt Bauman, writing in the tradition of Adomo and Horkheimer, makes precisely 
this point. Development in one discourse often involves a kind of 'tunnel vision'.. 28 so that 
the more securely a discourse legitimates itself, the greater the resulting chaos. 
There was a task to increase agricultural crops - resolved thanks to 
nitrates. And there was a task of steadying water supplies - resolved 
thanks to stemming the flow of water with dams. Then there was a 
task to purify water supplies poisoned by the seepage of unabsorbed 
nitrates - resolved thanks to the application of phosphates in specially 
built sewage-processing plants. Then there was a task to destroy toxic 
algae that thrive in reservoirs rich in phosphate compounds... 
Weeds are the waste of gardening, mean streets the waste of town 
planning, dissidence the waste of ideological unity, heresy the waste of 
orthodoxy, strangerhood the waste of nation-state building. 29 
As Walter Lowe puts it, 'Of the Enlightenment ... it 
is true that every revealing is 
simultaneously a concealing. The great temptation of the Enlightenment may be 
associated with its very name, that is with the implication that there can be an enlightening 
30 or revealing which is not simultaneously a concealing'. . 
In post- structurali st terms, the problematic may be stated as follows: The activity of 
" philosophy", the very task of thinking in terms of conceptual categories, is the reduction 
28 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity andAmbivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 199 1) 
29 Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition discusses the ways in which the production of 'language games' 
with their own discourses and specialisms, in isolation from each other, has produced within each 
discourse a technological illusion of mastery in a single domain which can have destructive consequences. 
Milan Kundera makes a similar observation: 'The rise of the sciences propelled man into the tunnels of 
the specialised disciplines. The more he advanced in knowledge, the less clearly could he see either the 
world as a whole or his own self, and he plunged further into what ... Heidegger called... 
"the forgetting of 
being" (The Art of the Novel, London: Faber and Faber, 1988, pp. 3 -4). 
30 Walter Lowe, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
(Such an understanding of 'enlightenment' has its roots in Greek thinking. Ina recent article, Louis H. 
Feldman contrasts the Jewish preoccupation with 'history' with the Greek emphasis on 'concept'. He 
points out that the Greek word 'to know' (eidenai) is related to the verb 'to see' (idein); even the word for 
'idea' comes from this verb 'to see'; the Greek, consequently, is interested in things (concepts) rather than 
events. 'No Greek ever heard his gods order him to remember'. (Louis H. Feldman, 'Hebraism and 
Hellenism Reconsidered', in Judaism, Issue 170, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1994,124-125) Even in grammar, 
the Greek has a timeless aorist tense, such as is lacking in Hebrew, and this tense represents both a past 
time and an eternal present. By contrast, Judaism's allegiance, in writing and liturgy, is to an ongoing 
anamnesis, a commitment to historic traditions which must be lived, interpreted and re-interpreted in the 
light of new situations. 
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or forgetting of otherness. In seeking to think the other, its otherness is reduced or 
appropriated to understanding. In this sense, "philosophy" is the inescapable perversion of 
philosophy (as thinking). "Real" philosophy, one might say, attempts to think the 
unthinkable, or acknowledge in its writing the inescapable violence of its language and 
distinctions. " 
I Similarly, according to Adomo and Horkheimer , abstraction,, the tool of Enlightenment, 
32 treats its objects as did fate, the notion of which it rejects- it liquidates them'. 
The natural world is organised according to conceptual or 'mythiC'33 categories, the object 
of 'false projection'. Whereas mimesis imitates the environmentl according to Adomo and 
Horkheimer false projection makes the environment like itself34For example, the 
murderer sees his victim as a persecutor against whom he must defend himself 
It is in these terms of projective behaviour that Adorno and Horkheimer examine anti- 
Semitism, but for Adorno and Horkheimer,. the morbid aspect of anti-Semitism is not 
projective behaviour as such, which is inescapable, but the absence from it of reflection. 
The naked pattern of power as such, which dominates all around it as 
well as its own decomposing ego, seizes all that is offered to it and 
incorporates it, without reference to specific nature, into its mythic 
fabric. 35 
31 In his interviews with Philippe Petit, Paroxysm (London: Verso, 1998), Jean Baudrillard makes a 
similar point: "The concept of history, such as comes into general use in the nineteenth century, 
corresponds to the moment when we were beginning to leave history. It's always the same. It's at the 
moment when we begin to intellectualize a phenomenon that in reality it disappears" (p. 20). 
32 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 13. 
33 In this tradition, myth is essentially integrative, an interpretive framework, ordering the world in 
which we live by turning randomness into pattern, by reconciling the frustrations produced by some 
contradictory experience in some higher unity. For example, in The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology 
ofStory (Sonoma, California: Polebridge Press, 1988), John Dominic Crossan distinguishes between myth 
and parables, which challenge the expectations raised in humankind by myth. 
34 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 187 
35 Ibid., p. 190 
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The French cultural critic Jean Baudrillard (1929-) has coined the tenn "simulacrum" to 
refer to a media-saturated reality in which experience can only take place at a remove. We 
can experience the world only through a kind of filter of preconceptions and expectations 
fabricated in advance by a culture swamped in images. 36 This is somewhat similar to 
Adorno and Horkheimer's notion of "false projection" -a preconceived conceptual 
framework,, defining roles and responsibilities, prevents one from responding to the other, 
and disarms one's capacity to respond to suffering- 
When thought in the process of cognition identifies as conceptual the 
conceptual elements that are directly posited in perception and hence 
so compelling, it progressively draws them back into the subject and 
37 rids them of perceptive power. 
Ac today practical scientific enterprises require an unim paired faculty 
of definition - the capability of arresting thought at a point determined 
by the needs of society, and of defining an area that is then minutely 
examined without going beyond it'. 38 
This concern to order and control, - 
however, results in paranoia, as experience threatens 
our expectations- 
... all words 
become part of the delusive system, of the attempt to 
possess through the mind everything for which experience is 
inadequate, to force meaning upon the world which makes him 
meaningless; but at the same time to defame the spirit and experience 
from which he is excluded and to attribute to them the guilt of the 
society which excludes hiM'39 
to defame the spirit and experience from which he is excluded and to attribute to them 
the guilt of the society that excludes them'. Here Adorno, and Horkheimer are reflecting 
36 See Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988. 
37 lbid., p. 194 
[NB. Adomo, in Aesthetic Theory (trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: Athlone, 1997), argues that 'No 
work of art should be described or explained through the categories of communication'. Again, he is 
objecting to the reduction of the work to the dialectic of the concept. For Adomo, if there is 
communication in art it must be without concept. Adomo is inserting himself into a tradition of thinking 
about art deriving from Kant, which Lyotard also develops. There is a thinking about art which is a non- 
conceptual communication. ] 
38 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 195 
39 Ibid., pp. 195 -196. 
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on the plight of the Jews in Europe, drawing on the tradition of the Jew as' conceptual 
other', the other of Western Enlightenment discourse,, wanderer and exilel outsider and 
scapegoat. 40 According to Derfida, for example, Western metaphysics has maintained an 
essentially Hellenistic tradition in which philosophy has sought to eliminate within Western 
thought the unrepresentable. The Jew mythically represents the outsider or wanderer, from 
the story of Abraham to the repeated experiences of exile and alienation. The' conceptual 
Jew' represents the unrepresentable, a hermeneutical tradition which refuses to establish 
secure boundaries, whose covenant is with an excessive God, '[t]he infinity irreducible to 
the representation of infinity'41 In these terms, the Holocaust can be seen as an attempt 
to eliminate within Western thought the unrepresentable itself represented by the Jews. 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the quest for universality, for a' false social order', 
the 'paranoia of discourse' in which nothing will escape the concept, has encouraged a will 
to destroy the Jews. 42 (Paradoxically, one may see Jewish sacred history as a negotiation 
of this problematic. The Jews have always known the "paranoia of a false social order" - 
for example, the Old Testament demand for a king; the temptation to become "like the 
other nations" and allow a particular interpretative framework too great a security. In this 
salvation history, deconstruction is at hand in the person of the prophet who calls Israel to 
repentance. 43) 
The Jews in Europe are characterised by a distinctive way of life which, in its 
distinctiveness, challenges the generality to which it does not conform. 44 
40 The 'Jew' as the 'other' of Enlightenment rationality - see also Zyginunt Bauman, Modernity and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London and New York: Routledge, 1978; Lyotard, Heidegger and the Jeics, 
trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990). 
For example, according to Hegel, development belonged to the law of universality, against which is set the 
law of singularity represented by the woman and the Jew! 
41 'Violence and Metaphysics', p. 98 
42 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 168. 
43 See, for example, I Samuel 8: 1-9. 
44 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 169 
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The general, that which fits into the functional context of society, is 
considered to be natural. But nature that has not been transformed 
through the channels of conceptual order into something purposeful, 
the grating sound of a stylus moving over a slate, the haut gout which 
recalls filth and decomposition, the sweat which appears on the brow 
of the busy man - everything which has failed to keep up, or which 
infringes the commandments which are the sedimented progress of the 
centuries - has a penetrating effect; it arouses diSgust. 45 
Adorno and Horkheimer recognise that anti-Semitism was based on a perversion of the 
ideal of equality, defined as confom-fity46 When they write of the 'paranoia of 
discourse', they are referring to the hatred induced in finding that one's 'norm' cannot be 
fulfilled,, resulting in the demonisation of those who do not fit the norm. 47 In terms of 
European rationality, the Jews are an embodiment of the 'negative pfinciple', 48 
representing the 'other' of Western Enlightenment thinking - 'happiness without power,... a 
home without frontiers, religion without myth. 49 They become scapegoats - for example, 
an illusory conspiracy of Jewish bankers financing Bolshevism - as a way of maintaining 
the system, which requires 'outsiders', demonic 'others', in order to legitimate Itself 50 
In his essay 'Force of Law- The Mystical Foundation of Authority', Derrida, discussing 
Walter Benjamin's Zur Krifik der Gewalt,, makes the connection between the evil of the 
Final Solution and the 'fall' of language into representation. 
... what Nazism, as the 
final achievement of the logic of mythological 
violence, would have attempted to do is to exclude the other witness, to 
destroy the witness of the other order, of a divine Violence whose 
justice is irreducible to right, of a violence heterogeneous to the order 
45 [bid., p. 180 
cf. Zygmunt Bauman's argument, that genocide is rooted in a particular construction of human virtue, a 
utopian vision desiring the elimination of chaos and disorder (Modernity and the Holocaust, op. cit. ). 
46 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p. 170. 
47 Ibid., p. 171 
48 [bid., p. 168 
49 Ibid., p. 199 
50 Ibid., p. 172 
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both of right (be it that of human rights or of the order of 
representation) and of myth. 51 
According to Derrida, the Holocaust ('the order of representation') tried to exterminate 
not only human lives by the millions, but also a demand for justice, the possibility of 
singularity, the language of names, for 'To name is not to represent, it is not to 
communicate by signs, that is, by means of means in view of an end, etCl. 52 
Lyotard's argument in Heidegger and the Jews is similar. Lyotard argues that the 'final 
solution', as well as attempting to eliminate without trace the physical presence of Jews in 
Europe, also sought to eliminate within Western thought the unrepresentable itself 
represented' by 'the jews'. 'The jews', for Lyotard, represent the extra-linguistic -that 
which falls beneath the repeatable terms of language. They represent a particular kind of 
anamnesis, that is an acknowledgement of the excess of experience over interpretation. 
Lyotard draws on Levinas'notion of the 'immemorial', a relation to what is always 
already forgotten in all thought, writing, literature and art, to a 'forgotten' that was never 
part of any memory as such and which any memory, as memory, forgets in turn by 
representing (that is, by giVing form to it or producing an image of it). 'Thejews'here 
signifies the entire problematic of the unrepresentable (hence the small J') and, according 
to Lyotard, does not refer to a nation, nor to a political, philosophical or religious subject. 
However, as David Carroll argues in his foreword to Heidegger and the Jews, even 
though 'the Jews' does not designate the Jewish people directly, it cannot be separated 
completely from those who have suffered through forced conversion, assimilation and 
finally extermination. 53 
51 'Derrda, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
52 Ibid., p. 6 1. 
53 David Carroll - introduction to Jean-Francois Lyotard, Heidegger and "thejews", op. cit., p. xii. 5 
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Dogmatic thought has sought to incorporate the 'otherness' signified by 'the jews' into 
itself, or to deny, repress or exclude that 'otherness', but for Lyotard the unrepresentable 
is what all representation must strive to represent, and what it must also be aware of not 
being able to represent. This aporia, or double bind, is for Lyotard, as for Derrida, the 
concern of ethics and aesthetics. As we shall see in the next chapter, the dilemma of the 
Holocaust writer focuses this ethical concern - the obligation to bear witness 'lest we 
forget'. but the question of how responsibly to represent the events which we call 'the 
Holocaust' without trivialising them or imposing narrative order upon them. 
The issue here is the need for thought to develop its capacities to resist and undermine the 
dogmatic, even totalitarian, possibilities which it also inevitably carries within itself, an 
obligation that thought become less and less philosophical and more and more 'written'. 
According to Derrida, after the Holocaust we need a return to the language of names, a 
language or a poetics of appellation, '... in opposition to a language of signs, of informative 
or communicative representation, beyond myth and representation... '54 
John Caputo, drawing on Derrida, makes the same point. The study of proper names - 
that is, an attention to the singular or the particular encouraged by poetics - is the 
element of obligations. Proper names allow one to say when and where obligation is 
happening, and to whom, and they help us to remember. However, as Derrida and 
Caputo also recognise, the particular cannot be perceived outside of the general. 
If you let differance have its way in ethics, you would never stop 
writing, because you would have to write down the names of everyone, 
one by one and say what is happening to them ... 
The proper name is a name for what is im/possible. Were a name 
truly proper, were there, properly speaking, truly a proper name, no 
one would understand it. Were it unique, were we utterly and totally 
unfamiliar with it, wholly unable to anticipate it, then we would not 
54 Derrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., p. 60. 
48 
know it as a name, we would not use it or understand its use, and it 
would not get known because it could never be repeated. 55 
The responsibility of the writer, then, as Jewish scholars like Elie Wiesel recoose, is to 
produce writing which registers this double bind - the impossible possibility of witnessing 
to proper names, against the threat of a 'fall' of language into representation. 
The Final Solution, antithetical to a poetics of 'proper names', presupposed the illusion of 
scientific objectivity, of the reconciliation of the concept and its reference, producing a 
discourse which allowed the unthinkable to be thought. As Reiner Schurmann has 
observed. 56 'Evil comes in an untold move, when singularization is cut off from one's 
constituted world,, when one blinds oneself againstit'. 57 
Derrida writes: '... Nazism has indeed been the most pervasive figure of media violence and 
of political exploitation of the modem techniques of communicative language and of the 
language of industry, of scientific objectification to which is linked the logic of the 
conventional sign and of f 58 ormalizing registration'. The language of the Final Solution 
was a simulacrum of bureaucracy, legal language, expertise and hierarchies. 
55 Caputo, Against Ethics, op. cit., p. 78. 
56 Reiner Schurmann, 'Conditions of Evil', trans. Ian Janssen, in Drucilla Cornell et al, Deconstruction 
and the Possibility ofJustice, pp. 387-403. 
57 Ibid., p. 390. 
The philosophical background to such thinking is the belief, which has been a feature of philosophy going 
back to the ancient Greeks, that out of unification comes the good and out of individuation evil. For the 
Greeks, evil meant to be dispossessed from 'the good'. In the tradition of Natural Law, evil meant failure 
to act in accordance with nature; for the Enlightened, evil meant a dispossession of enlightenment which 
turns one away from self-consciousness. In the tradition of Augustine, evil is seen as a privation of good. 
In each case, otherness is conceived as negation. In the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard significantly 
represented a break from such thinking. He wrote, 'Any discourse about a superior unity that would 
reconcile absolute contradictions is a metaphysical assault on ethics'. According to Kierkegaard, the good 
demands of me that I singularise myself, just as Abraham singularised himself sacrificing Isaac. However, 
as Schurmann recognises, though it is important to recognise the singular as irreducible, this does not 
mean one can somehow escape the general norms. Like Derrida, she recognises that we must live within a 
double bind, the tension between the general and the particular. But it is possible to enlarge one's way of 
thinking beyond the general view, to think for oneself the double bind. 'After hubristic sufferings - not 
unlike Oedipus who at Colonus wants his eyes open, wants himself open-eyed - it is possible to love 
differing ultimates. This, I submit, would be expanding the limits of imagination. ' It is the kind of 
imaginative thinking provoked in tragedy, which sees singulars jarring incongruously against their world. 
58 Derrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., p. 58. 
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Elie Wiesel has written: 
... the Nazis assassinated thousands upon thousands of Jews and spoke 
of 'special treatment. ' 'Things, objects, ' meant human beings. 
'Relocation' signified deportation, evacuation, liquidation: 
extermination. Night and fog are evocative words; we now know what 
they hid. Similarly, the word 'selection. ' Thanks to this verbal 
technique, the assassins succeeded in convincing themselves that they 
were not assassins. By 'obeying they were doing no more than 
I purifying' Europe of its Jews (32) 
'The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing' 
'Why has God used words as instruments of creation? Because an of creation lies in 
them. All of creation could be destroyed by them. And redeemed again' 59 
Post-structuralism has reminded us that a single, unified and objective perspective is 
unavailable, since there is no extra-linguistic perspective from which a given interpretation 
may be assessed. Human beings experience the world in and through language, which may 
be a'prison houSe'60 but is also our only redemption. Whereas structuralism was 
essentially a phenomenological study concerned with the linguistic structures which human 
beings inhabit, deconstruction is concerned with what these 'systems' leave unrepresented 
and unsaid. Deconstruction should perhaps be defined as 'good reading' - far from being 
merely nihilistic free-play, it is a rigorous approach to philosophical thinking, engaging in 
close readings of texts and exposing the excess of meaning over interpretation. These 
texts then become witnesses to the great ineffability of existence. 
The way language is used is, therefore, of profound ethical significance To represent is a 
necessary act of violence which anticipates and reduces to concept, yet writing may 
register this very difficulty. This is the significance of Derrida's style. He composes rich, 
lush 'overfull' texts which overlap with other texts, an excess of allusion and multi-lingual 
59 Elie Wiesel, From the Kingdom ofMemory: Reminiscences, op. cit., p. 43. 
60 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House ofLanguage: A Critical Account ofStructurahsm and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
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pun. The difficulty of Derrida's various discussions of deconstruction derives in part from 
his determination to do deconstruction at the same time as he talks about it. 
Derrida explores the theme of the violence of representation in relation to the question of 
foundation. What, he asks, is the legitimating origin of our laws? As he puts it in his 
deconstructive analysis of the American Constitution in'Otobiographies', the origin of 
every state is in some sense illegitimate. 61 It arises from a coup deforce, which is also an 
act of inscription or writing. Any founding act must be such an imposition, for it implies 
particular judgements, values and norms. Democracy is compromised from the outset 
since it must involve some form of representation, a process whereby individual voices 
surrender their moral autonomy and consent to take laws from elected citizens set up to 
62 It is impossible to think one's way back - as Rousseau would have us think govern them. 
- to the pre-social origins of society or the pre-linguistic origins of language. 63Thus, all 
constitutions are acts of violence. 
Derrida explored this aporia in his early work 'Violence and Metaphysics'. HereDerrida 
argues that the attempt to articulate conceptually an experience which has been forgotten 
or exiled by philosophy can only be stated within philosophical conceptuality. In other 
words, pure non-violence, like pure violence, is a contradictory concept. 64 Even in 
framing a question, one has already partially answered or forgotten the question, since 
61 'Otobiographies', in The Ear of the Other (New York: Schocken Books, 1985). 
62 See also Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1992). 
63 For example, in his discussion of Rousseau in Of Grammatology, Derrida deconstructs Rousseau's 
contention that the harmonic elaborations of modem French music are a 'gothic and barbarous' 
development, a path which 'we should never have followed if we had been more sensible of the true 
beauties of art, and of music truly natural' (quoted in Of Grammatology, Baltimore and London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 345n). As Derrida observes, it is impossible to conceptualise the nature 
of musicwithout admitting that harmony has been there from the outset, as part of music's natural 
resources. There is always a harmony within melody, no matter how carefully Rousseau attempts to 
keep 
the two principles apart. 
64 Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', op. cit. 
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questions are formulated in response to possible answers. '... the question is always 
enclosed; it never appears immediately as such, but only through the hermetism of a 
65 proposition in which the answer has already begun to detemiine the question'. Later in 
I that essay, he writes , 
Concepts suppose an anticipation, a horizon within which alterity is 
amortized as soon as it is announced precisely because it has let itself be foreseen'. 66 
Whilst, as Derrida continually ren-ýinds us, we cannot break out of the 'prison house' of 
language and we must negotiate our world in and through language, deconstruction calls 
us to responsibility, the responsibility to retain what Lyotard has called a 'sixth sense', the 
memory of that which is always forgotten in the act of representation. According to 
Derrida, '... non-violent language, in the last analysis, would be a language of pure 
invocation, pure adoration, proffering only proper nouns in order to call to the other from 
afar. In effect, such a language would be pufified of all rhetoric, which is what Levinas 
explicitly desires; and purified of the first sense of rhetoric, which we can evoke without 
artifice, that is, purified of every verb. 67 
Derrida raises an essentially theological issue akin to Martha Nussbaum's notion of the 
fragility of goodness. In Derrida's perspective, contra Rousseau, a language of purity, free 
of rhetoric, is unavailable. We are cast out of Eden and must live within a 'fallen'world,. a 
language of rhetoric, as we situate ourselves 'in the im/possible attempt to write proper 
68 f 
names, the im/possible attempt to remember them' or only by rhetoric can rhetoric be 
I redeemed. 69 As John Caputo writes in his recent book , 
deconstruction is set in motion by 
an overarching aspiration, which on a certain analysis can be called a religious or prophetic 
65 Ibid., p. 80. 
66 Ibid., p. 95. 
67 Ibid., p. 147. 
68 Caputo, Against Ethics, op. cit., p. 72. 
69 Inevitably, then, Derrida's writing becomes canonical, just as Plato may be seen as a great 
deconstructor who gives rise, against his will, to Platonism. 
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aspiration..., a movement of transcendence'. 70 Such thinking has more in common with a 
Jewish prophetic tradition, than with a Graeco-Christian tradition prenýsed on the 
immanent and the actual, the Word made flesh. Deconstruction, as a movement of 
transcendence, means registering the excess of experience over interpretation, charged 
with the responsibility to witness to the unrepresentable. 
Deconstruction is called forth in response to the unrepresentable, is 
large with expectation, astir with excess, provoked by the promise, 
impregnated by the impossible, hoping in a certain messianic promise 
of the impossible. 71 
The attempt to write 'proper names' can only be achieved through the resources of 
rhetoric. Derrida's own writing testifies to this impossible possibility, with its allusiveness, 
the richness of its metaphor, its use of pun. As he writes in 'Violence and Metaphysics, 
one must lodge oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to "destroy" it. 720r again, 
'it is necessary to state infinity's excess over totality in the language of totality... it is 
necessary to dress oneself in tradition's shreds and the devil's patches'. 73 Rhetoric, which 
is always originally violent, can only do itsetf violence, can only negate itself in order to 
affirm itself (The deconstructor is like a tight-rope walker who risks 'ceaselessly falling 
back inside that which he deconstructs'74). The attempt to articulate conceptually an 
experience that has been forgotten or exiled from philosophy can only be stated within 
philosophical conceptuality, which entails that the experience succumbs to and is 
destroyed by philosophy. 
As Derrida argues in 'Force of Law, the language of law is inescapable but, as thematic 
and generalised, can never do justice to every singularity - it is always open to revision and 
70 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofJacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. xix. 
71 fbid. 
72 'Violence and Metaphysics, p. I 11. 
73 Ibid., p. 112. 
74 Of Grammatology, op. cit., p. 14. 
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improvement in the name ofjustice which, according to Derrida, is beyond exchange and 
distribution and falls beneath the general terms in which language trades. To address 
oneself to the other in the language of the other is the condition of all possible justice, yet 
this is impossible since our public language always appropriates the language of the other. 
The best one can do is to maintain the memory of that which we know has been forgotten, 
to ensure that each judgement recognises the tension between the general law and the 
particular case, to re-think the language in the light of new experiences. Law, rhetoric 
must be recognised as contingent; not easily disposable, but capable of being re-visited or 
revised in the light of particular responsibilities. In this sense, deconstruction isjustice. 75 
It leads to a sense of responsibility without limits, excessive, incalculable, before memory. 
'Violence and Metaphysics' was a profound influence upon Levinas and it marks Levinas' 
linguistic tum. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas distinguishes between 'the saying' and 
I the said'. The saying is the site of our responsibility for the other. 'The said' is a statement 
which puts the relationship with the other in a codified arrangement. For Levinas, the 
birthplace of ontology is the said. It is the saying which draws us to our responsibilities., 
the said covers up our responsibilities. According to Levinas, influenced by Derrida's 
notion of deconstruction, philosophy must draw attention to the 'saying' in the 'said', and 
these moments of interruption are ethical moments. 
The concern of my three central chapters, on the Holocaust, Communism and Apartheid, 
is the consequences of failing to negotiate 'writing' as a condition of 'the Fall'. 
In a 1985 essay on the system of Apartheid in South Affica, against attempts by the South 
Affican government to erase the word 'apartheid' whi I st maintaining the reality, Derrida 
insists that the word, with all its resonances, must be retained. 76As the Final Solution 
75 Derrida, 'Force of Law'. op. cit., p. 15. 
76 See Derrida, 'Racism's Last Word', trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Critical Inquiry, Autumn 1985,290-299. 
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should have taught us, evil is tolerated when the scandalous and unacceptable are couched 
in fine language. The Pretoria regime's propagandists and officials recognise that the word 
I apartheid' has become a political liability, an emotive word which provokes dissent and 
opposition. It is expedient to cover over the wound, to mask, to forget. However, there 
is a responsibility to become more critical and self-conscious about the ways in which 
language is used in the im/possible attempt to write proper names, the im/possible attempt 
to remember them. Derrida wishes to maintain the word 'apartheid' against the South 
African regime's justificatory discourse. Not content to reproduce the official discourse,, he 
prefers to speak for the victims, to speak of 'apartheid'. Derrida writes , Do not forget 
apartheid, save humanity from this evil, an evil that cannot be summed up in the principial 
and abstract iniquity of a system. It is also daily suffering, oppression, poverty, violence, 
torture inflicted by an arrogant white n-finority (16 percent of the population, controlling 
60 to 65 percent of the national revenue) on the mass of the black population'. 77 
History and Forgetting 
The characteristic ways in which 'history' has been presented in nineteenth-century 
evolutionary thought, as a single lineage, a metanarrative of progress, evolution, - 
teleology, enlightenment, is a further way of banishing difference, turning from the past, 
and allowing individuals, or 'proper names', to be forgotten. 78 As Lyotard writes, 
'Narrative organization is constitutive of diachronic time, and the time that it constitutes 
has the effect of "neutralizing" an "initial" violence, or representing a presence without 
representation ... 
179 In such a view of 'history', nothing happens for which one is not 
prepared. According to Levinas, the person of utopia is '... nothing but Desire: disturbed 
77 Ibid., p. 293. 
78 In the novels of Central European writers such as Kafka, Hasek, Musil and Broch, 'History' is a 
monster which comes from outside; 'it is impersonal, uncontrollable, incalculable, incomprehensible - and 
it is inescapable' (Milan Kundera, TheArt of the Novel, op. cit., p. 11) 
79 Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. Geoff-rey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 199 1), p. 16. 
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by the dazzling day of his human conscience, he pursues a dream as though he were still 
sleeping, as though another day should dawn within his day, and with it another waking 
that would rid him of his suffocating nightmares'. 10 
In the famous image of Paul Klee, as described famously by Walter Benjamin, the storm of 
progress irresistibly propels the walkers backwards into the futurel the debris piling up in 
front of them. The hope of arrival turns out to be the urge to escape immediate 
responsibilities, to set tasks which do not endear the future but devalue the past and 
present. The past and present are always wanting, which makes them ugly: 
A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as 
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are 
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is 
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees 
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken 
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such 
violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. The storm is what 
we call progress. 81 
Histonans such as Reinhrt Koselleck82have shown how the specific tripartite structure of 
past, present and future, in which the future is asynchronous with the past, arose at the 
turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. The way in which our culture thinks of 
time is far from natural, even though we may experience it as such. According to Andreas 
Huyssen, 'in comparison with earlier Christian ages that cherished tradition and thought of 
the future primarily and statically, even spatially, as the time of the last judgement, 
80 Levinas, 'Place and Utopia', in Difficult Freedom, op. cit., p. 10 1. 
81 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1969), p. 249. 
82 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) 
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modern societies have put ever more weight on thinking of the secular future as dynamic 
and superior to the past'. 81 
I Such evolutionary thinking entails a particular understanding of 'theodicy. The 
assumption is that the process of enlightenment will just4 the suffering which It entails. 
The triumph of science or the triumph of the state will make good the sacrifices made in 
its name. In Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon (1940), the former revolutionary 
Rubashov is under arrest for having doubts about the doctrine of 'the end justifies the 
means'. In a passionate response to his inquisitor, he unfolds the horror of the policy he 
himself had once helped carry out. 
... 
in the interests of a just distribution of land we deliberately let die of 
starvation about five nullion farmers and their families in one year. 
So consequent were we in the liberation of human beings from the 
shackles of industrial exploitation that we sent about ten million 
people to do forced labour in the Arctic regions and jungles of the 
East, under conditions similar to those of antique galley slaves ... Acting consequentially in the interests of the coming generations, we 
have laid such terrible privations on the present one that its average 
length of life is shortened by a quarter ... 
In the effort to justify, such theodicy generates a narrative quite different from the memory 
of suffering. Each concrete, particular being is subjected to an all-embracing continuity. 
As the theologian Johann Baptist Metz puts it , 
The logic of evolution is the rule of death 
over history - in the end, everything makes as little difference to it as death' 84 
This logic of evolution tends to define our view of narrative, which is why (as we saw in 
the introduction) attempts to construct a "narrative ethics" are to be regarded with 
suspicion. Such a narrative understanding generates an amnesia which is the opposite of 
the anamnesis which is the subject of this chapter. 
83 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories; Marking Time in a Culture ofAmnesia (New York and London: 
Rouledge, 1995), p. 8. 
84 Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental TheoloKv. trans. 
David Smith (New York: Seabary Press, 1980), p. 173. 
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According to Metz, in this amnesia, religious subjectivity - the human being as subject 
before God - is lost. Metz argues that the 'contemporary subject' defines his or her 
existence only by what can be counted, measured, and identified as success or gain. For 
Metz, religious subjectivity requires memory; an obligation to remember human misery, 
dependence, past suffering and the voiceless dead. Whereas in the eyes of modem society 
suffering is to be rejected, for Metz 'the happiness of the descendants cannot compensate 
for the sufferings of the ancestors and social progress cannot make up for the injustice 
done to the dead' . 
81 As Metz observes, oppressed peoples commonly maintain their sense 
of themselves by telling their own stories, which are often stories of suffering. 
Characteristically these stories do not place the suffering within some larger, quasi- 
explanatory framework. The same is true of Elie Wiesel, for whom writing is an attempt 
to rescue individuals from the anonymity of 'history'. He writes, ' To be a Jew means 
safeguarding one's past at a time when mankind aspires only to conquer the future. 86 In 
contrast, the oppressor's view of history is just such a quasi-explanatory framework. It 
celebrates the victories, investing them with an aura of righteous inevitability. Against 
such triumphalism, those who have suffered have nothing to set but the simple, brute fact 
of suffering. Yet that fact in its starkness and simplicity becomes a powerful form of 
protest. Together, teller and tale resist assimilation, disturbing the teller's totalising claim. 
'The task of a historical and interpretative memory is at the heart of deconstruction' 
At the heart of deconstruction is an understanding of memory, anamnesis, which runs 
counter to evolutionary thinking, and has elements in common with Jewish Rabbinic 
tradition. Elie Wiesel writes- 
85 Ibid., p. 75. 
86 Elie Wiesel, A Jew Today (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 7. 
For an interesting discussion, placing Johann Metz's thinking alongside that of Elie Wiesel, see Michon 
Marie Matthiescn, 'Narrative of Suffering: Complementary Reflections of Theological Anthropology in 
Johann Metz and Elie Wiesel, in Religion and Literature 18: 2, Summer 1986,47-63. 
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What, precisely, did being a good Jew mean? It meant taldng upon 
oneself the entire destiny of the Jewish people; it meant living in more 
than one period, listening to more than one discourse, being part of 
more than one system; it meant accepting the teachings of Hiflel as 
well as Shamai, and following Rabbi Akiba. no less passionately than 
, 87 one followed his adversary, Rabbi Ishmael ... 
Since there is no extra-linguistic perspective available to human beings, memory is a 
never-ending exercise in writing and testimony; texts in conversation with other texts, 
struggling to do justice to particular experiences and insights. 88 Harold Fisch explores the 
role of testimony in the Hebrew Bible, showing the ways in which texts 'come to life 
again' in new circumstances, yielding new meanings. For example, the Song of Moses 4: ) 
echoes through the Psalms and the Prophets. The poem'... is a presence evoked and re- 
evoked in other times and settings and in other poeMS'. 89 We have the disturbing shock of 
recogmtion as a remembered text comes at us charged with a new historical urgency. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, much Holocaust literature self-consciously explores this 
tradition, with subtle and jarring allusion to biblical narratives, which serve to register the 
horror and incomprehensibility of the events. 
Such anamnesis is an acknowledgement of excess and the ineffability of human suffering, 
an attempt to witness to that which is forgotten in our attempts to memorialise. It is a 
tradition which refuses to countenance the enforced linearity of master narratives, in 
Lyotard's terms, 'put[ting] forward the unpresentable in presentation itself . 
90 Aleida 
87 From the Kingdom ofMemory, op. cit., p. 25. 
88 This is in contrast, for example, to the ways in which the Hebrew Bible has been appropriated by 
Christian scholars. For example, in his essay 'Persons or Figures', Levinas castigates a Christian 
VAjological approach which views the sacred texts of the Jewish tradition through the palimpsest of The 
Passion. 'When it is claimed that Noah's Ark is significant only in that its wood prefigures the future 
Cross, or that the wells sunk by Isaac prepare us for the meeting between the Samaritan woman and Jesus, 
or that Miriam's leprosy symbolises Mary's whiteness, or the burning bush prefigures the crown of thorns, 
all this brings us to a stage of logic that surpasses logic or precedes it' (Emmanuel Levinas, 'Persons or 
Figures', in Difficult Freedom, op. cit., p. 120). 
89 Harold Fisch, Poetty with a Purpose: Biblical Poetics and Interpretation (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 65. 
90 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, op. cit., p. 81. 
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Assmann calls this the concept of counter-memory, where memory has the function of 
producing and keeping up dissonance. 91 Such memory, according to Assmann, provides 
the possibility of transcending a given context and relating to a different set of values. In 
Heidegger and the Jews, Lyotard makes the point that the very attempt to remember or 
memorialise can often 'forget' by having too definite, too representative, too narrativised a 
memory. In another suggestive passage, Lyotard writes, 
By the 'immemorial', I try to express another time, where what is past 
maintains the presence of the past, where the forgotten remains 
unforgettable precisely because it is forgotten. This is what I mean by 
anamnesis as opposed to memory. In the time set out by concept and 
will, the project is only the 'projection' of present consequences on the 
future (as in 'faturology'). This kind of projection forbids the event; it 
prepares, preconceives, controls it in advance. This is the time of the 
Pentagon, the FBI, Security, the time of the Empire. 92 
Lyotard believes that we owe a debt to the Jewish tradition - that singular debt of an 
interminable anamnesis. There is obviously an important contrast between such a notion of 
anamnesis and the term as it is used in Plato. Plato's notion of 'anamnesis' is analagous to 
his understanding of 'mimesis'. For Plato the good painter is he or she who reproduces 
images already engraved in the soul, submitting to the ultimate authority of a logos, 
remembering what the soul must already (however remotely) have known. Platonic 
anamnesis is a re-collection of spiritual truths which the soul has forgotten in its fallen 
state, but can still be summoned to the mind through the disciplines of self-knowledge. For 
philosophers like Lyotard, there are no essences or universals to be remembered by 
enlightened reason. The unrepresentable is what all representation must strive to represent 
and what it must also be aware of not being able to represent. In this aporia, the value of 
thinking, writing and painting is insofar as they do not forget the obligation to the 
91 See Aleida Assmann, 'The Sun at Midnight: The Concept of Counter-Memory and its Changes', in 
Leona Toker (ed. ), Commitment in Reflection: Essa in Literature andMoral Philosophy (New York and 
London, 1994), p. 223f. 
92 Jean-Francois Lyotard, 'What is justT, in Richard Kearney, States ofMind: Dialogues with 
Contemporary Thinkers of the European Mind (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 303. 
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forgotten but persist in 'writing' the impossibility of either remembering or forgetting it 
completely. 
There is a hatred of literature in the writer, of art in the painter: it is 
the love of what art and literature conceal by representing it, and 
which it is therefore necessary to represent, and conceal again. 93 
It is thus a question, and it will always be a question, of unveiling 
anew what the gesture of unveiling has veiled, which is repeated in the 
tradition from Plato to Nietzsche; it will be a question of making 
understood that the unveiled is never the truth (since the unveiled is 
always the veiled, as the named is always the betrayal of the 
unnameable), but that the truth is the unveiling, and that the forgotten 
94 of thought as metaphysics (and physics) cannot be presented!. 
Lyotard argues for a certain 'literature' or modem poetics to counter conceptual thinking, 
a writing of exile, wandering and rootlessness, which never forgets that there is the 
forgotten and never stops writing its failure to remember. The following chapter will 
explore the possibility of such literature in relation to the Holocaust. 
93 Lyotard, Political Writings, trans. Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman (London: UCL Press, 1993), 
p. 34. 
94 Ibid., p. 60. 
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Chapter 2 
THE FINAL SOLUTION AND THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION 
No word intoned from on high, not even a theological one, exists rightfully after 
Auschwitz without a transformation'. I 
'The just man has a thousand truths, and that's his tragedy; the murderer has one alone, 
and that's his strength. 2 
'Memory means to live in more than one world,, to be tolerant and understanding with one 
another, to accept the mystery inherent in questions and the suspicion linked to answers. 13 
The Ideology of the Holocaust 
The basis of my argument has been that issues of ethics are inseparable from issues of 
narrative and representation. The ways in which we 'make' our worlds have consequences 
for the ways in which we act. Literary and historical worlds are never pure of each other, 
representations are responsible not just for interpretation of events but responses to them. 
This is seen no-where more powerfully than in the Holocaust. There is a curiously 'literal' 
quality about the language of the Final Solution. Was it, in fact, easier, asks James 
Young4, for the Germans to use Zyklon-B (roach gas) to 'exterminatethe Jews after 
having equated them figuratively for so many years with vermin? As Heinz Hohne writes, 
I Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum, 1983), p-367- 
2 Elie Wiesel, From the Kingdom ofMemory (New York: Schocken Books, 1990), P-25. 
3 Ibid., p. 195. 
4 James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), p. 93. 
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'The system and the rhythm of mass extermination were directed not by sadists ... [but by] 
worthy family men brought up in the belief that anti-Semitism was a form of pest control, 
harnessed into an impersonal mechanical system working with the precision of militarized 
industry and relieving the individual of any sense of personal responsibillty'. 5Through 
language the victim was deprived of subjectivity, which enabled the enactment of the 
narrative programme of extermination. Art Spiegelman's two-volume cartoon narrative of 
the Holocaust Maus,, disturbingly exposes the banality of this language. 6 These books 
present the language of the Holocaust quite literally - the Nazis are pictured as cats, the 
Jews as n-&e. There is a double irony here, as this very literalism exposes the banality of 
the Nazi discourse. At the same time,, in reading these books, one is conscious of entering 
a world at once familiar and unfamiliar - we are encouraged to identify with the characters 
but there is a sense of entering what has been called Punivers concentrationnaire (a world 
apart). Furthermore, the cartoon-strip format is a distancing strategy, which belies any 
attempt to 'reconstruct' the Holocaust in mimetic terms. 
David Roskies points out that the Nazis encouraged the Jewish people to interpret the 
events of the Holocaust in terms of established paradigms - in other words, the 'success' 
of the Final Solution relied upon the power of historical narrative. 7 The Nazis understood 
5 Heinz Hohne, quoted in Peter Haidu, 'The Dialectics of Unspeakability: Language, Silence, and the 
Narratives of Desubjectification', Saul Friedlander (ed-), Probing the Limits ofRepresentation: Nazism and 
the "Final Solution" (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 289, 
In the opinion of Herbert C. Kelman, moral inhibitions against violent atrocities tend to be eroded once 
three conditions are met, singly or together: the violence is authorized, routinized, and the victims of the 
violence dehumanized (Herbert C. Kelman, 'Violence without Moral Restraint', in Journal ofSocial 
Issues, vol. 29,29-61 - quoted in Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, 
p. 2 1). 
6 Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) 
7 David Roskies, Against the Apocalypse (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
p. 14. The same point is made by the historian Raul Hilberg (The Destruction of the European Jews, New 
York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1985): 'The German Nazis, then, did not discard the past-, they 
built on it. They did not begin a development; they completed it. In the deep recesses of anti-Jewish 
history we shall find many of the administrative and psychological tools with which the Nazis 
implemented their destruction process. In the hollows of the past we shall also discover the roots of the 
characteristic Jewish response to an outside attack'. 
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that the Jews are historically minded, interpreting current events in terms of themes from 
the past. Thus, for example, the Nazis reinstituted the Renaissance ghetto, the medieval 
yellow star and the seventeenth-century Jewish councils, as well as co-ordinating actions 
with the Jewish calendar. The effect was to encourage their victims to perceive their 
circumstances in the light of the past and ancient archetypes and so encourage a 
paradigmatic response to and understanding of their predicament. The Nazis were thus 
able to screen from view the difference of the Holocaust until it was too late. 
In Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) Zygmunt Bauman proposes that the Holocaust is 
, 
... a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modem society'. 8 
He suggests that: 
... the rules of instrumental rationality are singularly incapable of 
preventing such phenomena; that there is nothing in those rules which 
disqualifies the Holocaust-style methods of 'social engineering' as 
improper or, indeed, the actions they served as irrational. I suggest, 
further, that the bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society 
as an object of administration, as a collection of so many 'problems' to 
be solved, as 'nature' to be controlled, 'mastered' and 'improved' or 
I remade', as a legitimate target for 'social engineering', and in general 
a garden to be designed and kept in the planned shape by force ... was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the Holocaust could be 
conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to its 
conclusion. 9 
Bauman sees racism as resonant with the world-view and practice of modernity, a 
scientifically founded work aimed at the institution of a new and better social order. In 
this utopian world-view, science was seen as an instrument of power capable of improving 
on reality and re-shaping it according to human plans and designs. In this perspective,, 
genocide was not the work of destruction, but creation. Bauman suggests that gardening 
and medicine supplied the paradigms of this enterprise, while the management of human 
8 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, op. cit., p. 12. 
Bauman points to the danger of seeing the Holocaust as a 'Jewish' or 'German' problem, which prevents 
the experience from being seen as a universal problem of the modem human condition. 
9 Ibid., p. 18. 
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affairs was seen in terms of normality, health and sanitation. Human society became the 
object of planning and organisation, which, like garden vegetation or a living organism, 
could not be left to their own devices, lest they be infected by weeds or cancerous tissue. 
Thus,, Hitler's language and rhetoric were full of images of disease and infection. He told 
Himmler in 1942 that 'The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions 
that have taken place in the world. The battle in which we are engaged today is of the 
same sort as the battle waged, during the last century, by Pasteur and Koch. How many 
diseases have their origin in the Jewish virus ... We shall regain our health only by 
eliminating the Jew'. 10 In other words, the language of instrumental rationality succeeds 
in casting the victims in a position from which they cannot challenge the actor as a source 
of moral demands; in Levinas' terms, the victims may no longer confront the actor as a 
'face'. II 
Hannah Arendt was thinking in these terms when she wrote of the, banality of evil', 12a 
theme which William Styron explores in his novel Sophie's Choice (1976). 13 'In the world 
of the crematoriums hatred is a reckless and incontinent passion, incompatible with the 
10 Quoted in Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 71. 
II See Bauman's appendix to Modernity and the Holocaust: "Social Manipulation of Morality: 
Moralizing Actors, Adiaphorizing Action". 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, as in Postmodern Ethics, Bauman argues that theories of Goodness and 
Justice have precisely the effect of neutralising the moral demand. Similarly, Lyotard writes: 'As regards 
ethical decisions, if it had to authorise itself by involdng theories of Goodness or Justice, it would forfeit 
its ethical character forthwith. Why? Because it would lose all responsibility for what it decides 
submitting itself to the authority of theory. Decisions are ethical precisely when they are not authorised by 
a system (intelligible or otherwise), when they take upon themselves the responsibility for their 
ýc authority". An SS torturer is not ignoble because Hitler's "theory" was false, but because he refuses his 
own responsibility and believes himselflustified by obedience. Arendt refers to this as the 'banality of 
evil' - the banalisation of responsibility by 'necessity'. Necessity here is poverty, but it is also theory 
which is the poverty of morality' (Lyotard, 'What is justT, in Richard Kearney, States ofMind. - Dialogues 
with Contemporary Thinkers of the European Allind, p. 300). 
12 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1977). 
13 William Styron, Sophie's Choice (London: Corgi Books, 1980) 
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humdrum nature of the quotidian task'. 14 Reflecting on the character of Rudolf Hoss, 
governor of Auschwitz, the novel's narrator contrasts 'imaginary evil' with 'real evil'. 
This 'imaginary evil' -... to quote Simone Weil-'is romantic and 
varied, while real evil is gloomy, monotonous, barren, boring. ' 
Beyond doubt those words characterize Rudolf Hoss and the workings 
of his mind ... Hoss was hardly a sadist, nor was he a violent man or 
even particularly menacing. He might even be said to have possessed 
a serviceable decency. Indeed, Jerzy Rawicz, the Polish editor of 
Hoss's autobiography, himself a survivor of Auschwitz, has the 
wisdom to rebuke his fellow prisoners for the depositions they had 
made charging Hoss with beatings and torture. 'Hoss would never 
stoop to such things, Rawicz insists. 'He had more important duties to 
perform. ' The Commandant was a homebody ... 
but one dedicated 
blindly to duty and a cause; thus he became a mere servomechanism in 
which a moral vacuum had been so successffilly sucked clean of every 
molecule of real qualm or scruple that his own descriptions of the 
unutterable crimes he perpetrated daily seem often to float outside and 
apart from evil, phantasms of cretinous innocence. 15 
Much the same can be said of the S. S. doctor Jernand von Niemand'. In the terrifying 
scene at the climax of the novel we learn of Sophie's 'choice'. Sophie and her two 
children undergo the 'selection' between those to be immediately murdered at Birkenau 
and those to be sent to the slave labour camp at Auschwitz. When he discovers that 
Sophie is a Christian, von Niemand allows Sophie to choose life for one of her children; 
the other will be sent to the gas. Styron suggests that there was a perverted religious 
motivation behind this man's forcing upon Sophie her terrible dilemma. 
The banalit,, of the Final Solution has left von Niemand with no consciousness of sin - he 
is merely a functionary in an industrial process. In a perversion of Pauline theology,, 
therefore, he sins boldly16- projects himself beyond the banality of the system he serves - 
in an attempt to restore his belief in God. 
14 Ibid., p. 205. 
15 Ibid., p. 201. 
16 Romans 5: 20: 'Law came in to increase the trespass, but where sin increased, grace abounded all the 
more'. See also Mark 2: 17: 'It is not the healthy who need a doctor, but the sick. I have not come to cal I 
the righteous, but sinners'. 
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But of course the answer finally dawned on him [von Niemand], and 
one day I suspect the revelation made him radiant with hope. It had to 
do with the matter of sin, or rather, it had to do with the absence of 
sin, and his own realization that the absence of sin and the absence of 
God were inseparably intertwined. No sin! He had suffered boredom 
and anxiety, and even revulsion, but no sense of sin from the bestial 
crimes he had been party to, nor had he felt that in sending thousands 
of the wretched innocent to oblivion he had transgressed against 
divine law. All had been unutterable monotony. All of his depravity 
had been enacted in a vacuum of sinless and businesslike godlessness, 
while his soul thirsted for beatitude. 
Was it not supremely simple, then, to restore his belief in God, and 
at the same time to affirm his human capacity for evil, by committing 
the most intolerable sin that he was able to conceive? Goodness could 
come later. But first a great sin. One whose glory lay in its subtle 
magnanimity -a choice. After all, he had the power to take both. 17 
Real eviL it seems, eradicates any sense of sin, or lack, or incompleteness - the confidence 
of its language drains the world of mystery and obligation, and thus eradicates any sense 
of God. Kenneth Surin describes this as a religious language without an eschatological 
dimension. The literal language of the Final Solution cannot accommodate hope as a 
significant category of experience. Surin writes: 
Hope is a modality of love, and where there is no love there can be no 
hope. And where there is no hope there can be no faith in the God of 
the future; and where there is no faith in the God of the future there 
can be no surrendering of our own future into the hands of God, no 
trust in the mystery of God. This is perhaps why von Niemand 
snatches so desperately at the chance to engineer his own salvation. 
His faith - for he is a religious man - lacks an eschatological 
dimension, and hence resides in the 'already' of the God who instead 
of the 'not yet' of the God who is to come. Without an understanding 
of the God of the future, the God of the Resurrection, the God who 
brings about the death of death, the reality of the present becomes the 
only available horizon for human thought and action. 18 
We return, - then, to 
Derrida's notion,, following Walter Benjamin, of the 'fall' of language 
into representation. 19 In Nazi propaganda, language died (and became deadly). The Final 
17 Sophie's Choice, pp. 646-647. 
18 Kenneth Surin, 'Atonement and Moral Apocalypticism: William Styron's Sophie's Choice', in New 
Blackfriars, July/August 1983,311. 
19 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority', in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 29f. 
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Solution may be seen as an attempt to eliminate from Western thought the 
unrepresentable, represented by the Jews. In the wake of the Holocaust, too,. the 
survivor and the artist are faced with the ethical problem of how responsibly to witness to 
the Holocaust without trivialising it or imposing narrative order upon it. Writers are 
invested with a responsibility to acknowledge textuality, the possibilities and slippages 
within language, as well as its inadequacy in the face of the enormity of events. 
As Roland Barthes insisted,, the 'healthy' linguistic sign is one which draws attention to its 
own arbitrariness - which does not claim to be 'natural' but, in the very moment of 
conveying a meaning, communicates something of its relative, artificial status as well. 
Signs which claim to be 'natural', which offer themselves as the only conceivable way of 
viewing the world, are authoritarian and ideological. In Terry Eagleton's words, 'It is one 
of the functions of ideology to "naturalise" social reality, to make it seem as innocent and 
unchangeable as Nature itself Ideology seeks to convert culture into Nature, and the 
I natural' sign is one of its weapons. Saluting a flag, or agreeing that Western democracy 
represents the true meaning of the word 'freedom', become the most obvious, spontaneous 
responses in the world'. 20 
Derrida writes of the evil,. or lethal power, which comes to language precisely by way of 
representation. For Deffida, discourse, literature and poetry after the Holocaust must 
reflect a 'language of names', 'a language or a poetics of appellation, in opposition to a 
language of signs, of informative or communicative representation, beyond myth and 
representation but not beyond names'. In the Holocaust names became numbers,, 
individuals became a nameless mass. It was precisely 'the name'which the Nazis sought to 
destroy, for the name represents the possibility of singularity which for Derrida is the 
20 Terrv Eagleton, Literary Theorv: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) p. 135. 
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demand forjustice. For Derrida, to name is not to represent, it is not to communicate by 
signs, that is, by means of means in view of an end. The name represents' the law that 
transcends representation and withholds the unique, all uniqueness, from its reinscription 
in an order of generality or of comparison. 21 
For Derrida, the language of names is an antidote to the 'fallen' , 
dead' language which 
breeds forgetfulness and indifference, the impulses which led to the Holocaust. As Wiese] 
I puts it , the opposite of love is not hate but indifference ... What is worse than death? - 
killing death through indifference'. Similarly, Lyotard writes in Ae Differend, reflecting 
on the Nazi attempt to eradicate traces of the 'Final Solution', in terms of Nazi logic 'This 
death must therefore be killed,, and that is what is worse than death. For, if death can be 
exterminated., it is because there is nothing to kill. Not even the name Jew'. 22 
Problematics of Holocaust Representation 
The Holocaust writer is charged with an awesome responsibility and difficulty, which is an 
ethical responsibility - the need to keep language and memory alive, to witness to names, 
to fight indifference and complicity with those who sought to erase memory. Yet the 
Holocaust experience represents such a decisive break with other experience. Holocaust 
autobiographers are painfully aware that whatever the form and content of their narrative, 
they have not succeeded in conveying the past adequately. Elie Wiesel feels that7 though 
his autobiographical Night is the centre of his work, 'what happened during that 
night ... will not 
be revealed'. 23Throughout his texts there is an unresolved conflict between 
the urge to cry out and the need to remain silent. Saul Friedlander writes of his own 
autobiography, II will never be able to express what I want to say; these lines, often 
21 Derrida, 'Force of Law', op. cit., p. 62. 
22 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Differend, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 10 1 
23 Harry James Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel (New York; Paramus; Toronto: Paulist Press, 
1976), P. 86. 
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clumsy, are very far removed, I know from my memories, and even my memories retrieve 
only sparse fragments of my parents' existence,. of their world,, of the time when I was a 
child'. 24 
Language cannot go beyond the constraints of the human intellect and imagination. 
George Steiner compares the impotence of language in the face of the Holocaust with the 
problem of religious language. 25 Steiner suggests that Auschwitz, a new universe, marks 
the abandonment of the human and regression to bestiality, which 'both precedes 
language, as it does in the animal7 and comes after language as it does in death'. 26 
Similarly, Elie Wiesel has written , Where was I to discover a fresh vocabulary, a primeval 
language? The language of night was not human; it was primitive, almost animal - hoarse 
shouting, screaming, muffled moaning, savage howling, the sounds of beating ... 
A brute 
strikes wildly, a body falls; an officer raises an arm and a whole community walks toward 
a common grave; a soldier shrugs his shoulders and a thousand families are torn apart, to 
be reunited only by death. Such was the language of the concentration camp'. 27 
How does one witness to this primeval chaos in a language which, by its very nature, is 
committed to order,. structures of grammar and syntax? How does one witness to 
discontinuity and uniqueness in language which is a web of continuities and associations. 
Moreover, any representation must be an abstraction, since, in addition to its content, it 
represents the exclusion of other perspectives. 
24 Quoted in Joseph Sungolowsky, 'Holocaust and Autobiography: Wiesel, Friedlander, Pisar', in 
Randolph L. Braham (ed. ), Reflections of the Holocaust in Art and Literature (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), p. 13 5. 
25 George Steiner, 'The Long Life of Metaphor: An Approach to "the Shoah"', in Encounter 48: 2 (1987), 
55-61. 
26 Ibid., p. 55 
27 Elie Wiese], 'Why I Write', in From the Kingdom ofMemory, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Analogies, too, are impossible. Descriptions rely on comparison. Analogies are embedded 
in all attempts to communicate - this event, of which we do not know, is like that event of 
which we know at least a little. But what if there is nothing with which to make a 
comparison? What we see in the camps is not just the worst of our world intensified? How 
is Holocaust testimony to register this sense of the uncommunicable? 
Holocaust writers are also afraid of eloquence; a language too sure of itself and 'in 
control'would be a betrayal of so many deaths. This is the meaning of Theodor Adomo's 
provocative call for 'no poetry after Auschwitz'. Further, we cannot share with the vistims, 
in imagination or fact, the experience of extermination. Whoever has not lived through the 
event can never know it. And whoever has lived through it can never fully reveal it. 
Since language presupposes community and belonging, how can it approach the 
experience of abjection? As Lyotard expresses it, 'To be unable to declare one's plight and 
excluded from interlocution altogether, as the victims of the concentration camps were, is 
to plumb depths of abjection which may be impossible to translate into the common 
discourse of our communities. The ordeal of being forgotten cannot be expressed in the 
sharing of speech which is ignorant of it'. 
The worst fear is that Holocaust art generates an inability to hear, or rather, one hears 
words but cannot take them in. The words do not communicate the reality. The horrors of 
the Holocaust are dissipated into such meaningless abstractions as the six million. Six 
million? A number incapable of internalisation. Just as Nazism traded in a bureaucratic 
deadening of language ('the final solution', 'special treatment', 'the race and resettlement 
laws'), the Holocaust writer is in danger of achieving no more than bland generality. This 
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is why Elie Wiesel insists that he writes to sur 28 prise, not to inform. One can only begin to 
approach the horror by reflecting on individual examples which manifest the horror of the 
whole. This is part of the significance of the Jewish insight that 'Whoever saves one life 
saves the world in time. Such witness is as necessary as ever, given that wars are 
increasingly fought at a distance from the enemy, sanitised by technology and bureaucracy, 
as well as physical distance. Wiesel has contended that the publicity accorded to the 
Holocaust made later atrocities easier to commit and easier to absorb into history. 
Similarly, there is a danger that Holocaust education may inculcate a sense that we know 
it all already, as the story is narrativised and its 'scandal' evaporated. 
The Holocaust survivor and writer are therefore caught in a double bind - the unavoidable 
question, How can we dare to speak? has an unavoidable answer, Simply because we 
cannot dare not to speak. There is the silence which acknowledges inadequacy and the 
silence which constitutes betrayal - ignoring reality because reality has become 
unpalatable. So we have the ambivalence of a writer like Elie Wiesel who, as he feels he 
must bear witness, also feels that silence is the only option; that to try to speak or write 
intelligibly, interpretively about Auschwitz is to misconceive totally the nature of the 
event. However, as Leon Wieseltier puts it, Holocaust autobiographies are 'all the more 
illuminating, because memory is the consciousness of things and events that have notyet 
disappeared completely into knowledge'. 291n Lyotard's terms, we can do nothing more 
than witness to the unpresentable or communicate the impossibility of communication. For 
Wiesel this means the dialectic of silence and language - of transmitting silence through 
I language. Wiesel has said in an interview with Harry J. Cargas , 
If I could communicate 
what I have to say through not publishing, I would do it. If I could, to use a poetic image, 
28 Lily Edelman, 'A Conversation with Elie Wiesel, in Harry J. Cargas (ed. ), Responses to Elie Wiesel: 
Critical Essays by Major Jewish and Christian Scholars (New York: Persea Books, 1978), p. 10. 
29 Joseph Sungolowsky, op. cit., pp. 13 5-6 
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communicate a Silence through silence I would do so. Perhaps I am not strong enough or 
wise enough. I try to communicate that Silence through wordS'. 30 
The challenge for the Holocaust writer or artist is to maintain the Holocaust as a scandal, 
retaining the scriptural force of that word -a stumbling block, a scandal to rationalisation. 
If, in Foucault's terms, power's success is proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms, then there is a need for art which openly declares its status as art, witnessing 
to an unrepresentable 'other', evoking a sense of what Lyotard calls dispossession. 
Dispossession commonly refers to events which prevent consciousness from being the 
subject of traditions, disciplines and interpretations. An 'it happens' is momentarily 
unconnected to acts of thought, to what has 'already been thought, written, painted in 
order to determine what hasn't been'. Dispossession involves 'disarming all grasping 
intelligence': a 'protection of the occurrence "before" defending it, by illustration of 
commentary' shifts cognition from its fanatical dependency on representations to 
experiences which may be without reason. 3lMoreover, according to Lyotard 
'dispossession' frustrates attempts to narrativise history or rely on preconceived models or 
paradigms. In Sande Cohen's words, dispossession 'refers to practices wherein objects do 
not symbolise: they do not connect desire and history or desire and sociality, but instead 
allow for an exteriorization of force which sidesteps the collective sociological ego. 32 
Such dispossession makes indifference impossible. For Lyotard, such an aesthetics of the 
sublime will enable us to see only by making it impossiblefor us to see. 
The Holocaust as Myth and History 
30 Harry J Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel, op. cit., p. 5. 
31 Lyotard 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde', quoted in Sande Cohen., 'Between Image and Phrase', in 
Saul Friedlander, op. cit., p. 178. 
32 Ibid., p. 178. 
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If the task of the witness is to witness to the unpresentable and transmit silence through 
language, then this has important consequences for an understanding of 'history' and 
memory'. We are always in danger of reducing the texture of history to a linear narrative 
- this, it seems, is the danger of those 'communitarian' approaches to ethics which 
emphasise narrative continuity. 33 A linear conception of history represents precisely the 
fall of language into representation which Derrida describes - an essentially ideological 
understanding of language. The Holocaust ren-ýinds us of a different ethical sense of 
history -a responsibility to retain the memory of the unpresentable. By erecting 
monuments, or memorialising Particular places, the rhetoric of the monument is easily 
mistaken for the nature of the events it communicates. As James Young observes in a 
study of Holocaust memorials and meaning, this confusion is most striking in the case of 
monuments located at the sites of the original concentration camps, where a sense of 
authentic place tends to literalise the meanings assigned. The memorial camps invite us to 
mistake their reality for the actual death-camps' reality and to confuse a monumentalised 
vision with unmediated history. 34 Art becomes guilty of a second holocaust when the 
Holocaust is mythicised, made conceivable and representational; it becomes subject to the 
same' E4,11' into representation which enabled the Holocaust itself 
Perhaps the most responsible memorials are, once again, those which draw attention to 
themselves as pieces of human artifice, inadequate, fractured. Tadeusz Augustynek was 
commissioned to design a memorial that might simultaneously construct the memory of a 
lost community and commemorate the tremendurn in Jewish memory. 35The result is a 
freestanding tombstone-wall, twenty-five metres long and six-metres high, assembled out 
of the shards of shattered headstones - with a small cluster of shattered headstones still 
33 See discussion of ethics and narrative in Introduction. 
34 See James E. Young, op. cit., pp. 172f. 
35 Ibid., p. 179. 
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standing before it. Rather than attempting to mend Jewish memory, the makers of this wall 
have built into it the irreparable break in the continuity of both Jewish life and memory- 
the wall itself is torn by a jagged and gaping crack. 
Once again, anamnesis is to remember that there is more than language can signify, that to 
conceptualise is to reduce, exclude, forget; a memory and a recognition of that which has 
never and can never be known. The past is remembered as past and as unassimilable, an 
absent presence; another time in which, to quote Lyotard, the 'forgotten remains 
unforgetable precisely because it is forgotten'. 36 As Derrida has written recently,, 
An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. 
Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to 
reaffirm by choosing. 'One must' means one must filter, sift, criticize, 
one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same 
injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion around a secret. If 
the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if 
it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would 
never have anything to inherit from it. We would be affected by it as 
by a cause - natural or genetic. One always inherits from a secret - 
which says 'read me, will you ever be able to do so? '3 7 
This ethical call ,II must'. 
is a call to sustain the difference between the 'fallen' language of 
representation - the naturalised language of ideology - and textuality, that interminable 
web of signifiers, rich and multi-layered but never finally interpretable and never adequate 
to its task. It is a call to be attentive to more than one discourse rather than to seek 
resolution. For Wiesel, this, too, is the task of the Jew. 'What, precisely, did being a good 
Jew mean? It meant taking upon oneself the entire destiny of the Jewish people, it meant 
living in more than one period, listening to more than one discourse, being part of more 
than one System ... '38 The memory of 'different possibles that inhabit the same injunction' 
easily gives way to a collective memory confident in its priorities and interpretations, the 
memory of myth and resolution. 
36 Lyotard, 'What isjust? ', op. cit., p. 303. 
37 Jacques Derrida, Specters ofAfarx. tr. Peggy Katnuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 16. 
38 Elie Wiesel, 'To Believe or Not to Believe', in From the Kingdom ofAlemory op. cit., p. 25. 
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As Elaine Scarry reminds us, the mind is better able to remember events which invite 
strong interpretation. 39 The ease or difficulty with which any given phenomenon can be 
verbally represented also influences the ease or difficulty with which it can be forgotten. 
In her book The Body in Pain (1985), Scarry argues that physical pain resists and actively 
destroys language; its resistance to language is essential to what pain is. '-physical pain - 
unlike any other state of consciousness - has no referential content. It is not of orfor 
anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other 
phenomenon, resists objectification in language'. 40 As a consequence, those phenomena 
which can be represented more easily tend to assume greater importance in political 
discussions; discourses of strength tend to obscure those of weakness. Scarry writes- 
If, for example, it were easier to express intellectual aspiration than 
bodily hunger, one would expect to find that the problem of education 
had a greater degree of social recognition than the problem of 
malnutrition or famine; or again, if property (as well as the ways in 
which property can be jeopardized) were easier to describe than bodily 
disability (as well as the ways in which a disabled person can be 
jeopardized), then one would not be astonished to discover that a 
society had developed sophisticated procedures for protecting 'property 
rights' long before it had succeeded in formulating the concept of 'the 
rights of the handicapped'. 41 
It is for these reasons that the phenomenon of Holocaust denial is a possibility; that which 
cannot be comprehended is easily denied. This would seem to be the significance of Elie 
Wiesel's striking objection to the Christian notion of 'forgiveneSS'. 42For Wiesel, 
forgiveness implies the forgetfulness of a closed narrative. To forgive, implies Wiesel, is to 
blot out, to forget, whereas the antidote to indifference is the memory of that 
unpresentable brokenness signified by the fractured wall of Augustynek's scultpture. 
39 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain. - The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and London: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). 
40 rbid., p. 5. 
41 [bid., p. 12. 
42 See, for example, Wiesel, 'When Memory Brings People Together', in From the Kingdom ofAlemory, 
op. cit., p. 194. 
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'The Evil Demon of Images': The Holocaust and Cinemagraphic Testimony 
The difficulties of Holocaust representation are perhaps most acute in relation to the 
medium of film. Implicit in the lateral movement of film is a sense of sequence, a linear 
causality that suggests explanations, or narrative understandings, of events. 
Wiesel states the problem thus: 
Why this determination to show 'everything' in pictures? A word, a 
glance - silence itself communicates more and better. How, after all, 
can one illustrate famine, terror, the solitude of old people deprived of 
strength and orphans robbed of their future? How can one "stage" a 
convoy of uprooted deportees being sent into the unknown, or the 
liquidation of thousands and thousands of men, women and children? 
How can one "produce" the machine-gunned, the gassed, the mutilated 
corpses, when the viewer knows that they are all actors, and that after 
the filming they will return to the hotel for a well-deserved bath and a 
meal? 43 
The tyranny of the media image is its very claim to be real. How does one avoid 
trivialising human suffering by subjecting it to an intrusive 'realism'. How does one avoid 
the sensations of voyeurism and suspense? Film provides a possibility of providing a 
mimesis of everything, however extreme. Does such a 'direct' approach actually 
communicate the horrors? Wiesel writes of the danger of demystifying death by subjecting 
it to the intrusion of media imagery. 'All is trivial and superficial, even death itself there is 
no mystery in its mystery. It is stripped naked, just as the dead are stripped and exposed to 
the dubious enjoyment of spectators turned voyeurs'. 44Wiesel stresses that in the Jewish 
tradition death is a private, intimate matter, and we are forbidden to transform it into a 
spectacle. 
Geoffrey Hartman cites Lessing's notion that the highest kind of art may 'invent allusions' 
to our damaged life and our mortality, but it may not present them as such. 41 Hartman 
43 Elie Wiese], 'Trivializing Memory'. in From the Kingdom ofNfemory. op. cit.. pp. 167-168. 
44 fbid., p. 17 1. 
45 Geoff-rey H. Hartman, 'The Book of the Destruction', in Saul Friedlander (ed. ), op. cit., p. 327. 
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suggests that such reticence may be realistic in its estimate of what will move rather than 
overwhelm or incite disbelief Hesiod said that the fear of the gods was alleviated by 
giving them distinct shapeS46' so too our fear of the evil in human beings is alleviated by 
such super-mimesis. Lyotard would like to believe that art makes things a little harder to 
see, yet, as Hartman points out, the popular exploitation of the Holocaust in film suggests 
instead a repetition of the imaginative and ethical error that defamed the victims. With the 
conventions of cinema, and the paradoxical distance which cinema realism creates, once 
more, the victims become objectified and distanced from the audience. As Baudrillard 
insists,. it is precisely when it appears most truthful, most faithful and most in conforn-lity 
to reality that the film image is most diabolical. It is the very 'reality' of cinema image 
which makes it diabolical, because it anticipates reality, cooling and neutralising the 
meaning. Baudrfllard charges film images with creating artificial memories which obliterate 
people's memories, which obliterate people from memory. The Holocaust is aestheticised 
and forgotten. The pervasiveness of film imagery generates a lack of differentiation 
between image and reality which no longer leaves room for representation as such. 47 
If films are to be responsible witnesses to the unpresentable, the difficulty is to challenge 
the narrowly-circumscribed Hollywood conventions of story-telling and reflect critically 
on the limits and impasses of film as well as utilizing its potential. 
A self-reflexive way of encoding history is called for, the kind of historiography that 
probes most radically the limits of representation, the rejection of narrativity, the 
proliferation of perspectives - texts which deliberately draw attention to their style or to 
the way they are put together. 
46 Ibid., p. 331. 
47 See Jean Baudrillard, 'The Evil Demon of Images', in Power Institute Publications, Number 3. 
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One way of focusing this debate is to look at the work of two film-makers who address 
these issues in very different ways - Steven Spielberg's Schindler's List (1993) and 
Claude Lanzmann's Shoah (1985). Critical opinion has tended to polarise into an 
opposition between these twofIMS. 48 However, this is to over-simplify the issues. As 
Minam Bratu Hansen puts it, 
The critique of Schindler's List in high-modernist terms ... reduces the dialectics of the problem of representing the unrepresentable, to a 
binary opposition of showing or not showing - rather than casting it, 
as one might, as an issue of competing representations and competing 
49 modes of representation. 
As we have seen, a language of purity, in terms of text or film, is not available - only by 
language is language redeemed. Both Schindler's List and Shoah are forms of rhetoric, 
which are responsible in so far as they probe the limits of representation. 
Claude Lanzmann is himself partly responsible for polarising the debate. 10 He maintains 
that it is not possible to tell the story of the Holocaust through the eyes of a Gennan who 
saved some Jews. It gives a distorted picture because for so many Jews this is not how it 
happened. In fact it is impossible to make any representation or reconstruction of the 
events. To illustrate this, Lanzmann points to a scene in his own film, Shoah, where a 
survivor describes how they were forced to open mass graves and disinter the corpses 
with their bare hands, and then bum the remains for days and weeks. Lanzmann writes,. 
It is very powerftd. I wouldn't have imagined anyone daring to show 
this scene. But he dares to do it. 
He claims that even if there had been documentary footage of the actual extermination 
process he would not have used it -I would have destroyed it. You don't show this'. 
48 For a survey of critical responses to Schindler's List and Shoah, see Miriam Bratu Hansen, 'Schindler's 
List Is Not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory', in Critical 
Inquiry, Winter 1996,292-312. 
49 Ibid., 302. 
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Commenting on those very scenes which do appear in Schindler's List, Lanzmann 
expresses a deep revulsion: 
I was watching the Spielberg film and I thought he'll never go so far. 
And he did. But he even created suspense. There were naked women 
shown in the shower and we are led to believe they are inside the gas 
chamber. It is very twisted. And these people, all of them are actors. 
All of them. They're actors. They do not look like people who have 
had these experiences. It is an adventure film. 
Lanzmann also criticises the end of the film which seems to offer resolution and 'meaning'. 
It shows scenes of a line of people singing an Israeli song in Hebrew, a song which was 
written after the Six Day War. He feels that this gives the impression that the 
establishment of the State of Israel redeemed the Holocaust or that the Holocaust gave 
Israel the right to exist. 
Lanzmann writes, 
There is a happy end for Spielberg's Schindler. But there is no happy 
end. When did the Holocaust stop? On the last day of the war? The 
creation of Israel? Now it is the fashion. Now there is the great 
reconciliation. The Jews, the Germans, the Christians. We're all OK. 
Everyone is saving the Jews. 
Shoah is a film about the destruction of the Jews. And Schindler is a 
film about the saving of the Jews. If so many wanted to save the Jews 
then why did so many die? 
By contrast, Lanzmann's Shoah is a nine-and-a-half-hour documentary-style film which 
makes no attempt to represent the Holocaust but is based on interviews with survivors and 
witnesses, - 
former concentration camp guards and Nazi officials. It is as if the disaster itself 
resists representation and can only be approached by studying the after-shocks. There is an 
inbuilt indirectness. In Lyotard's terms, Shoah makes us see by making it impossible for us 
to I see'. The film is not to document experiences or present facts as such but rather to 
document the witnesses as they make their testimony and the understanding and meaning 
50 The Evening Standard, 10th February, 1994. 
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of events generated in the activity of testimony itself In Shoah, all layers of translation 
are left intact on screen, as though experiences are in search of a language. Lanzmann asks 
the questions in French, they are translated by an interpreter into Polish, Yiddish or 
Hebrew, answered in these languages, translated back into French, then flashed onto the 
screen in English sub-titles. It is as though no single language is finally adequate to the 
task. We watch as memory enters speech, often for the first time. We see the telling act 
itself, its hesitancies, its essential provisionality. Where writers necessarily break silence in 
order to represent it, in Shoah silence remains as much a presence as the words 
themselves, as those who are interviewed struggle for words or refuse to go on. The 
pauses and hesitations in the telling of a story remain intact. We also perceive traces of a 
story the survivor is not tefling; eyes, movements, expressions are part of the text, 
suggesting much more than we are hearing and seeing. Also, by interviewing people for 
whom the Holocaust is present memory, the Holocaust is not just seen as an event in the 
past, history is not seen in narrative or linear terms; rather, past and present merge, the 
present is multi-layered, never truly present but haunted by the past and projecting into the 
future. By stringing together survivors' recoRections, Shoah preserves broken fragments of 
memory. Unlike narratives which tend to hide their lines of construction, Shoah retains the 
process of construction. 
Lanzmann has written A film devoted to the Holocaust can only be a counter-myth, that 
is,, an investigation into the presentness of the Holocaust, an investigation into a past 
whose wounds are so fresh and so keenly inscribed in consciousness that they are present 
in a haunting timelessness'. 51 Lanzmann's multi-layered collages contain no transparent 
messages, but rather impressions and possibilities. 
51 Claude Lanzmann, 'From the Holocaust to the Holocaust', Telos 42 (Winter 1979-80), 143. 
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The sheer length of the film, the silences, punctuated by the insistent noise and imagery of 
the train, communicate a sense of the enormity of fathomless events. The very 
awkwardness of the film refuses any concession to Hollywood conventions and openly 
declares its status as artifice; the awkward movements of the camera, the disruption of 
narrative as interviews follow one from another with no attempt to smooth over the joins. 
Lanzmann transports us to the sites of atrocities, now lush countryside retaining little trace 
of past horrors. This unbearable absence re-inforces the need for memory and underlines 
the transience of events, the ease with which they can be forgotten. Lanzmann's quest for 
houses in which Jews had lived for generations before the transportations also evokes a 
powerful sense of absence and succeeds in particularising the victims. 
In one memorable sequence, the camera moves slowly along what was a trench containing 
the bodies of victims. There is little trace left of the trenches - just a small indentation 
along what is now a lush grassy area surrounded by trees. The length of time it takes the 
camera to span the length of the trench in silence is itself almost unbearable. Nothing is 
said explicitly, yet these minutes of film are immensely powerful and allusive, working by 
the power of association. Throughout, it is absent presence which is the true subject of 
the film. 
Lanzmann's film is an aesthetic figuration of the very impossibility of representation. 
Unlike Schindler's List, Shoah refuses any direct representation of the past, whether by 
fictional re-enactment or archival footage. However, the strength of Schindler's List is 
that Spielberg is working within a Hollywood genre - which is why he was able to reach a 
mass audience - and using the resources and conventions of the Hollywood movie in 
order to keep memory alive. This is not the occasion for a detailed discussion of the film,, 
but this is clearly a text which draws attention to itself as text, rejecting any pretence of 
being neutral. It is in grainy black and white with some significant sequences in colour. 
This reminds us of the constructed or artificial nature of the film, the fact that we are 
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watching a length of celluloid rather than reality unfolding. By highlighting its own 
artificiality (the clearest example being a monochrome sequence in which one girl's 
raincoat is coloured red), the film can be said to admit that it cannot, on its own, tell the 
whole story. This is, after all, only a film. In their different ways, then, both of these 
works, Shoah and Schindler's List, show that the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust is 
not rendered in n-ýimetic terms but through the textures and devices of texts which seek to 
be responsible witnesses to the unpresentable. It is for this reason that much Holocaust 
testimony has drawn on the Jewish tradition of midrash, where meaning is produced in the 
relationship between texts. 
Elie Wiesel's Testament 
Elie Wiesel's autobiographical book Night (195 8) is the foundation of his entire work. 52 It 
describes his early life as a young Orthodox Jewish boy growing up in a small Eastern 
European town destined to be destroyed by the Nazis. He describes the journey that led 
from his native town of Sighet, nestled in the Carpathian mountains of Transylvania, to the 
macabre univers concentrationnaire of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. 
Wiesel has written that he never intended to be a novelist. The only role he sought was 
that of a witness; his deepest fear, the fear of forgetting. 53-The role of the witness is a 
paradoxical one, to tell of the Holocaust so that their audience knows that it cannot be 
told. 'No,, I do not understand. And if I write., it is to warn the reader that he will not 
understand either. "You will not understand, you will never understand, " were the words 
heard everywhere in the kingdom of night. I can only echo them. '54He is deeply concerned 
that, for example, the analytic writings of the historian or the social scientist demystify the 
52 Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. Stella Rodway (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981). 
53 Elie Wiesel, 'Why I Write', in From the Kingdom ofMemory, op. cit., p. 14. 
54 lbid, p. 18. 
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Holocaust by participating in a conceptual universe which possesses a vocabulary far 
removed from the void which Wiesel describes. Furthermore, Wiesel insists that we do not 
have the right to make a philosophy out of so many deaths, to make the suffering of 
countless human beings part of a general equation. He writes, 'Auschwitz signifies not 
only the failure of two thousand years of Christian civilization, but also the defeat of the 
intellect that wants to find a Meaning - with a capital M- in history. What Auschwitz 
embodied had none. The executioner killed for nothing, the victim died for nothing. No 
God ordered the one to prepare the stake, nor the other to mount it. During the Middle 
Ages, the Jews when they chose death were convinced that by their sacrifice they were 
glorifying or sanctifying God's name. At Auschwitz the sacrifices were without point, 
without faith, without divine inspiration. If the suffering of one human being has any 
meaning, that of six miflion has none ... '55Lawrence Langer makes the same point when he 
writes that the fate of the Holocaust victims cannot be perceived in terms of literary 
tragedy. 'We do not recognize the features of an Oedipus or an Othello, whose destinies 
at least in part follow from their deeds, in the faces of the victims on the way to the gas 
chamber: the Jews have done nothing to deserve their fate. Unlike the tragic figure, their 
doom is unconnected to their previous lives ... they are 
deported and will die because they 
are Jews, and for no other reason. Their deaths will not be linked to their lives in any 
way ... 
'56Clearly the usual notion of tragedy, with a hero caught between difficult choices 
but free to embrace an attitude towards the consequences, and hence preserve his or her 
moral stature, does not apply to people sent to the gas. 
Even from the Nazi point of view, the Holocaust finally had no meaning. 'The Holocaust 
was an absurdity and, therefore, we can say an ontological phenomenon. It had no 
55 Quoted in Lawrence L. Langer, 'The Divided Voice', in Alvin H. Rosenfeld and Irving Greenberg, 
Confronting the Holocaust: The Impact ofElie Wiesel (Bloomington and London: Indiana University 
Press, 1978), p. 35. 
56 Lawrence L. Langer, 'The Writer and the Holocaust Experience', in Henry Friedlander and Sybil 
Milton (ed-), The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and Genocide (Millwood, New York: Kraus 
International Publications, 1980), p. 312. 
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meaning. When they gave priority to the Jews, carrying Jews to the camps, priority over 
military trains carrying troops to the front - it was madness! Sheer Madness! Even from 
57 their point of view it had no meaning'. 
Wiesel insists that one cannot tell the story of the Holocaust; all one can do is to tell 
fragments of memory, tell the stories of particular personalities and particular events. He 
begins one of his articles, 'Let us tell tales. Let us tell tales - all the rest can wait, all the 
rest must wait. Let us tell tales - that is our primary obligation. Commentaries will have to 
58 come later, lest they replace or becloud what they mean to reveal'. 
Since the Holocaust was about removing individuality, turning people into beasts, 
individuals into numbers, Wiesel has said that 'in each book, I take one character out of 
Night and give him a refuge, a book, a tale, a name, a destiny of his own... '19 In 
remembering the dead through his stories, Wiesel gives them honour; letting them speak 
again, he cheats the death factories of what would be their final victory, the silencing of 
each individual in the abstractness of the number six million. 
This testimony is ongoing - '... I never finish [a book] because I always smuggle into every 
book one sentence which is the substance of the next book -a Jewish tradition. When we 
finish reading the Torah on Simchat Torah, we must begin again the same Torah at the 
same session. Because we never finish, we never begin ... 
it's a continuous process. 60 
Wiesel shares, for example, with Derrida, the recognition that 'there is nothing outside the 
text'; all thought and interpretation are textual, our sense of self and the ways we perceive 
57 Harry J. Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel, op. cit., p. 91 
58 Wiesel, 'Art and Culture after the Holocaust', in Eva Fleischner (ed. ), Auschwitz: Beginning of a New 
Era? Reflections on the Holocaust (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1974), p. 403. 
59 Harry j. Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel, op. cit- p. 3. 
60 Ibid., p. 91. 
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the world. Language is a rich web of signifiers and signifieds, straining to do justice to the 
complexities of experience, with no access to an extra-linguistic signified. So there is no 
signified which can disclose the reality 'Holocaust'. This is what Wiesel means when he 
writes that 'The spoken word preceded creation itself Because of that word,, the world 
emerged from nothingness and light parted from the dark. Before acting, God spoke. 
Language introduced mankind into history, not the reverse'. 61 Words can be both salvific 
and demonic, either living, rich with vitality and allusiveness, or the' naturalised' dead 
language of ideology. 'Why has God used words as instruments of creation? Because all 
creation lies in them. All of creation could be destroyed by them. And redeemed again. '62 
Wiesel, like Derrida, is invoking an ethical call to maintain textuality as living and vibrant, 
witnessing to 'names' and refusing the deadly security of ideology. 
Wiesel has said of himself that he writes against words. He does not trust words and yet 
he knows their power. So he tries to write little, in a condensed style, to transmit a sense 
of uncertainty and fragility. He is afraid of words betraying him and him betraying 
words. 63Night, Wiesel's one work dealing directly with the Holocaust, has 116 pages of 
text. Everything is simplicity itself. Yet every word points to complexities beyond our 
power to grasp. The simpler the sentence the more complex the idea. It is the silence 
within his speech, the silence between the words, that communicates. What is not said is 
as important as what is said - perhaps more so. When mother and father, daughter and 
son get off the train at Birkenau, the reception centre for Auschwitz, and an SS officer 
orders 'Men to the left! Women to the right' we read this- 'And I did not know that in that 
place, at that moment, I was parting from my mother and Tzipora for ever'. There is a 
kind of horrified silence in these words, - 
but a silence which suggests so much. Similarly, 
61 Wiesel, 'To Believe or Not to Believe', in From the Kingdom ofMemory, op. cit., p. 27. 
62 Elie Wiesel, 'Inside a Library', in From the Kingdom ofMemory, p. 43. 
63 Harry j Cargas in Conversation with Elie Wiesel, op. cit., p. 93. 
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Wiesel tells of seeing a prisoner killed by his own son over a piece of bread, a son who is 
then immediately murdered by a group of other prisoners. Wiesel's conclusion: J was 
fifteen years old'. Again, the words speak volumes. 64 
The Kingdom of Night 
In Night, the title and the recurrent imagery of darkness represent the descent into terror,, 
madness and the unknown. We are confronted with a world we cannot understand. Once 
Efiezer enters Auschwitz he loses his sense of time and reality. A border has been crossed 
to a fearful and unrepresentable world. Night narrates the passing from the context of the 
secure and the traditional (the shtetl community of Sighet) to the terrifying and macabre 
world of the concentration camp. As Ellen S. Fine has pointed out, at the beginning of the 
I novel'Eliezer spends many of his evenings in the semi-darkness of the synagogue 
I 
conversing with Moshe, his chosen master of the Kabbala. As Fine writes , Night, 
here, 
exudes a poetic and pious atmosphere as the time for prayer, interrogation and dialogue 
within the context of the secure and the traditional'. 65The'kingdom of night'into which 
Eliezer is transported is a world apart, a world which cannot be understood in terms of the 
continuities of language or past experience. It is for this reason that writers refer to 
l'univers concentrationnaire. When Eliezer sees the flames leaping out of a ditch where 
little children are being burnt alive, he pinches his face in order to know if he is awake or 
dreaming. Night is about the breaking of continuities. Separated from his mother and three 
sisters upon their arrival at Birkenau, Eliezer becomes obsessed with the need to hold on 
tightly to his father's hand, the only object of life in a universe where every moment holds 
the possibility of death. His father represents a life force, which combats the all- 
encompassing blackness. However, his father, symbol of reason, strength and humanity, 
64 See Night, p. 106. 
65 Ellen S. Fine, Legacy ofNight: The Literary Universe ofElie Wiesel (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1982), p. 12 
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finally collapses under the barbaric tactics of the Nazi oppressor. Indeed part of this new 
world is the Nazi attempt to eradicate family ties and create a state of mind in which 
people view each other as enemies or strangers. This is demonstrated in Night through a 
series of incidents showing the competition for survival between fathers and sons. 
The sense of discontinuity is seen finally in the face in the mirror at the end of the 
narrative. Several days after the liberation of Buchenwald by American soldiers, and after 
a severe bout of food poisoning, Eliezer looks at himself in the mirror for the first time 
since the ghetto. A stranger -a child of Night - peers at him. 
Stories of a New Bible 
Wiesel has written, 'When I speak of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, when I evoke Rabbi 
Yohanan ben Zakkai and Rabbi Akiba,, it is the better to understand them in the light of 
Auschwitz. 66 
Wiesel's writing may be considered in the tradition of midrash, which, in terms of the 
Jewish Bible, Daniel Boyarin defines as 'radical inter-textual reading of the canon, in 
which potentially every part refers to and is interpretable by every other part'. 67 
According to Boyarin, the Jewish Biblical texts are dialogical in nature, contesting their 
own assertions as an essential part of the structure of their discourse. 68 In a real sense, 
there is nothing outside the text, the extra-linguistic is experienced in terms of absence and 
allusion, in terms of allusions to and clashes with existing texts; there is no unmediated 
access to a transcendental signified. Midrash does not grope for concepts in order to solve 
problems and dissolve paradox; meaning is not generated through correspondence but 
through the clashes, paradoxes and allusiveness of the texts we inhabit. A feature 
66 Wiesel, 'Why I Write', in From the Kingdom ofMemory, op. cit., p. 19. 
67 Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading ofMidrash (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), p. 16. 
68 Ibid, p. 12. 
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characteristic of much Holocaust writing is its rhetorical inter-textuality, its subtle and 
jarring allusions to biblical narratives, which serve to register horror and discontinuity, 
Primo Levi has called such writing 'stories of a new Bible'. 69 This approach is in contrast 
to the Christian typological approach, which seeks resolution through typology, believing 
that the events of Christianity are anticipated and understood in terms of the events of the 
old covenant. In his essay 'Persons and Figures, Levinas castigates such a typological 
approach as a violence to the particularity of the Jewish texts. 
When it is claimed that Noah's Ark is significant only in that its wood 
prefigures the future Cross, or that the wells sunk by Isaac prepare us 
for the meeting between the Samaritan woman and Jesus, or that 
Miriam's leprosy symbolises Mary's whiteness, or that the burning 
bush prefigures the crown of thorns, all this brings us to a stage of 
logic that surpasses logic or precedes it. 70 
Such typology is in the service of an essentially 'Platonic' anamnesis. Plato's notion of 
anamnesis is analagous to his notion of mimesis. For Plato, the good painter is he or she 
who reproduces images already engraved in the soul, submitting to the ultimate authority 
of the logos, remembering what the soul must already (however remotely) have known. 
Platonic anamnesis is a re-collection of spiritual truths which the soul has forgotten in its 
fallen state, but can still be summoned to the mind through the disciplines of self- 
knowledge. In the Jewish tradition, there are no essences or universals to be re-collected 
by enlightened reason; anamnesis is a recognition of the extra-linguistic to which one has 
no unmediated access, a recognition of an absence which constitutes a presence. The 
midrashic notion of inter-textuality recognises that meaning is generated through the 
69 Primo Levi, If This is a ManlThe Truce, trans. Stuart Woolf (1958; London: Penguin, 1979), p. 72. 
See also Karl A. Plank, Mother of the Wire Fence: Inside and Outside the Holocaust (Louis-01le, 
Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), which explores the significance of inter-textuality in Dan 
Pagis '' Written in Pencil in the Sealed Railway-car' and Simkhe Bunem Shayevitsh's 'Lekh-Lekho'. 
70 Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, ed. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 120. 
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relationship of texts with each other, rather than in a given text's relationship with its 
signified. In terms of the Holocaust, a writer like Wiesel recognises that the 
incomprehensible night of the Holocaust can only be communicated by radically 
subverting existing paradigms through inter-textuality. 
In ethical terms, the relationship of Wiesel's Night with other texts is more important than 
its representational relationship with the Holocaust. The only way to incorporate the 
Holocaust, and to register its incomprehensibility, is in a scripture which is an over-turning 
of previous scripture. Wiesel therefore alludes to, and subverts, the stories of the Exodus 
and the Akedah, as well as the Christian image of the Cross. Such allusion prompts a 
sense of 'dispossession', preventing consciousness from being the subject of traditions and 
interpretations, and so registering the radical discontinuity and incomprehensibility of the 
Holocaust, and preventing one from anticipating its significance. An 'it happens' is 
momentarily unconnected to acts of thought, to what has 'already been thought, written, 
painted in order to determine what hasn't been'. 71 
David Roskies has pointed out that the kind of rhetorical inter-textuality found in the 
writings of Jewish writers of the Holocaust is in the tradition of the biblical writers. Earlier 
figures were often recalled by the survivors of destruction in order to register their 
N 
inadequacy as analogies. For example , The chastisement of my poor people 
/ was greater 
than the punishment of Sodom, / which was overthrown in a moment, / without a hand 
71 Quoted in Sande Cohen, 'Between Image and Phrase: Progressive History and the "Final Solution" as 
Dispossession', in Saul Friedlander (ed. ), Probing the Limits ofInterpretation, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 
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striking it' (Lamentations 4: 6). 72Part of the response to catastrophe has always been a 
self-reflexive questioning of the available archetypes. However, Roskies distinguishes 
between the 'sacred parodists' and the modem 'sacreligious parodists' of the tradition. 
Even though the scribes of Lamentations may have lamented bitterly, questioning the 
efficacy of the figures and archetypes available to them, they ultimately respected the 
covenantal framework of guilt, punishment and retribution. On the other hand, 'the 
modem writers use parody to unmask the artificiality of the accepted conventions and to 
argue for radical change'. 73However, James E. Young goes further and argues that the 
modem parodists are not keeping faith with the tradition, because, unlike the sacred 
parodists of the past, the modems repudiate both the figure of the archetype and the 
meaning it imposes on experience. 74 
The father/son relationship in Night has been viewed by Andre Neher as 'an anti-Akedah: 
not a father leading his son to be sacrificed, but a son guiding, dragging, carrying to the 
altar an old man who no longer has the strength to continue'. Whereas in the Bible God 
saves Isaac from being sacrificed by sending a ram to replace him, He does not intervene 
to save the father at the altar of Auschwitz. God allows the father to be consumed by 
Holocaust flames and the son is forced to recognise that he is impotent in the face of 
death's conquest. He must slowly watch his father die. His father, for Wiesel symbol of 
reason, strength and humanity, finally collapses under the barbarism of the Holocaust. 75 
This inter-textual approach maintains a powerful sense of fracture: the horror of the 
Holocaust is suggested by the violent and radical analogies that are evoked. There is no 
72 David G. Ro4ies, Against the Apocalypse, op. cit., pp. 13 -14. 
73 IN& p. 69. 
74 See James E. Young, op-Cit. 
75 Quoted in Ellen S. Fine, Legacy ofNight, op. cit.,. p. 21. 
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possibility of resolution or interpretation - we are refused what Lyotard calls 'the solace of 
good forms' but the violence serves as witness to the unpresentable. 
The critic Lawrence S. Cunningham argues that Night f 76 unctions as an 'Anti-Exodus'. 
Night is the story of the movement of Wiesel's people from the God-intoxicated milieu of 
the Hungarian town of Sighet to the death-dominated life of the camps. It is thus an 
inversion of the Exodus story. The town of Sighet, as Wiese] describes it, is a secure and 
happy place with a comforting rural way of life, a strong sense of community and of God. 
An angel comes to the village, in the form of Moshe the Beadle, - and tells the people to 
flee, for death will come to them. Unlike the angel of the Passover, this angel is thought to 
be mad and no-one listens to his message. Moshe's warnings are shown to be justified; the 
orders come for the Jews to pack their possessions in haste and get ready to leave. As 
Cunningham points out, in Wiesel's account there is a rumour among some that they will 
be sent to work in brick factories in the west. So in this anti-exodus, a people were to go 
and make bricks as slaves rather than leave behind such slavery. But even this proves an 
optimistic rumour. In the biblical story of the Exodus, the Jews were to find God in the 
desert; they were his people, He their God. In the anti-Exodus, people come into the 
desert not to be formed into a people but to have their peoplehood exterminated. In an 
obscene use of biblical vocabulary, I election' and 'being chosen' mean being marked for 
death. 
So the life-giving biblical myth of election, liberation, covenant and promise becomes the 
vehicle for telling the fearful story of death and destruction. By telling the story of Night 
within the framework of an earlier story, subverting the paradigmatic story of liberation 
and promise, the reader is forced into recognition of horror and incommensurability. The 
76 See Lawrence S. Cunningham, 'Elie Wiesel's Anti-Exodus, in Harry J. Cargas, Responses to Elie 
Wiesel, op. cit., pp. 23-28. 
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irony, too, is that the paradigmatic salvific narrative is alluded to in order to be over- 
turned, as though any attempt to find narrative coherence in the Holocaust must be 
avoided. The Exodus is displaced from its salvific role, so this displaces any surrender of 
the Holocaust to frames of theological rescue. Since, according to Wiesel, it is impossible 
to evoke death in writing since death is par excellence the most ineffable and 
incommunicable human experience, the best that one can do is to deny and distort 
everything that supports structures of living and hope. 
Wiesel's allusion to the image of the cross at the end of Chapter 4 of Night is extremely 
provocative, and has been siezed upon by critics wishing to find a theology in the novel. 77 
Wiesel describes the execution of two men in the camp who had been discovered with 
arms, along with a young boy. Three gallows are erected, the three are hanged and the 
other prisoners forced to march past with their faces turned to watch those hanging. The 
two adults die quickly but the child, being so light, is still alive and remains so for more 
than half an hour. A man asks 'Where is God nowT and the narrator hears a voice within 
him answer ,I Where is He? Here He is - He is hanging here on this gallows ... * 
(p. 77). 
Once again, the disturbing consequence of this passage is that theology is rendered silent. 
The Cross, as the Christian image of salvation, is subverted; the Christian theological 
response rendered ineligible. Wiesel is presenting the unpresentable, communicating a 
sense of the incomprehensible, by purging the incident of 'meaning. 
God does not resuscitate the young boy slowly dying on the gallows. This is, as Lawrence 
Langer observes, 'the ritual of death ungraced by the possibility of resurrection'. 78 
The reader is driven to search for the implications of the Christian allusion, but attempts to 
find a consistent message are frustrated. The passage suggests multiple possibilities; for 
77 Night, pp. 75-76. 
78 Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New Haven, Conn: Yale University 
Press, 1975), p. 85. 
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example, the suggestion of atheism; or the assertion of the presence of God in curious and 
deeply alien circumstances when his presence is least perceptible, the incomprehensible 
God whose ways are not our ways; or the God who is present in his absence from human 
discourse. For Byron Sherwin, the message is that God only dies insofar as the image He 
shares with human beings, the stamp of divinity, has been erased by apathy. 79Perhaps God 
is dead when human beings seek to rid themselves of the creator's imprint, or the memory 
of the unpresentable 'other. 
The effect of such rhetorical inter-textuality is to make clear that the Holocaust cannot be 
integrated into antecedent perspectives. The effect of the biblical allusions is' a poetics of 
displacement'. They displace theological schemes that would fix the text's meaning and 
conscript its service within religious or cultural agenda. The text sustains a stubborn 
dissonance which impedes the path of ideological reading, of seizing one direction in the 
text and using it to suppress any other claim. Lunivers concentrationnaire is maintained in 
its difference rather than integrated into the reader's familiar world. Connections are made 
only to be broken. 
The Texture of Memory 
The ethical challenge which the Holocaust imposes upon us is the challenge to remember, 
to be witnesses to, the incomprehensible and the unpresentable, especially as the 
incomprehensible is so easily interpreted or even denied. The incomprehensibility of the 
Holocaust is not rendered by any mimetic representation of it but by presenting it 
I scripturally' as anti-scripture. However, the unpresentable is forgotten as we are seduced 
by stable notions of 'meaning' - be they media images or historical narratives - into 
79 Byron L. Sherwin, 'Elie Wiesel. and Jewish Theology', in Responses to Elie Wiesel, op. cit., p. 143-144. 
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believing that we truly perceive 'the real'. The Holocaust presses most radically the 
necessary denial of 'meaning' and the task of an interminable anamnesis of what has never 
and can never be known but must never be forgotten. 
The ethical significance of memory is the sensitivity it engenders towards 'otherness', the 
mystery of the singular which may never be grasped by the concept. It is also to guard 
against indifference, which is precisely a lack of memory. Our worst sin, according to 
Wiesel, is not that of criminal activity, but of nonactivity, apathy, indifference. It was an 
indifference to life on the part of the executioners and spectators which, in Wiesel's view, 
allowed the destruction of the six million. 
According to Derrida, one remembers those others 'who are not present, nor presently 
living, either to us, in us, or outside us' in the name ofjustice. In the name ofjustice 
'-where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no 
longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or 
rights'. 80 In the following chapter, I will explore the relationship between law and justice 
through readings of Derrida's influential essay 'Force of Law' (1990) and a novel by the 
Czech writer Ivan Klima, Judge on Trial (1986). These texts are read against the 
background of Vaclav Havel's analysis of Soviet Communism. Once again, I will explore 
the importance of writing in deconstructing the consequences of political ideology. 
80 Jacques Derrida, Specters ofMarx, tr. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. xix. 
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Chapter 3 
BEFORE THE LAW 
'At this late hour ... the only ethic that remains possible is an ethic that acknowledges its 
necessary entanglement with the impossible. 'I 
Justice without law is another name for God (Walter Benjamin)2 
'By hope we are saved but hope which is visible is not hope'3 
Implied in my title is an allusion to Franz Kafka's parable 'Before the Law' in his novel The 
7 Trial. 4 As Derrida does, I am playing on two senses of the phrase 'before the law - 
Kafka's 'man from the country' standing before the gate of the law,. and the Law (which 
Derrida refers to as Justice') as an ethical demand prior to, or exceeding, statutory law. 
I want in this chapter to reflect on the relationship between law and justice, taking as my 
starting-points an essay by the Czech play-write and politician Vaclav Havel and a novel 
by a contemporary Czech novelist writing in the tradition of Franz Kafka, Ivan Klim'a. I 
will argue that these works, written under the pressure of Soviet Communism, call for an 
aporefic or paradoxical relationship between law and justice such as that envisaged in 
Derrida's recent writing. 
1 Mark C. Taylor, Nots (Chicago and London: The Chicago University Press, 1993), p. 94. 
2 See Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell et al, 
Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York and London, Routledge, 1992), p. 5 1. 
3 Ivan Kli"ma, A Ship Alamed Hope, trans. Edith Pargeter (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1970). p. 196. 
4 Franz Kafka, The Trial, tr. ldris Parry (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994). pp. 166-173. 
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Communist ideology as experienced in Soviet Czechoslovakia calls for an ethic ever 
conscious of the inescapability of language just as it is fearful of language hardening into 
ideology. As George Steiner writes, 'Languages are living organisms. Infinitely complex, 
but organisms nevertheless. They have in them a certain life-force,. and certain powers of 
5 absorption and growth. But they can decay and they can die'. We are all responsible for 
language, its life and its death. Our fear must be what Steiner calls the erosion of the 
logos, of the gain of letter on spirit. It is the very freedom of language, celebrated in 
literature,. which allows one to move beyond ideological construction. In Wolfang Iser's 
words,. literature involves 'a continual repatterning of the culturally conditioned shapes 
human beings have assumed". 6 
Literature written under the pressure of Communism alerts us to the fearful consequences 
of such deadening ideology: an ethic claiming to be comprehensive and all-inclusive, an 
ethic which must subsume the particular in the universal. The result, anticipated by Kafka 
at the dawn of Nazism,, and a constant theme of the powerful dissident literature which 
developed in the Soviet bloc, is human alienation and a kind of collective stagnation, as 
the 'real' world of phenomena develops its own relentless logiC7 and individuals struggle to 
find the meaning of 'freedom'. In Kafka, the institution is a mechanism which obeys its 
own laws; no-one knows who programmed those laws or when; they have nothing to do 
with human concerns and are thus unintelligible. As Nfilan Kundera puts it, writing of 
Kafka's Ae Trial: 
5 George Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature and the Inhuman (New York: 
Atheneum, 1976), p. 96. 
6 Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology (Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopldns University Press, 1993), p. xi. 
7 See, for example, Kalka's parable 'In the Penal Colony', in Franz Kafka, The Transformation and Other 
Stories, tr. Malcolm Pasley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), pp. 127-153. 
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In Kafka the logic is reversed. The person punished does not know the 
reason for the punishment. The absurdity of the punishment is so 
unbearable that to find peace the accused needs to find a justification 
for his penalty: the punishment seeks the offense. 
The Prague engineer is punished by intensive police surveillance. 
This punishment demands the crime that was not committed, and the 
engineer accused of emigrating ends up emigrating in fact. The 
punishment has finally found the offense. 8 
Ivan Klima's early work A Ship Named Hope (1970) functions at a number of levels, but 
one of its themes is the ways in which ideology makes it impossible for people to take 
responsibility for their lives. Klima draws on a metaphor found, for example, in Plato's 
Statesman and Republic, in which the state is compared to a ship and the king to a 
captain. 9 A group of tourists find themselves stranded, having missed the last ferry across 
a Scottish loch. They find themselves aboard the passenger ship Hope, which they expect 
to convey them across the loch. However, the captain has other plans for the ship's final 
voyage, a voyage into open sea, and, it eventually becomes clear, to inevitable destruction. 
The captain is in command but 'unmoved by any consideration of what effect his 
commands might have on the people aboard, with an officer who fulfilled orders without 
allowing himself to have any doubts about them, or even to give a moment's consideration 
tothem'. 10 Klima! s story shows just how easy it is to allow one's moral judgement to be 
compromised by the system, as the main character, Jacob, a passenger stranded on the 
ship, tries to foster good relations with the ship's officer in order to gain the officer's 
confidence and establish the ship's destination, but succeeds only in helping the ship to sail 
its fatal course. Like Kafka's parable 'In the Penal Colony', the system must play out its 
relentless logic, much as the Nazi Final Solution continued relentlessly, impervious to 
economic or military good sense. 
8 Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, tr. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 103. 
9 For a discussion of this metaphor, see Michael B. Naas' introduction to Derrida, The Other Heading: 
Reflections on Today's Europe, tr. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. xliv. 
10 Klima, A Ship Named Hope, op. cit., p. 227. 
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In Specters ofMarx (1994), Derrida argues that one of the historical factors influencing 
so-called 'deconstruction' was totalitarian terror in the countries of the Eastern bloc. II 
One of the lessons of the various varieties of terror which have blighted our century seems 
to be the need for an ethic painfully conscious that any given perspective or social vision 
must be partial, a necessary abstraction, and one constantly in need of revivifying or 
rethinking. The various monologic systems of our century call us to retain a memory of 
A excess'. 'Excess' might seem a curious word in this context, particularly given 
Aristotle's connection, in his Nicomachean Ethics,, of morality with moderation. 12 
However, the term is being used in its Derridean sense, as that which falls beneath the 
repeatable terms of language. So to retain a memory of this excess is to be sensitive to the 
multiplicity of history, the memory of the countless forgotten voices, which enables one to 
raise one's conscience against injustice. Literature maintains such a memory, just as 
ideology kills it. 
Only a sense of enormity and incomprehension sustains our capacity to respond to 
suffering. Any attempt to limit responsibility by fixing the ethical relation within the 
boundaries of norms or narratives risks limiting our capacity to recognise the suffering of 
others. For as Dwight Furrow puts it, in his recent book Against Iheory (1995) reason 
alone makes the forgotten eminently forgettable. 13 
I should note here that, while this chapter focuses on extreme forms of totalising 
discourse, such an approach to ethics seems as urgent as ever in the contemporary world 
II Derrida, Specters ofMarx, tr. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge. 1994), p. 15. 
12 See Stephen H. Webb, 'The Rhetoric of Ethics as Excess: A Christian Theological Response to 
Emmanuel Levinas', in Allodern TheoloýT 15: 1, January 1999,1-16. 
13 Dwight Furrow, Against Theoýv: Continental andAnalytic Challenges in Moral Philosophy (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1995). p. 190. 
99 
of fiberal democracy, where the pressures of rationalisation and bureaucracy are so 
insistent. 14 
This chapter will argue that the situation described, for example in Ivan Klima's novel 
Judge on Trial (1986), calls for an aporetic approach to ethics such as that explored in 
Jacques Derrida's essay 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority' (1990), and 
his recent study Specters ofMarx. Derrida sees that law-making requires abstraction but 
that it must be enlivened, and laws must continually be revivified or revised, in an attempt 
to deal with the particular, recognising that particular formulations are always less than 
ideal and must be brought into tension with the particular case. Such a vision, I will 
argue, implies a messianic perspective -a view which Derrida explores further in Specters 
of Marx. 
Vaclav Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless' 
To begin my reflections, I turn first to an influential essay by Vaclav Havel, 'The Power of 
the Powerless'. a reflection on what Havel calls post-totalitarianism. 15 
'The power of the powerless' represents another paradox or aporia -a reconceiving of 
power, not in terms of ideological solutions but learning to live within the paradox, 'the 
power of the powerless. Stephen K. White calls for such a shift in understanding at the 
end of his book on Political neory and Postmodernism (199 1) - the need for a 
14 In Specters ofMarx, op. cit., Derrida opposes the utopianisin of certain thinkers of the New Right and 
neo-liberal Western democracies. Derrida opposes the political Right in its 'manic triumphalism' over the 
collapse of Communism. For example, the American historian Francis Fukuyarna, in his book The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992), celebrates a capitalist paradise as the end of history. Derrida sees 
capitalism and liberalism as a dogmatic discourse, and argues that 'never in history has the horizon of the 
thing whose survival is being celebrated been as dark, threatening, and threatened'. 
15 Vaclav Havel et al (ed. John Keane), The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the state in central- 
eastern Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985) 
It is ironic that Havel, like Mikhail Bakhtin, is writing within the spectre of Marx's own writings in order 
to expose the enormity of the totalitarian state that has arisen out of Marxism. Havel may be seen as the 
spectre of Marx exorcising Marxist ideology. Ironically, Havel's essay begins echoing the start of the 
Conuminist Manifesto. 
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I thoroughgoing realignment of modem consciousness ... the slow process of learning to be 
at home in homelessness, or reorientating ourselves to our own finitude and the meaning 
of otherness'. 16 
The background to Havel's essay is Charter 77, a call by leading dissident figures in 
Communist Czechoslovakia for civil and human rights to be respected. 
Havel begins his essay with an analysis of the nature of power in the Eastern bloc. One 
feature which distinguishes this system from classical dictatorships is that it is not limited 
in a local geographical sense; nation states are united by a single framework throughout 
the power bloc. The power bloc has been systematically organised according to a set of 
ideals, which claims a certain comprehensiveness. A feature of the historical origins of 
Soviet Communism is a 'correct understanding' of social conflicts in the period from 
which the original movement emerged. Havel describes it as a secularised religion, 
offering a ready answer to any question; 'it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and 
accepting it has profound implications for human life'. The price of such a quasi-religious 
ideal is an abdication of one's own reason, conscience and responsibility- the centre of 
power becomes the centre of truth. 
According to Havel,, ideology offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, 
and of morality, while making it easier to part with them. 17 Responsibilities are fulfilled if 
the State's demands are obeyed. The State represents a 'supra-personal', objective ethical 
authority and enables people to deceive themselves that duty to the state represents ethical 
duty. It is a veil behind which people can hide their duplicities and their adaptation to the 
status quo. All those involved are provided with the illusion that the system is in harmony 
16 Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
199 1), p. 147. 
17 'The Power of the Powerless', p. 28. 
101 
with the human order and the order of the universe. The fearful consequence of such 
ideology is that the system assumes a life of its own; a fracture is opened up between 
human aspirations and the aims of the system. As Havel puts it, 'while life, - 
in its essence, 
moves towards plurality, diversity, independent self-constitution and self-organisation..., 
the post-totalitarian system demands conformity, uniformity and discipline'. 18 No matter 
what position individuals hold in the hierarchy of power, they are not considered by the 
system to be worth anything in themselves, but only as things intended to serve the 
automatism. 
Ideology becomes mere simulacrum, a world of appearances and ritual, a formalised 
language deprived of semantic contact with reality. 19 Havel gives the famous example of 
the greengrocer, who hangs a sign in his shop window, 'Workers of the world unite', not 
through any political conviction, but as a subconscious sign that he is willing to conduct 
his business according to the rules of the game, and to secure his business interests free 
from State scrutiny. In other words, he conceals his fear of losing his job behind an 
alleged interest in the unification of the workers of the world. Similarly, the government 
official can cloak his interest in staying in power in phrases about service to the working 
class. The significance of phenomena no longer derives from the phenomena themselves, 
but from their locus as concepts in the ideological context. Reality does not shape theory, 
but rather the reverse. In this situation,, the demands of the State feed on the human fear 
of exclusion and alienation from society. In consequence, human beings end up living a 
'double life' - at once maintaining notional conformity to the status quo, whilst seeking to 
18 [bid., pp. 29-30. 
19 Like Kafka, Havel is inuch influenced by Edmund Husserl's The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences (1936) 
and Husserl's concern that theoretical knowledge has lost contact with living human experience 
(Lebenswelt). For a discussion of Havel's writing, within the context of the Czech intellectual tradition, 
see Walter H. Capps, 'Interpreting Vaclav Havel', in Cross Currents, Fall 1997,301-316. Capps writes, 
'For Havel, the resort to Lebensweft fostered the conditions of "living in truth". The alternative to top- 
down, mechanistic, manipulative theoretical deduction (which, in Havel's view, is the tendency of 
Marxism) is acute attention to what Havel calls "the flow of life"' (307). 
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live out personal aspirations. Hence, the recurrent theme of alienation in literature 
emerging from this context, and the question of what is meant by 'fi7eedom'. 
A further consequence is a kind of collective stagnation, as people become incapable of 
understanding any language other than the one that has stultified them. 
Obviously, this experience of 'living within a lie' is not exclusive to totalitarian regimes,, 
I though such regimes do bring the issues into focus. As Havel puts it ,A person who has 
been seduced by the consumer value system, whose identity is dissolved in the 
accoutrements of mass civilization, and who has no roots in the order of being, no sense of 
responsibility for anything higher than his or her personal survival, is a demoralised 
person. The system depends on this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it 
intosociety'. 20 This is an indictment on liberal democracies as much as'late-totalitarian' 
regimes. 
Another way of articulating Havel's analysis is that ideologies rely on a 'literalising' of 
language -a reification, so that linguistic structures no longer feed on lived experience but, 
rather, dictate the terms in which lives are to be lived. 
In order to confront this simulacrum,, Havel argues for a powerful dissident literature. By 
'dissidence', Havel is arguing for an intellectual stance which continually problematises 
any notion of ideological completeness, which, in other words remains perceptive to 
I otherness'. 'Dissidence',, in these terms,, is not, - then, simply 
irresponsible opposition to 
authority, but a constant reminder of the excess of experience over interpretation. There 
is an important relationship, then, between dissidence and excess, memory and literature. 
20 'The Power of the Powerless', p. 4 5. 
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Because, in terms of ideology, political 'reality' becomes a discreet linguistic order, - 
informed by habitual conventions and habits of thought (all the more so as the Western 
media banalises political realities), there is a need for the logic to be challenged by an 
I outside'voice. Havel puts it thus: 'It is because those who are not politicians are also 
not so bound by traditional political thinking and political habits and thereforel 
paradoxically, they are more aware of genuine political reality and more sensitive to what 
can and should be done under the circumstances'. 21 The role of the dissident is to 
question abstract projects for an ideal political or economic order and to insist on a 
concrete and human 'here and now' - in other words7 to force the universal to be called 
into question by by the particular. 'To shed the burden of traditional political categories 
and habits and open oneself up fully to the world of human existence and then to draw 
political conclusions only after having analysed it- this is not only politically more realistic 
but at the same time,, from the point of view of an 'ideal state of affairs', politically more 
promising as Well'. 22 A better economic or political order is not achieved by trying to 
realise abstract political ideals but from 'profound existential and moral changes in 
society'. 'A better system will not automatically ensure a better life. In fact the opposite is 
true: only by creating a better life can a better system be developed. 23 Political and 
economic language need to be re-charged and re-enlivened by attention to concrete 
individual instances of injustice. More generally, using Derridean terms, such existential 
and moral changes require a paradoxical understanding of language which recognises its 
necessity as well as its 'fallenness' (it is interesting that Derrida uses such theological 
language to describe a linguistic condition). The dissident voice refuses to allow language 
to harden into ideology and insists on the need for language to retain a sense of its 
provisionality. It is simply not sufficient to oppose the post-totalitarian system by 
21 Ibid., p. 5 1. 
22 Ibid., p. 52. 
23 fbid., p. 52 
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establishing a different pol-itical line and then striving for change in government. In so 
doing, one would simply be re-enforcing the existing 'language game' instead of calling 
attention to the banality of the language itself What I have been calling the 'dissident 
voice' forces politics to return to individual people. Havel insists that such a return is just 
as necessary in western democracies, where the violence done to human beings is not 
nearly so obvious and cruel (a theme I will return to again with Derrida's Specters of 
Marx). Systemic change in itself is secondary and can guarantee nothing. An attitude is 
required which turns away from abstract political visions of the future and towards 
concrete human beings and ways of defending them effectively in the here and now. Such 
a view is antipathetic to all forms of violence carried out in the name of a' better future', 
and sees that a future secured by violence might actually be worse than what exists now. 
in other words,, the future would be fatally stigmatised by the very means used to secure 
it. 24 As Havel suggests in the final words of his essay, the 'brighter future' might be a 
new way of conceiving things, what I would wish to call a sense of the aporetic, a 
sensitivity to 'otherness' and the necessary tension between the general and the particular. 
Havel writes , For the real question 
is whether the 'brighter future' is really always so 
distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our 
own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and 
kept us fTom developingit? '21 
Since post-totalitarian regimes are characterised by what Havel calls 'living within a lie', 
one's conformity to the regime being a cloak for various vested interests, the role of the 
dissident voice is to expose this duplicity, to insist on what the laws of the land really say, 
and the distance between the laws and the reality. As Derrida is continually doing, the 
concern is to re-energise the dead language of the law (for example, we see this 
in 
24 Ibid., p. 71. 
25 Ibid., p. 96. 
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Derrida's essays on Nelson Mandela and South Affica, discussed in the next chapter26). 
Because of the system's paranoid dependence on the illusion that the laws are being 
observed, such a critique is extremely powerful and the system is compelled to react. Such 
appeals make the purely ritualistic nature of the law clear to society and to those who 
inhabit its power structures (which is precisely what Charter 77 attempted to do). Havel's 
essay aims to ruin 'this whole game of "as if' by 'consistently calling things by their proper 
names'. 27 
One might claim that Havel is arguing for the power of the irreducible word, 'excessive', 
resistant to stable categories or concepts. Whilst ideologies reduce the word, freezing 
and 'naturalising' language, such dissident, or prophetic, literature enlivens language by 
insisting on the aporetic - language becomes most powerful, and most responsible, when it 
insists on its inadequacy and powerlessness. The dissident voice retains the linguistic 
condition that exists in the phrase 'the power of the powerless'. 28 
Literature and Ethics 
Such an aporetic quality is an essentially literary device and it is no accident that the 
dissident voice to which Havel refers is largely literary. The force of literature, as Derrida 
continually reminds us, is that it promotes variety and multiplicity, and avoids the imposed 
unity of ideology. 
Mikhail Bakhtin,, a Russian intellectual in the 1920s and until his death in 1975, is another 
important literary figure in the struggle against Soviet Communism. Bakhtin opposed the 
26 See Derrida, 'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration', in Jacques Derrida and 
Mustapha Tlili (eds. ), For Arelson Mandela (New York: Seaver Books, 1987). 
27 An interesting Derridean resonance here. The term 'proper name' is also used by Derrida to signify the 
particular which is always being lost in the universal. 
28 The notion of 'the power of the powerless' is reminiscent of St. Paul's notion of the 'foolishness of 
God' or the reversals of the Magnificat or the Sermon on the Mount. 
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linguistic formalism of leading scholars like Roman Jakobson and Viktor Shklovsky, who 
were favoured by the political establishment. These writers saw art as an autonomous 
enterprise, to be examined on its own terms. 29 For these writers,, literature is essentially 
apolitical, which of course accounts for their political acceptance in the 1920s. As David 
Jasper puts it, 
... [the Russian Formalists'] linguistic principles tended towards the 
production of a rhetoric which beautifully sustained an authoritarian 
ideology perceived in quasi -theological terms, on a vertical axis which 
professed an inbreaking of beneficent authority, but actually embraced 
a static, unified version of society which can make no moral claims 
outside its own structures. 30 
Against this formalist rhetoric, Bakhtin sets a carnival world that is organised on a 
horizontal,, rather than a vertical, axis,, celebrating incompleteness and ambiguity. 31 
In Problems ofDostoyevsky's Poetics (1929), Bakhtin argues that Dostoyevsky institutes 
a new genre, the 'polyphonic' novel, which is characterised by the multiplicity of voices 
present in it, none of which is subjected to the authoritarian control of the author. 
Dostoyevsky, like Goethe's Promethius, creates not voiceless slaves (as 
does Zeus), but rather free people who are capable of standing beside 
their creator, of disagreeing with him, and even of rebelling against 
h 32 im. 
Similarly, Havel sees the novel as a game with invented characters. One sees the world 
through their eyes and thus sees it from various angles. The more differentiated the 
characters, - the more the author and the reader 
have to step outside themselves and try to 
understand. 
29 See Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 59-73. 
30 David Jasper, Rhetoric, Power and Community (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 97. 
31 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington. Indiana 
University Press, 1984). Rabelais (1494? -1553), author of the Pantagruel and Garganthia, develops the 
anti-authoritarian practices of the language of carnival and popular festivity, which play freely with 
language to parody the languages of the Church and the magistrates. The individual character has free 
play against the author or social rules and conventions. 
32 Bakhtin. Problems ofDostoyevsky's Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: Universitýý of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 4. 
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Whereas ideology wants to convince that its truth is absolute, a novel shows everything is 
relative. Whilst ideology is a school of intolerance, the forin of the a novel teaches 
tolerance and understanding. As Havel argues, the more ideological our century has 
become,, the more anachronistic the novel, but the more anachronistic it gets, the more we 
needit. 33 
According to Havel, the destruction of the story breeds a strange collective deadening. 
The life of an individual becomes the dull and uniform functioning of a component in a 
large machine and his or her death is merely something which puts him or her out of 
commission. Havel describes a late-totalitarian system in which revolutionary ethos and 
terror have been replaced by dull inertia, bureaucratic anonymity and mindless, 
stereotypical behaviour, the whole point of which is to become, ever more fully, exactly 
what they are. By contrast, according to Havel, every story begins with an event - the 
incursion of one 'logic' into the world of another 'logic'. The logic of the story is that of 
dialogue, encounter and the interaction of different truths,, - attitudes'. 
ideas,, traditions,, 
passions - independent forces which have done nothing in advance to define each other. 
As such,, the novel is not amenable to one overarching 'meaning', it refuses resolution. 
Derrida in his writings precisely tries to do justice to the literary text as radically situated - 
written, read and re-read at particular times and places - and as possessing a singularity 
(each time) which can never be reduced by criticism or theoretical contemplation. 34 
By contrast, in late-totalitanan society, there is a single, central agent of all truth and all 
power. Everything is known ahead of time. And when everything is known ahead of 
time,, there is no soil for the story to grow out of When the story is destroyed, the 
feeling 
33 See Vaclav Havel, 'Stories and Totalitarianism', in Index on Censorship, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 1988. 
34See, for example, Derrida, Acts ofLiterature, ed. Derek Attridge (New York and London: 
Routledge, 
1992). 
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of historicity disappears as well ('historicity', that is, as Lyotard envisages it, the memory 
that we haveforgotten, a sense of the multiple strands which make up history, and a sense 
of the unforeseeable and the unknown). 
Havel argues that as the story is destroyed,, the very experience of time begins to 
disappear: time seems to stand still or go round in circles. Totalitarian power brings 
bureaucratic order into the living disorder of history and thus effectively anaesthetized it as 
history. This nihilisation stems from the belief that ideology has fully understood the world 
and revealed the truth about it. In Derrida's terms, it is a failure of memory and hope, a 
failure to live with the inescapability of forgetting as we order our experience. 
It is story which is one of the channels of Havel's dissident voice, refusing to allow the 
particular to be lost in the universal, refusing to allow the system to forget its 'others'. 
The dominant tradition in philosophy tends to see injustice as a derivative phenomenon: as 
what happens when just norms are broken. As Stephen K. White points out, injustice is 
not only derivative within this tradition; it is of secondary concern, because it tends to be 
seen as essentially correctable. So theory has tended to be concerned with the goal of 
justice, with injustice seen as a temporary obstacle. 31 Literature continually reminds us 
that injustice is a central and ineliminable feature of the world, because we simply cannot 
know enough about people or events to fulfil the demands ofjustice. In Derrida's terms 
justice is an excessive demand. The writer consistently deflates the dominant model's faith 
in the efficacy of norms -a faith which blinds us to injustice. The 
dissident voice of 
literature,. with its focus on injustice, calls for engagement with neglected ethical/political 
issues, the different faces of victimhood, the ways in which we rationalise or learn to live 
with injustice. In other words, literature insists on the excess which destabilises categories 
35 See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism. op. cit., pp. 122-4. White is discussing 
Judith Shklar's observations in her article, 'Giving Injustice Its Due', in Yale Law Journal 98 (April 
1989). 
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of 'justice' and 'injustice'. By engaging in a deconstruction of such categories, language 
is continually sustained and revisited by a poetics of excess and memory. Categories of 
'justice' and 'injustice', then, become subject to linguistic tropes rather than ideological 
structures. 
Ivan K114Ma, Judge on Trial 
... the opportunity to study and reflect on law offered the greatest 
satisfaction while the requirement to implement it was the saddest or 
most painful fate that could befall one. The practice of law led either 
to cynicism or madness. We could see examples of the former all 
around us, and as for the latter, suffice it to recall Kafka, who, though 
few realised it, was a Prague lawyer ... 
36 
... 
human history was an eternal clash between poets and policemen 
and that clash had never been resolved- And was Ufflikely to be. 37 
Since the Prague Spring the Czech intelligentsia has returned to the traditional role it 
inherited from the nineteenth century. In the face of a massive onslaught on society by a 
totalitarian power, the sphere of culture became the ultimate rampart against 
I normalisation' or 'sovictisation'. Much Czech literature written under the pressure of 
Communism charts the gradual erosion of messianic ideals by the praxis of social 
engineering. Often writers engage with Marxism and the Marxist concept of history and 
insist on the multiplicity of history which enables one to rouse one's conscience against 
injustice. 
Ivan Klima was bom in Prague in 193 1. I-Es writing is haunted by imprisonment and the 
quest for 'freedom'. IFEs protagonists seem to move from gaol to gaol, as each 'freedom' 
leads to disillusionment and a new encarceration. He himself witnessed the horrors of 
Nazi occupation during the war (he began to write in Terezin concentration camp); the 
Stalinist regimes of the fifties; the celebrations of the Prague Spring (he was editor of 
36 Ivan KIIMa, Judge on Trial, tr. Alice and Gerald Turner (London: Chatto and Windus, 1991), p. 283. 
37 Ibid., p. 388. 
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Czechoslovakia's most important literary magazine); the despair of the Soviet invasion in 
1968; the bravery of the members of Charter 77; the triumph of the Velvet Revolution in 
1989, and the uncertainty which followed. Much of his writing emerged during the years 
of Soviet Communism and a constant theme is the alienation of the individual. As in 
Kafka, in Klima's novels the 'real' world of phenomena develops its own logic and leaves 
his characters yearning for a freedom they are unable to grasp. For Klima's characters, 
every' fireedom' becomes the next encarceration,, because each 'freedom% whether it be 
Communist ideology or, as in one of his recent novels, Waitingfor the Dark, Waitingfor 
the Light (1994) the liberal democracy of the post-Communist Czech Republic, each 
attempt to realise utopia, inevitably brings disappointment. So, for example, the 
Holocaust victim becomes the foot soldier of the new glorious revolution: 
Convinced I had to do something to ensure that people never again 
lost their freedom, so that they should never again find themselves in 
hermetically sealed surroundings with no chance of escape, ruled 
solely by butchers' knives, I prepared to become a foot-soldier of the 
revolution, a hobby horse for a new generation of butchers to mount, 
and wielding their cleavers drive the scattered human herd into rebuilt 
enclosures, and set to with their knives to carve out the splendid 
fature. 38 
A0 
A discussion of Mima's Judge on Trial (1986) will focus the issue of the relationship 
between law and justice, the need for poetics and a discourse of the messianic. 
'0, As one of Klima's characters puts it, 'It seemed to me I had to solve the contradiction 
between people's yearning for justice and the institutions that pretended to be satisfying 
that aspiration'. 
In the tradition of the polyphonic novel, Judge on Trial is governed by no overarching 
I metanarrative', the story of the protagonist Adam -a lawyer struggling with his sense of 
professional and personal alienation, having lost faith in the ideals of the Party - is not 
unilinear. Various stories are juxtaposed with each other, there is a variety of narrative 
38 Ibid., p. 69. 
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voice an no clear distinction between past and present. Moreover, an the characters are 
morally ambiguous, all are sympathetic and to some extent victims. The way the 
characters are presented shows the difficulty of binary oppositions, such as 'just' and 
I unjustil, 'guilty' and 'innocent' - all are characters enmeshed in complex histories and 
webs of relationships. 
As a lawyer working for the Party, Adam is at once excluding force and one who is 
excluded. He is employed to exclude individuals, not only from the legal system, but 
perhaps more importantly from the possibility ofjustice. At the same time he also feels 
himself to be excluded, both from society as a whole and the individuals around him, but 
also ultimately from the legal system which he represents and of which initially he thought 
himself a part. 
Judge on Trial shows the human consequences when law and justice collapse into each 
other. At one point in the novel Adam engages in conversation with one of the 'older' 
law professors, who reflects that 
Legislation was enacted and its implementation was assured by the 
rulers, and rulers always used violence; every law was intrinsically an 
act of violence against human liberty. He asked me whether I believed 
it was possible to achieve some kind of pure justice ... 
Yes, of course, that was how it always started. Everyone yearned for 
perfection and purity. As if there existed some collective creative 
spirit that soared ever higher and higher. However, it soon found itself 
far above the earth and got lost in the clouds, whereupon it forgot why 
it had set out in the first place and where it was bound. At that point it 
could see only itself and became fascinated by its own image. It 
actually became bewitched by its own face, its own proceedings, its 
own words, its own form, its perfect logical judgement. 39 
.e 
A constant theme in Kli . ma's novels is a search for a locus of freedom and value. Because 
the Party represents ideals which it enforces, there is little hope of anything 'other' - the 
39 Ibid., p. 283. 
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void is filled with constant rush,, a sense of merely marking time. Adam regrets that 
,... since most conversations consisted entirely of repetition - phrases, events, ideas, 
opinions - he usually kept quiet' (p. 87). He asks, 'Which was the path of salvation? What 
was the country, where was the place where you would know you were aliveT (p. 9 1) 
It is the quest for an 'ideal' which makes Klim'a's novels a catalogue of failed relationships 
and false hopes. Adam is no exception. f1is personal investment in the ideals of the Party 
has meant that, as his ideals are disappointed, there is nothing to fill the vacuum and he 
cannot relate to those around him. 
Maybe life had always been like that, but previously he hadn't had time 
to notice the dreariness. He had channelled his interest, feelings and 
activity elsewhere, into developments he assumed were going to 
transform the world. It was from that quarter too that he had looked to 
see fulfilment coming. But with his unavoidable withdrawal from such 
involvement, he was shocked to find that he had nothing to fill the 
vacuum left behind. He found nowhere to turn his restless soul; 
nothing and no one to fix his expectations on. (p. 76) 
Adam's mother has learnt that one should not have different aspirations from other people, 
that one should only aspire after what is permitted (p. 9 1), a pressure to conform which 
breeds fear of denunciation and suspicion of others. 
The novel shows that there is no ideal way of life for the individual or society - human 
beings are the product of a whole range of variables and they lead only one of many 
possible lives. What all Klima's characters fail to do is live with this ambivalence. 
As he grows up, Adam, is looking for the absolute, for harmony. As Ian Ward has 
pointed out, in Judge on Trial at various points in the narrative, through Adam, Klima 
considers the whole gamut of legal theories, natural law, positivism, Kantianism, and 
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critical legal theory. 40 Adam is seduced by the beguiling logic of the system, its quest for 
consistency and perfection: He reflects that '... the very attempt to encompass the whole 
of life and organise it into a system enthralled me'(pp. 235). Hejoins in the quest to 
banish unreason from society, to realise a perfectly balanced and harmonious ideal - 'a 
society carefully run so as to leave no scope for unreason' (p. 28 0). 
From his first experiences as a 'judge' at school, when he is asked as a Party member to 
pass judgement on his classmates, to his later personal relationships, Adam believes that 
judgement involves exteriorising a person and measuring them against a standard (the 
,... pretence of being a model individual judging a malefactor, p. 287), which also enables 
him to avoid judging himself 
At an early stage, Adam is convinced by a Marxist vision of justice.: 'The basis of all 
crimes' was 'inequality, and material inequality above all' (p. 163) ... 
' all the misery that 
has been caused by property ... 
As soon as someone acquires property he starts to block the 
path of progress, sometimes by force of arms ... 
When the world is ruled by those who 
work there will be no reason to conquer the world'. Adam's ffiend Mirak replies that- 
'General rules were easy to formulate, and they tended to neglect the various 
contradictions,, variables and possible objections ... 
' 
Once an ideal of normality has been established, all kinds of crimes are justified in pursuit 
of the ideal. 'We commit crimes, or at least we acquiesce in them, so we can go on 
leading normal lives. But we can never live normally again once we are implicated' 
(p. 13 1). The very desire for purity is dangerous. 'The very will to cleanse oneself of evil 
and to atone for guilt conceals within it the risk of new crimes and new wrongs' (p. 103). 
40 in Scottish Slavonic RevjcNN,. Ian Ward, 'Ivan Klima's Judge on Trial: A Study in Law and Literature'. 
Glasgow, 20, Spring 1993,24. 
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In other words, the novel denies a world in which people can be sorted out into guilty and 
innocent,. defendant and judges. From the beginning of the novel, we are confronted with 
the difficult distinction between defendant and judge. We are given an account of the life 
of the man Adam is judging - his mother abandoned him, his grandmother was executed, 
his father turned to drink. This is a pathetic figure, largely the victim of circumstances, 
and his life story reminds Adam of his own childhood experiences as a victim of Nazism. 
A priest who knew the defendant in prison 
'Don't imagine that I seek to condone that dreadful deed, if he did 
commit it. But ever since I heard about it, my thoughts have turned 
again and again to the lad. What was the extent of his guilt and the 
guilt of those who IdIled the man within him and impregnated his soul 
with hatredT (p. 265) 
The system gives people protective roles which define them in relation to the whole, Klima 
exposes these definitions as flimsy and misleading. 
Judge on Trial is concemed with the consequences when a system denies the tension 
between the universal and the particular. The alienation of individuals from the system 
generates a lack of hope, which forces them in on themselves. 
Like Havel's essay, Judge on Trial is insisting that language, law, becomes most 
powerful, and most responsible, when it remembers its 'fallenness". The dissident voice 
retains the linguistic condition that exists in the phrase 'judge on trial'. The paradox of this 
title is its very necessity. 
Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law' 
It seems that the problematic described in Klima s novel calls for an aporetic model of 
ethics such as that described in Derrida's important essay, I Force of Law: The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority'41 and, more recently, Specters ofMarx. 
41 Dcrrida, 'Force of Law', op-cit. 
115 
All Derrida's writing is an attempt to break away from the fatalism of philosophy built on 
static foundations, towards affirmation of possibility. As he insists in his now famous 
interview with Richard Kearney, I Deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness but an 
openness towards the other'. 42He distinguishes between 'positions' (stable foundations on 
which philosophies are built) and 'affirmations'. So,. for example, 'justice' can never be 
stabilised and reduced to what is. He points out that founding acts, like a new 
constitution, are always impositions - they are never 'self-grounded'. The foundation of a 
law is always outside the law thus founded. The principle foundation cannot found itself 
A distinction has to be maintained, then,, between law, as necessary imposition, and justice. 
Justice is never realised, or grounded in an unshakeable foundation, because there are 
simply too many perspectives, too many 'proper names'. It is attempts to build justice on 
a stable foundation which have led to the kind of self-justifying post-totalitarian system 
Havel describes. Derrida speaks in messianic terms ofjustice 'to come'. In his interview 
with Kearney he shifts into strikingly theological language- 
It is true that I interrogate the idea of an "eschaton" or "telos" in the 
absolute formulations of classical philosophy. But that does not mean 
that I dismiss all forms of Messianic or prophetic eschatology. I think 
that all genuine questioning is summoned by a certain type of 
eschatology, though it is impossible to define this eschatology in 
philosophical terms. The search for objective or absolute criteria is, to 
be sure, an essentially philosophical gesture. Prophecy differs from 
philosophy in so far as it dispenses with such criteria. The prophetic 
word is its own criterion and refuses to submit to an external tribunal 
which would judge or evaluate it in an objective or neutral fashion. 
The prophetic word reveals its own eschatology and finds its index of 
truthfulness in its own inspiration and not in some transcendental or 
philosophical criteriology. 43 
The sub-title of Force of Law' ('The Mystical Foundation of Authority') is extremely 
important. As we have seen, for Derrida justice is not self-grounded but is a responsibility 
42 Richard Kearney (ed. ), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), p. 124. 
43 Ibid., p. 119. 
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to an'other'who is always before the law. A'mystical' ethic is an ethic premised on no 
ground of its own. The word 'mystical' functions negatively, as a concern that no 
justificatory discourse can or should assume the role of a meta-language in relation to its 
dominant interpretation. The term 'mystical' represents a refusal to allow law to be 
tautologous or self-justifying. What is rotten in a legal system, it seems, is precisely the 
erasure of its own mystical foundation of authority so that the system can dress itself up as 
justice. 
The word 'justice' comes from the Latin 'iufis',, denoting that which is binding (in 
Derrida's terms, perhaps, a binding responsibility, an infinite obligation, a recognition that 
current notions ofjustice are always inadequate fictions or approximations, to be 
questioned and improved). By contrast, the word 'law' means 'to gather or set in order', 
to stabilise. According to Derrida, one cannot speak directly about, thematise or objectify 
justice. Justice is an infinite obligation - it concerns the other as other in a unique situation, 
irreducible to objective law. 44 Ifjustice is identified with positive law, the very notion of 
justice is undermined. Whereas law is deconstructible (constructed, interpretable., 
textual), justice is not. 45 Law is deconstructible to the extent that it claims to be founded 
on something - conventions,, rules, norms,, or nature itself There is no static foundation on 
which laws can be built. As he repeatedly argues, any constitution is an imposition to the 
extent that it is a performative act, bringing about what it claims as its ground. Law is 
statutory and stabilizable, a matter of legality and fight, calculable within a system of 
44 It is to be noted that what Derrida calls 'justice' is very close to what Levinas calls 'ethics'. 
45 Derrida's sense of the relationship between law and justice is reminiscent of Chapter 13 of St. Paul's 
Epistle to the Romans. Here Paul urges his readers to submit themselves to the governing authorities, 'for 
there is no authority except that which God has established'. In verse 8 we read, 'Let no debt remain 
outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for he who loves his fellow-man has ftdfilled 
the law'. The commandments are summed up in the injunction to 'Love your neighbour as yourself 
(verse 9). Paul's readers are called to live according to the law, which is finite, whereas one's binding 
obligation to one's neighbour is infinite. The infinite obligations of love inform and fiffil the finite 
obligations of legality. 
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regulated codes and presentations. Justice is the possibility of deconstruction - an 
unrepresentable 'before'. Derrida goes so far as to say that deconstruction is justice46, by 
which he means that deconstruction keeps open the 'beyond' of currently unimaginable 
transformative possibilities precisely in the name ofjustice. Justice is an infinite 
responsibility to which we can never close our ears or eyes through an appeal to what is. 
Deconstruction thus leads to a sense of responsibility without limits, excessive 
incalculable, before memory (since our memories rely on narrative structures). Yet 
although laws are always inadequate and always open to question, they are nevertheless 
unavoidable. This is a version of the aporia to which Derrida returns repeatedly - we 
inhabit language so that there is no extra-linguistic perspective available to us; every 
representation is partial and exclusive since language is about repetition and 
generalisation, but words nevertheless have great power for good and ill and must be used 
responsibly, I ethically'. 
Justice is the experience of the impossible, of the undecidable, of aporia. Justice always 
concerns singularity, the other in a unique situation. Yet societies need to regulate justice 
in laws which are necessarily general and impartial. Inasmuch as the singular is unique it 
can never be comprehended within any general structure. Any legitimate judgement, 
then,, must recognise the tension between the generality of the law and the singularity of 
the particular case. So Derrida places his emphasis not on singularity as such, but on the 
puzzling yet productive relation between singularity and generality. 
The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or tension between two 
decisions, it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, 
foreign to the order of the calculable, the rule, is still obliged ... to give 
itself up to the impossible decision while taking account of law and 
rules. A decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable 
46 Derrida, 'Force of Law'. op. cit., p. 15. 
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application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal. it 
would not be jUSt. 47 
A desire for justice whose structure would not be such an experience of aporia would have 
no chance of being what it is, namely a call for justice. Instead,, it would merely be about 
unfolding a particular programme or discourse. The law then loses its grounding in the 
particular, is reified and assumes a life of its own. 48The absolute singular is 'before'the 
law. In other words, it is not a past present that can be re-membered or re-collected - it is, 
in Levinas' terms,, an 'unrepresentable before'. 
Derrida's notion of 'iterability' is important here. Iterability is the necessary repeatability of 
any item experienced as meaningful (for example, a law), which at the same time can never 
be repeated exactly since it has no essence that could remain unaffected by the potentially 
infinite contexts into which it could be grafted. When this notion of iterability is denied 
and language is literalised, we are back to the problems we identified above. 
Institutions of law are charged with a responsibility to retain the memory of aporia - the 
irresolvable tension between the generality of the law and the specificity of the particular 
case. 
47 Ibid., p. 24. 
48 Similarly, Paul Lehmann ponders this aporia in his discussion of Romans 13: 1-10 (See Paul Lehmann, 
The Transfiguration ofPolitics, London: SCM Press, 1975, pp. 34-48). He writes, '... a premature 
celebration of the messianic presence is vulnerable to demonic distortion, as well as open to divine 
enablement' (p. 34). Lehmann argues that, according to Paul, '... the state is the instrument, not the 
source, of authentic sovereignty, and that the state and revolution are on a collision course, so long as the 
state obstructs and does not serve authentic sovereignty. As Paul interprets Jesus, however, it appears that 
Jesus sees more clearly than does Marx (and with him the makers of revolution and the shapers of modem 
revolutionary experience) that revolutions imperil the love that they so passionately practice by devouring 
their own children either through the self-justification of their own authority or through dissipation as 
rebellion against authority. A politics of confrontation in Jesus' sense in neither submission to, nor 
legitimation of, existing governments. It is a much more subtle practice of the love of neighbor that 
recognises in existing authorities the great divide between a self-justifying legitimacy that ends in the 
tyranny of order and a seif-justifying rebellion that ends in the tyranny of anarchy' (p. 39). 
Lehmann's discussion of Karl Barth's commentary on Romans 13 brings out some similar resonances. 
The State is to be seen as God's agent and must render certain services and duties, but, when it confuses 
itself with the order of God, it begets its own downfall. The revolutionary is always nearer to what God is 
doing in the world to make human life human but is imperiled by the temptation to mistake his own 'no' 
to the existing order for the new order (p. 45). 
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Levinas sets up a contrast which is very similar to Derrida's distinction between justice and 
law. Levinas speaks of 'ethics', as the extreme exposure and sensitivity of one subject to 
another, which becomes 'morality' as soon as we move into the political world of the 
impersonal 'third' - the world of govermnent, institutions, tribunals, schools, prisons, 
committees. But the norm which must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the 
ethical norm of the inter-human. If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical 
foundation, it must accept all forms of society including the fascist or totalitarian, for it 
can no longer evaluate or distinguish between them. 
In his essay 'Before the Law', Derrida reads Kaflca's famous parable of the door-keeper as 
illuminating these issues. 49 There is a singularity about relationship to justice (what in this 
parable is called the Law), which must come into contact with the general or universal 
essence of the law (small 7) without ever being able to doSo. 50 Kafica's text relates in its 
way this conflict between law and singularity. Like the man from the country in Kafka's 
story, narrative accounts would try to approach justice ('the law of laws') and make it 
present, to enter it and become intrinsic to it, but this cannot be accomplished. To seek to 
49 Jacques Derrida, 'Before the Law', in Derek Attridge (ed. ), Acts ofLiterature (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 181-220. 
50 In a discussion of another Kafka parable, 'In the Penal Colony', Lyotard wrestles with the same issues 
- the relationship between law and what he calls the intractable (that which resists all law). According to 
Lyotard, the intractable is an absolute condition of morals. The intractable is that which is prior to, or 
exceeds, interpretation. Drawing on the imagery of Kafka's parable - the machine for execution which 
works -by writing the sentence on the body of the condemned - Lyotard highlights the danger of forgetting 
the necessary violence of law or interpretation. 'Because the Westerner has forgotten blood; because he 
believes that he has already redeemed the body once and for all through some incarnation (Jesus, or Louis 
XVI), that is, through a law that became flesh at the cost of spilled blood, a cruor - but once and for all. 
Such is the perfunctory attitude of the West regarding the law; such is its nonconfrontation with cruelty. 
It scarcely wants to know more about cruelty than about the cook's recipe. But you can't make an 
omelette without breaking some eggs' (Lyotard, 'Prescription', in Toward the Postmodern, ed- Robert 
Harvey and Mark S. Roberts, New Jersey and London: Humanities Press, 1993, p. 18 1). Furthermore, to 
be just it does not suffice to be the officiant of the law: one must suffer from it. This is why, in the 
parable, the Commandant lays himself down on the machine, the programme having been set to write on 
his body the article of the law he infringes by serving it. And this article reads: 'Be Just'. 
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enter into relations with justice (Kafica's Law) is to act as if it no longer depended on its 
historical presentation. However, as Derrida puts it, 'the inaccessible incites ftom its place 
of hiding"51 and the doorkeeper does not say 'no' but 'not yet', indefinitely. What cannot 
and must not be approached is the origin or ground of language and interpretation - there 
is no foundation to be appropriated (if Derrida speaks of a foundation it is of a 'mystical 
foundation'). Likewise, Derrida points out that the storv 'Before the Law' does not tell or 
describe anything but itself as text. The text guards itself, maintains itself - like justice, 
speaking only of itself, that is to say, of its non-identity with representations of itself 
Justice as justice does not occupy a ground - it is only recognised in its other. 
Like Derrida's texts,, Kafka's story says what it does by doing what it says. Derrida goes 
on in this essay to relate the story of Kafka's man from the country to the experience of 
the reader confronted with the literary text. Just as one is confronted with the possibility 
and impossibility ofjustice, its readability and unreadability, its necessity and prohibition, 
one has the same experience when confronted with a literary text. 52 This 'unreadability 
of the literary text is, then, ethically necessary to the extent that it insists on the aporetic 
whilst denying a single interpretation. But this 'unreadability' is only evident through a 
reading of the text. Only by reading the text does one find that it is unreadable, so that 
interpretation is never singular or monologic. 53 Our experience of reading, then, should 
prompt a sense of the 'undecidable', where every reading is haunted by its forgotten 
others. 
Derrida is careful to distinguish his notion ofjustice 'to come' from both the messianic 
demand for a kingdom and the teleology of Hegelian-Marxist revolution. Both demand a 
51 Derrida, 'Before the Law, op. cit., p. 191. 
52 Ibid., p. 196. 
53 See also J. Hillis Nfiller, The Ethics ofReading (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
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period of waiting, whereas, according to Derrida justice cannot wait - though it cannot be 
presented or realised in terms of positive law, it nevertheless cannot wait. Derrida is 
calling us to a sense of 'kairos', a recognition (as he puts it in Specters ofMarx) that time 
is 'out ofjoint' - the demand for justice (like the Kingdom of God) is 'at hand' - it is here 
but on its way, suspended between expectation and immediacy. This notion relates to 
that of 'anamnesis' - Derrida asks us to leave behind a linear undertsanding of history, with 
a predetermined past and a future which has been anticipated, to an anamnesis which, one 
might say, looks 'from side to side' - even as one necessarily makes decisions, one is 
conscious of a debt to forgotten 'others'. Whenever ethics is located on a linear 
continuum, whether a particular understanding of the past, present or future, it will always 
become destructive and forgetful. Once again, memory requires an understanding of 
language which recognises that, although it is our only means of understanding, it is never 
I naturalised' or 'at home' - that what falls beneath what is represented always threatens to 
haunt it. 
It was this demand for justice, a mission to 'name', or an anamnesis which recognises that 
time is out ofjoint, never patient to historical concepts, always haunted by forgotten 
others, which the various forms of totalitarianism this century have sought to eradicate. 
Dogmatism or ideology are the results of worshipping the law for its own sake, or 
revering it as adequate to each singular decision that has to be made. 
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx 
I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of Derrida's Specters ofMarx (1994). One 
of the interesting features of this book is that deconstruction, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Ufflon,, deprived of an obvious ideological enemy, engages with the legacy of Marx. 
The editors in their introduction to this work, remind us of the dangers presented by the 
collapse of Communism in the Eastern bloc. There is every sign that the collapse of 
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Communism has signalled for many the triumph of capitalism, the replacement of one 
ideology with another, the messianic legacy of Marx now merely identified with Soviet 
Communism. Yet,, like all Derrida's work, Specters ofMarx is directed against those who 
would reduce and simplify both philosophy and literature, instead of recognising, as Derek 
Attridge puts it, 'that the texts to which we give these labels remain always ahead of us, 
making demands on us, laughing at us and withUS'. 54 Such is the legacy (or legacies) of 
Marxism and we must avoid the temptation of thinking we 'know'the legacy of Marx and 
can therefore happily dispose of it. 
It is clear that once again for Derrida the notion of justice is inseparable from memory. 
We are required to learn to live with ghosts, which I take to mean living, qua Lyotard, 
with the memory that we have forgotten, a reminder of the partiality of our memories and 
that the texture of history is too thick to be captured by our pale representations of 
history. In the name ofjustice, Derrida speaks about those who are not present. This 
memory that we have forgotten reminds us that justice is not yet. Nojusticeandno 
politics is possible that does not recognise this painful sense of excess, which denies binary 
oppositions, a sense of obligation to the nameless suffering, those others who are no 
longer. The present must be seen as non-contemporary with itself, but haunted by a 
responsibility to past and future voices. The possibility ofjustice carries beyond present 
life, life as my life or our life. In other words, justice is always ' at hand' or in judgement, 
an urgent imperative, but never complete. One might say justice lives within the 'kairetic 
moment'55 - it iS, though it is not yet. 
Derfida's notion of the 'proper name' is important here. Justice requires that people 
should never be spoken of'... in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of the flag or of 
54 Derek Attridge's introduction to Acts of Literature, op. cit., p. 2 1. 
55 Mark 1: 15 -'The moment is at hand'. 
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martyrdom. A man's fife, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and 
something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper name should always 
name'. 56 
For Derrida, 'ghost' or 'spectre' is a figure which stands for all that is lost in the human 
attempt to grant meaning to experiences by making them subject to linguistic demands. 
The 'presence' achieved in representation presupposes absence, the absence which must 
haunt our deliberations. As Deffida puts it, - reflecting on the Western metaphysical 
tradition, 
There has never been a scholar who really, and as scholar, deals with 
ghosts - nor in all that could be called the virtual space of spectrality. 
There has never been a scholar who, as such, does not believe in the 
sharp distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and the 
inactual, the living and non-living, being and non-being. 57 
Derrida argues that the writings of Marx have urgent lessons to teach us today, as long as 
one takes into account what Marx and Engels say about their own possible 'ageing' and 
their intrinsically irreducible historicity. Marx and Engels did not hold to a static view of 
their theories; they were open to the transformation to come of their own ideas. 58 
According to Derrida, we must retain the memory and inheritance of Marx or, rather, we 
must remember that there is, and must be, more than one 'Marx'. 
An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. 
Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to 
reaffirm by choosing. 'One must' means one must filter, sift, criticise, 
one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same 
injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion around a secret. If 
the readability of a legacy were given, natural transparent, univocal, if 
it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would 
never have anything to inherit from it. We would be affected by it as 
by a cause - natural or genetic. One always inherits from a secret - 
which says 'read me, Will you ever be able to do So? '59 
56 Derrida, Specters ofMarx, op. cit., p. xv. 
57 Ibid_, p. 11. 
58 Ibid., p. 13. 
59 Ibid, p. 16. 
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The danger in believing that the collapse of Communism heralds the triumph of capitalism, 
liberalism and the virtues of parliamentary democracy, is that what we mean by these 
terms is the present, which is to say in fact past, forms of electoral and parliamentary 
apparatu. s. 60 Once again, in Havel's terms, we become anaesthetised to history, time 
stands still. Like KII'm'a's characters, we move from gaol to gaol, our new freedom 
becoming our next encarceration. We exorcise spectres at our peril. 
60 Zygmunt Bauman writes, 'The present crisis of socialism is as derivative as its past triumphs. The 
present crisis is not of socialism's sole making. It is the crisis of socialism as a distorted and, in the end, 
an ineffective form of modernity; but it is also a reflection of the crisis of the modem project as such' 
(Modernity andAmbivalence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 266). 
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Chapter 4 
WRITING AGAINST APARTHEID 
The 'Theology' of Apartheid 
Like the Nazi 'Final Solution' and Soviet Communism, the ideology of Apartheid was an 
essentially utopian vision. It relied upon essentialist notions of 'nationhood' and ideal 
unity, a vision of the relation of 'races' to each other, known as 'separate development' - 
Africans and Europeans seen as distinct 'nations' separated by secure boundaries. 
Apartheid was an attempt to order or control human experience according to a logic of 
binary opposition. It was thus resistant to 'writing' or 'scripture", which precisely 
disturbs these oppositions, confronting the reader with the possibility and impossibility of 
justice, its readability and unreadability. Such writing may thus provoke a crisis for 
interpretation which clears the ground for new moral vision. As Robert Bernasconi points 
out, one of deconstruction's most profoundly 'political' contributions has been in 
disturbing the confidence with which the boundaries between disciplines and areas are 
maintained. 2 
Like the preceding chapters, this chapter will explore the ethical possibilities of literature 
(including Derrida's writings on South Africa which problematise the distinction between 
philosophy and literature) in destabilising the artificial boundaries set in place by apartheid 
and so fostering a sense of the incomprehensible, a crisis of representation making 
I Ironically, since the regime used biblical scripture in the service of its ideology. 
2 Robert Bemasconi, 'Politics beyond Humanism: Mandela and the Struggle Against Apartheid', in Gan 
B. Madison (ed. ), Working Through Derrida (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993). 
pp. 94-95. 
In The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), Derrida considers whether the prospects of a New Europe might demand not only 
a new definition of European identity but also a new way of thinldng identity itself. 
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particu ar ethical responsibilities immediate and urgent. I IFEllis Miller has written that 
,. Ahe moral law gives rise by an intrinsic necessity to storytelling, even if that storytelling 
in one way or another puts in question or subverts the moral law'. 3 I understand fEllis 
NEller to imply here that, whereas ideology seeks to make the moral law present within 
language as positive law, literature may enact a recognition of the excess of experience 
over interpretation, and thus offer testimony to the moral law. 4 In his discussion of Paul 
de Man, I-Ellis Miller argues that the reader has the impossible task of reading 
unreadability 'but that does not mean that reading, even good reading, cannot take place 
and does not have a necessarily ethical dimension'. 5 The ethical moment in reading is a 
recognition of unreadability, or of the necessary violence of interpretation. 
In Apartheid theology, there was no sense of what Derrida calls 'writing' as a condition of 
the Fall - no sense that the ideal is never finally attainable, that no single interpretation may 
do justice to every individual and perspective. There was no recognition of the need for 
creative tension between the general law and the particular case, or of the excess of 
experience over interpretation. Apartheid relied upon a single interpretation of human 
relations for which it sought to find concrete realisation - as such it was inherently circular 
(in Derridean terms, a 'closed text' as opposed to an 'open text'). As Derrida reminds us, 
it is only in the continual attempt to break this circle, providing openings by re-reading and 
re-writing that justice is continually and tentatively pursued. In the terms of Derrida's 
essay on Edgar Allen Poe, 'The Purloined Letter', apartheid as a system represented the 
3 J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics ofReading (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 2. 
4 Hillis Miller is particularly critical of the tendency in some literary circles of 'measuring and 
ascertaining ... the meaning of a text by something nontextual outside the text: God ... society ... 
history ... the 
psychology of the author, the "original" of the text in real life' (The Ethics ofReading, p. 6). Such 
approaches give the impression of having mastered or domesticated the text according to predetermined 
criteria. Hillis Miller's interest is in the performative power of the text to disturb such a sense of mastery. 
'This ethical "I must" cannot be accounted for by the social and historical forces that impinge upon it. In 
fact the ethical moment contests these forces or is subversive of them. ' 
5 lbid., p. 59. 
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purloined lettet-6. the letter stolen or appropriated, as apartheid froze and naturalised 
meanings according to predetermined criteria. 
This failure to acknowledge 'writing' can be seen in the ways in which the Dutch 
Reformed Church read scripture, and this raises larger questions about the ways in which 
the Bible is used in theological and ethical reflection. 
According to Allan Boesak, the uniqueness of apartheid does not lie in the inherent 
violence of the system but in the fact that this system claims to be based on Christian 
principles. 7 This theology was articulated, for example, at the 1950 Dutch Reformed 
Church Conference. Johann Kinghorn characterises it as a 'detailed system of social 
ethics'. 8 The underlying formula was- all people are equal, not as individuals but within 
the confines of their own nationhood. According to the 1950 vision humanity did not 
consist of permanently inferior or superior people but of more or less developed nations. 
A dream, or ideal, was constructed - an apartheid called 'separate development', a dream 
of 'separate freedoms. 
A 
Apartheid theology is the expression of a comprehensive concept of reall I ity and life - the 
constituent elements of which are rigidly integrated. Kinghorn argues that apartheid 
6 See Derrida, 'The Purveyor of Truth, in Yale French Studies, no. 52 (1975), 31-114. The essay is a 
response to Jacques Lacan's reading of Edgar Allan Poe's story. Derrida criticises Lacan's reading as 
suggesting that nothing ever escapes the privileged hermeneutical standpoint of psychoanalysis. Derrida's 
reading of Poe's story shows that something must always escape in the reading of a text, no matter how 
subtle the reading. 
7 Allan Boesak, Black and Reformed: Apartheid, Liberation and the Calvinist Tradition (Maryknotl, New 
York: Orbis Books, 1984), p. 85. 
For a detailed discussion of the religious and moral justification of apartheid, see Cecil Ngcokovane, 
Demons qfApartheid (Braamfontein: Skotaville Publishers, 1989). Cecil Ngcokovane shows how the 
Xederduitse Gereformeerdekerk, The National Party and the Broederbond together worked out the central 
religious and moral legitimations of apartheid. 
8 See Johann Kinghom, 'The Theology of Separate Equality: A Critical Outline of the DRC's Position on 
Apartheid, in Martin Prozesky (ed-), Christianity amidst Apartheid: Selected Perspectives on the Church 
in South Africa (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 66. 
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theology was the conceptual integration, within the protestant faith, of three sets of ideas 
dealing with cosmology and anthropology derived from the European tradition. He calls 
these three sets of ideas 'evolutionary idealism', 'harmonious balance' and 'intrinsic 
collectivism'. In the theology of apartheid the 'unity' of humanity is always stated as a 
point of departure. This was interpreted in a Platonic way as an ideal unity. For example, 
the unity of the Church is said to be found in the 'trinitarian God'. to which was usually 
immediately added that this unity does not negate the diversity in God's creation. Rather, it 
I supersedes'it. 9 Thus, the unity of the church is '-something different from an artificial 
and forced unity which is pursued merely for the sake of a visible unity'. 10 Alsowhen 
apartheid theology deals with human history, an idealistic anthropology is likewise 
employed. From Genesis I and 2 it is inferred that mankind is an 'essential unity'. 
However, this does not mean that all individuals are 'one. On the contrary, when 
humanity is viewed synchronically a multitude of 'forms' (that is, nations) becomes visible. 
Ideally people are 'one', but in reality they are diverse. The reason for the diversity of 
human forms is explained in terms of a concept of history according to which, in the 
course of time, different human families emerged from the original one pair of ancestors. 
These fan-fflies developed differently, each according to their own intrinsic qualities and, 
thus today, they all stand at different levels of cultural achievement. According to 
apartheid theology this view of history is supported by the story of Babel told in Genesis 
11. The story of Babel is interpreted as the first historical attempt to thwart God's 
creational will by uniting, instead of dividing, the different nations. This had forced God to 
intervene to ensure that the course of human history complies with the intended order of 
creation. The story of Babel therefore serves to confirm the belief that human pluriformity 
is, in fact- the aim of God. 
9 Dutch Refonned Church Report, Church and Society, 1986, quoted in Kinghom, ibid., p. 76- 
10 Ibid. 
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The New Testament scholar Professor E. P. Groenewald commented in 1947 in his 
A 
p Apartheid and guardianship in the light of Holy Scripture', that there are many statements 
in the Bible that give fixed principles with regard to race relations. He concluded that the 
Bible teaches the unity of mankind; that God consciously divided man into races, peoples 
and tongues; that apartheid is the will of God and that it leads to national, social and 
religious apartheid; and that there is a spiritual unity in Christ. II 
In apartheid theology a concept of primal balance was applied to social groups. The result 
was that humanity was conceived of as a constellation of different entities delicately 
counterbalancing one another, which, if successful, produced harmony. Thus the delicate 
network of counterbalances should not be disturbed. It was thought that God needs the 
entire diversity of reality to reflect all His glory. God being Spirit, what is one in God must 
therefore of necessity be many and diverse in the realms of space and time. 
Apartheid theology relied upon an essentialist notion of nationhood, according to which a 
nation is an extended family integrated historically, as well as genetically, by a particular 
and unique identity. According to this type of anthropology and sociology, every 
individual is subordinate to a specific identity of which the individual is merely a particular 
expression. By means of this identity, the individual is bound to others who share the 
common identity. The group is therefore much more than the sum total of individuals 
belonging to it. The group is the individual's Primal ground of being. 
According to Cecil Ngcokovane, Affikanerdorn relied on a Kuyperian notion that culture 
is a divine product,. which together with race, history, fatherland and politics differentiates 
nations from each other. As a divinely created entity, each volk is a separate social sphere, 
11 See Willem Vorster, 'The Bible and apartheid', in John de Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio (eds. ). 
Ipartheid is a Hereýv (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), p. 96. 
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with a God-willed structure, purpose, calling and destiny. The 1966 General Synod of the 
Dutch Refon-ned Church stated: 
Where intentional mixing and integration might take place on a large 
scale, or might be enforced... God-willed diversity is in danger of being 
levelled down to a colourless uniformity, the distinctiveness of people 
destroyed, and their particular culture bastardized, then the pure 
religion of Christianized peoples would be threatened and peoples 
would, in sport, not be able to ffiffill their independent vacations and 
live according to their distinctive character. The mixing must be 
resisted with every resource as wrong and sinftd, and such a 
development must be opposed in principle. 12 
Implied in such thinking is a particular understanding of 'natural law'. For example, one of 
the architects of apartheid, Dr. N. Diedrichs, wrote that 'any attempt to obliterate national 
differences abrogated God's natural law', hence his rejection of notions of human 
equality. " Afiikanerdom relies, too, on a particular mythic understanding of history. 
Ngcokovane shows how Afrikaner national history is given a quasi-sacred character. The 
Affikaners are God's chosen people, with a mission, as D. F. Malan put it, 'to convert the 
heathen to Christianity without obliterating his national identity'. 14 Hence, in all past 
events, such as the Great Trek, the Anglo-Boer Wars,, the National Party victory in 1948 
and the establishment of the Republic in 1961, God is declared to be the Affikaner God. 15 
Ngcokovane argues that apartheid may be seen within a theodical tradition, to the extent 
that apartheid enabled the oppressed black majority to accept its present condition as the 
will of God. Moreover, this theodicy allows the white minority to accept, explain and 
justify its own satisfaction with the existing social, political and economic inequalities. 
12 Quoted in Cecil Ngcokovane, op. cit., p. 48. 
13 Apartheid is a Heresy, op. cit., p. 5. 
14 Quoted in ibid., p. 18. 
15 Apartheid is a Heresy, p. 10. 
131 
The approach to scripture in such a vision is clearly circular. Scripture is in the service of 
a powerful ideology and once such legitimation, or such a hermeneutic, has become 
established, Scripture is read with a series of assumptions, and fresh legitimation is 
discovered in the text. Apartheid theology starts with an ideology that is introduced into 
scripture and in the end it becomes an ideology based on scripture. A hermeneutic circle 
is thus in place. 
By contrast, Derridean thinking involves a recognition of the inescapability of the 
hermeneutic circle, but requires that the circle be continually broken as new openings for 
alterity are recognised, even though this will establish a new circle, which in turn must be 
broken (this is precisely the process of reading and re-reading). The process is to 
continue ad infinitum. Such a process is a continual affirmation of the hors-texte which is 
no foundation but calls into question all foundations. 16 Such a process is required in the 
name ofjustice. 
It is interesting to contrast Derrida's discussion of the myth of the tower of Babel with the 
use of it made by the apologists of apartheid. In his essay 'Des Tours de Babel' (1985) he 
writes: 
The myth of the tower of Babel ... tells of the need 
for figuration, for 
myth, for tropes, for twists and turns, for translation inadequate to 
compensate for that which multiplicity denies us. In this sense it would 
be the myth of the origin of myth, the metaphor of metaphor, the 
narrative of narrative, the translation of translation, and so on ... The 'tower of Babel' does not figure merely the irreducible 
multiplicity of tongues; it exhibits an incompletion, the impossibility 
of finishing, of totalising, of saturating, of completing something on 
the order of edification, architectural construction, system and 
architectonics. 17 
16 Again, see Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, 
Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1992). 
17 See Peggy Kamuf (ed. )_4 Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 244. 
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The second paragraph of the above quotation provides a helpful critique of the strategies 
of apartheid. 'The tower of Babel does not figure merely the irreducible multiplicity of 
tongues': it is not to be interpreted (qua the apologists of apartheid) in a fatalistic way, as 
the futility of seeking to break out of interpretative systems. The tower represents the 
impossibility of finally achieving the ideal. 
Apartheid theology, then, raises the broader question of the nature of theology. Must 
theology be hermeneutical and self-fulfilling or is it to be seen, in Christian terms, as a 
dynamic commitment to Basileia, the Kingdom of God, I at hand' but 'on its way', or a 
justice which requires action but is always to come? To what extent should theology be 
subject to 'ethical' demands? Derrida's commitment to 'writing' in the name oflustice 
seems to provide an antidote to theological tower building, a vision ofjustice pursued 
through poetics. Jesus' teaching of the Kingdom of God, characterised by parables 
(performative, refusing determinate meaning) bears comparison with this notion ofjustice 
pursued through poetics. By 'poetics' I mean writing and reading ever conscious of the 
excess or remainder which each interpretation leaves, seeking continually to create new 
openings in the name ofjustice. I have not come to destroy the Law but to fulfil it': 
whereas ideologies involve the destruction of the Law Oustice), the fulfilment of the Law 
requires its re-reading or re-writing. 
There are points of comparison here with the Reformed notion of the supremacy of the 
Word, for example, Karl Barth's critique of unevangelical conservatism. Whereas for 
Barth the danger of theological liberalism was that of undermining the historical continuity 
of the faith,. the danger of theological conservatism was that of denying the need for the 
living Word of God to speak afresh to the Church in every situation. 
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In these circumstances it is not the Gospel which gives to the 
community the faith..., on the contrary, it is the community which 
imposes on the Gospel its own faith, mode of thought and outlook'. 18 
Allan Boesak argues that the way in which Reformed Christians in South Africa have used 
the Bible to justify oppression is the very denial of the Reformed belief in the supremacy of 
I scripture. Boesak writes , The church 
believes that the Bible provides us with the 
fundamental principles ofjustice, love, and peace that we in the making of our societies 
ignore or deny at our own peril. It is this word of God that is the critique of all human 
actions and that holds before us the norms of the kingdom of God'. 19 
Writing against Apartheid: Jacques Derrida 
To pursue the relationship between poetics and justice, I turn now to an essay by Jacques 
Derrida 'in admiration' of Nelson Mandela. 20 
As always with Derrida, this writing problematises the distinction between philosophy and 
literature,, seeking to frustrate any monologic, or ideological, reading. As he says of the 
I tone of another of his essays ,I shall speak then of 
(with) an apocalyptic tone in 
philosophy'. 21 There is a poetic quality to this text, allusive and endlessly productive of 
meaning. It is a writing self-consciously resistant to interpretation, performative in that it 
enacts what it celebrates, the impossibility of determinate meaning. The article is a 
celebration of the possibilities of writing, the multiple implications of words, and a refusal 
to allow the kind of freezing or naturalising of language we have seen in Apartheid's 
justificatory discourse. 
At the risk of doing what Derrida's texts deny - that is, extrapolating a determinate 
I meaning' -I want to reflect on themes and possibilities in this text. 
18 See John W. de Gruchy, 'Towards a Confessing Church: The Implications of a Heresy', in John de 
Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio (eds. ), op. cit., p. 89. 
19 Allan Boesak, op. cit., p. 88. 
20 Jacques Derrida, 'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration', in Jacques Derrida and 
Mustapha Tlili (eds. ), For Nelson Afandela (New York: Seaver Books, 1987). 
21 Jacques Derrida, 'Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently adopted in Philosophy', in Semeia, 23,1982,63. 
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Derri a appends a similar proviso to the end of his reflections on Nelson Mandela: 
We have looked at him [Mandela] through words which are sometimes 
the devices for observation, which can in any case become that if we 
are not careful. What we have described, in trying precisely to escape 
speculation, was a sort of great historical watchtower or observation 
post. But nothing permits us to imagine this unity as assur4 still less 
the legitimacy of this optic of reflection, of its singular laws, of the 
law, of its place of institution, of presentation or of revelation, for 
example of what we assemble too quickly under the name of the West. 
But doesn't this presuraption of unity produce something like an effect 
(I don't hold to this word) that so many forces, always, try to 
appropriate for themselves? An effect visible and invisible, like a 
mirror, also hard, like the walls of a prison. 
All that still hides Nelson Mandela from our sight. 22 
Derrida is wary of talking of 'Mandela' in the third person, implying an objectivity which is 
impossible, but he has no option but to do so. He expresses the same concern about 
those who extrapolate his name, 'Derrida' and the meaning of his texts, which in a very 
real sense are what they are and are to be experienced in the act of reading. It is the act of 
reading Derrida's text, and responding to its performative power, that may generate a 
sense of the ethical - to extrapolate a meaning from the text constitutes an act of violence. 
In his essay 'Signature Event Context', Derrida argues that the performative significance 
of the signature is lost when it is regarded as an authoritative stamp acting as a guarantee 
of the fixity of a text's meaning. He writes, 
As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the 
performative does not have its referent (but here that word is certainly 
no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the 
discovery) outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of 
itself. It does not describe something that exists outside of language 
or prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it effects; and even 
if it can be said that a constative utterance also effectuates something 
and always transforms a situation, it cannot be maintained that that 
constitutes its internal structure, its manifest function or destination, 
as in the case of the performative. 23 
22 Jacques Derrida, 'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration', pp. 41-42. 
23 Derrida, 'Signature Event Context', in Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 
p. 13. The distinction being made is that between textuality and the authorised, signed and finished work. 
or, as Derrida puts it in Of Grammatoloýý, the end of the book (closed, signed and sealed) and the 
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Yet, in my case too, I have no option but to offer a commentary on Derrida's text - 
secondary, removed from the text itself and inevitably 'forgetful' - in the hope of 
prompting further commentaries. Such commentary is forgetful partly because the style of 
commentary suggests an authoritative perspective which is belied by Derrida's highly 
allusive style. 
I In this essay, 'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration' , 
Mandela' 
becomes a trope of deconstruction and, as a trope or 'figure, he assumes a messianic 
I stature. If we look again at the above Passage, for example , Mandela' as a trope of 
deconstruction represents that which refuses to be objectified, viewed impartially and at a 
critical distance. Words, says Derrida, can become devices for observation if we are not 
careful, yet it is impossible to find a watchtower from which to observe 'Mandela'. The 
impossibility of doing justice to 'Mandela' represents the impossibility of fulfilling the 
ethical demand,. because this demand, ., 
the demand to do justice to 'Mandela', is infinitely 
demanding of our reading and imagination. 
What does it mean to 'admire' mandela. First, says Derrida, admiration is rational, it asks 
questions. Mandela 'forces' our admiration - what does this 'force' imply? He 'forces' 
even his enemies to admire him. Where does that force come from and where does it 
lead? First of all it is a force of (self-) reflection, of (self-) analysis. But Derrida plays 
on the word 'reflection', using it also in the sense of looking at oneself in a mirror. There 
is no law, says Derrida, without a mirror. In other words, framing laws involves justifying 
what has already been perceived - and is therefore forgetful of other possible perspectives 
(specularity'24 - the repressed spectres which haunt any interpretation). 25 We can never 
beginning of writing (See chapter 1, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
24 See the discussion in the previous chapter. 
25 'The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration', p. 14. 
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avoid seeing the other in our own terms - in this sense, the ambiguity of the word 
I reflection' is significant. 
Mandela, implies Derrida, forces our admiration, surprises us, forces us out of our habitual 
modes of thought, refuses to allow the hermeneutic circle to remain immobile. 
Admiration is a recognition of the 'extraordinary', and Derrida concurs with Descartes, 
that outside this sense of the extraordinary there is only ignorance. Such adniii-ation, one 
might say, is a recognition or recovery of a sense of the'excess' of experience over 
interpretation, an unsettling of habitual modes of thought, a recognition of all that 
particular discourses suppress or silence. 
According to Derrida, 'Mandela becomes admirable for having known how to admire. The 
ability to reflect, to perceive new meanings and new possibilities, to celebrate 'textuality', 
forces our admiration. This 'force', argues Derrida, is 'the law itself, the law above other 
laws'. 26 It is the Law (capital T) that Mandela has admired and I what inscribes it in 
discourse, in history, in the institution ofjurisprudence'. 27 Once again, it is the Law, or 
what Derrida sometimes calls justice"28 insatiable, impossible to stabilise or fulfil, which is 
Mandela's master. 
Mandela 'admires' the tradition of Western democracy, 'the tradition inaugurated by the 
Magna Charta, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man .... parliamentary 
democracy 
and ... the doctrine of the separation of powers, the 
independence ofjustice'. Elsewhere 
Derrida has asserted that 
Notliing seems to me less outdated than the classical 
emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it 
26 Ibid., p. 15. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See 'Force of Law: "The Mystical Foundation of Authority"' 
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today ... 
But f this ideal exceeds I ... all self-serving 
interpretations, 
... all 
determined and particular reappropriations of international 
law... 29 
Derrida argues that Mandela is the inheritor of this tradition, but Derrida takes the 
opportunity to reflect on the meaning of 'inheritance'. The following dense passage 
touches on important themes in Derrida's work- 
You can recognise an authentic inheritor in the one who conserves and 
reproduces, but also in the one who respects the logic of the legacy 
enough to turn it upon occasion against those who claim to be its 
guardians, enough to reveal, despite and against the usurpers, what 
has never yet been seen in the inheritance: enough to give birth, by the 
unheard-of act of reflection, to what had never seen the light of day. 
This passage is concerned with the relationship between the general and the particular, the 
nature of textuality and what it means to be an authentic witness or guardian of 'memory'. 
'The one who conserves and reproduces': We have seen the consequences of a certain 
kind of conservation,, that which continually replicates a particular interpretation of the 
legal code, without thought of the specific case. We have seen this in the official 
discourse of late-totalitarianism, just as we have seen it in the justificatory discourse of 
Apartheid. What is the 'logic of the legacy'to which Derrida refers? Presumably the 
values which inhabit it - in this case those same Western democratic values. Yet the 
language of western democracy can itself become a mask which hides injustice, 
particularly if, as in South Affica, there are those who are defined as outwith this legacy, 
for according to the doctrine of 'separate development', the non-whites represent cultures 
I other' than that of western democracy, a separate race and tradition. It is incumbent on 
such as Mandela, therefore, to reveal 'what has never yet been seen in the inheritance', to 
insist that we need to return to the legacy, re-read it, look at it with new eyes, insist on the 
logic of the legacy which has been forgotten by its complacent inheritors as its language 
has been assimilated and naturalised. Once again, this is what Derrida means by memory 
29 fbid., p. 28. 
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(anamnesis) - allowing the discourse of the tradition to yield new meanings and new 
possibilities - remembering that there are possibilities which have never been seen and new 
possibilities which must be seen if the tradition is to be true to its logic. 
So. argues Derrida, Mandela refused to ally himself with the liberal whites who wanted to 
maintain the struggle against apartheid within the constitutional framework because, for 
Mandela,, this framework was not true to its ideals, or its logic. The South Affican 
constitution, whilst standing for human rights, excluded the majority of its citizens. To 
some extent, as Derrida continually argues, such a coup deforce always marks the 
founding of a constitution, since the values which it represents can never finally be 
expressed or codified, but some founding acts are more 'happy' than others to the extent 
that they do or do not seek to give each person his or her due. In the case of South Africa 
the violence of the founding act was too great because it sought to categorise and define 
the roles of its citizens. This excessive violence results in a kind of paranoia which 
generates more legislation by way ofjustification -Ia pathological proliferation ofjudicial 
prostheses'. 30 The system thus becomes increasingly destructive as legislation proliferates 
to maintain the status quo - like the late-totalitarian system Havel describes, and like any 
utopia, it becomes self-justifying. 
Mandela thus 'contests the constitutionality of the Constitution"31 its failure to live up to 
Western democratic ideals. 
Derrida quotes the Charter of Freedom (of the Affican National Congress): 
South Africa belongs to all its inhabitants, black and white. No 
government can claim an authority which is not founded on the will of 
the entire people. 
- The people will govern. 
- All the national groups will enjoy equal rights ... 
30 'The Laws of Reflection', p. 18. 
31 Ibid., p. 19. 
139 
- All will be equal before the law. 
32 
As Derrida argues, such a declaration is not only a statement or description; it is both an 
urgent imperative, requiring immediate action, and it will never be fully realised. Like the 
Kingdom of God it cannot wait but is always 'to come'. It seems this is true of all such 4: 7 
democratic statements (the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights or the American 
Declaration of Independence would be other examples) - they are necessary statements 
which represent fundamental convictions about the equality and worth of each human 
being, but to legislate for the particular needs of each human being, and the contingencies 
he or she will face, is finally impossible. For Derrida, the important insight is the need to 
maintain a creative tension between legislation and the particular needs of people. 
The Freedom Charter, however re-founds the founding act of the law, 'reflecting against 
the white community the principles from which it was claiming to be inspired'. In other 
words, these values require a new look at the founding text, a new reflection on the words 
themselves and their implications. South Affica must continue to be defined as a 
democracy but the understanding of this word must change. This time, the 'entire nation' 
must include all the national groups, such is the logic of the law to which the white 
tninority was pretending to appeal. 
the 'reflection' of which we are speaking here would make visible what 
was not even visible any longer in the political phenomenality 
dominated by the whites. It would oblige us to see what was no longer 
seen or was not yet to be seen. It tries to open the eyes of the whites; it 
does not reproduce the visible, it produces it. This reflection makes 
visible a law that it does more than reflect, because this law, in its 
phenomenon, was invisible - had become or continued to be invisible. 
'... it does not reproduce the visible, it produces it. ' 'Reflection' involves looking at the 
text again and again to reveal what is no longer seen or has never been seen. Beyond the 
particular context of South Africa, Derrida is calling for a more general concern with 
32 Quoted in ibid., p. 2 1. 
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textuality or writing, a concern that we become good readers. As flillis Miller reminds us,. 
'Deconstruction is nothing more or less than good reading as such'. 33 
In the South African context, the 'invisible' has often been the 'non-white', and Derrida 
implies that the word 'democracy' has become identified with Western models and 
peoples, who have become blind to other possible models. Derrida quotes an 
autobiographical account from Nelson Mandela in which the elders of Mandela's village 
reflect on how 'democracy' was present in Affican societies before western imperialism 
imposed its particular model. Western democratic models or representations have 
assumed a self-evidence and,, suggests Mandela,, understanding of the notion of 
'democracy' is enriched by reflection. Derrida quotes Mandela: 
There was much in such a society that was primitive and insecure and 
it certainly could never measure up to the demands of the present 
epoch. But in such a society are contained the seeds of a revolutionary 
democracy in which none will be held in slavery or servitude, and in 
which poverty, want, and insecurity shall be no more... 
According to Derrida, what is significant here is Mandela's reading of early Affican 
societies. Mandela perceives possibilities for democracy in the 'text' of early Affican 
societies. As Derrida puts it, 'Mandela lets himself be fascinated by what he sees being 
reflected in advance, what is not yet to be seen, what he fore-sees: the really revolutionary 
democracy of which the Anglo-American West would, in sum, have only given an image 
at once incomplete, formal, thus also potential'. Once again, such 'reflection' does not 
merely reflect the visible; it makes visible. 'Reflection' on early African societies reveals 
another possibility, another language, unseen by the habitual language of the West, indeed 
repressed by that dominant tradition. Such 'reflection' is a recognition that 'democracy' is 
never fully realisable, even whilst it is an urgent requirement. No 'representation' of 
33 J. Hillis Nfiller, op. cit., P. 10. 
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democracy is complete or adequate, but this is no fatalism but an affirmation of possibility 
- the possibility of writing and re-writing 'democracy'. 
Mandela, says Deffida, is a 'man of the law'. 34Paradoxically, Mandela has always 
appealed to the law, even if he has had to oppose himself to specific legality. It is an 
appeal to the law which is critical of the instantiation of the law, or any attempt to contain 
35 the law within 'the Book' rather than engage with it as 'writing'. This law (the law of 
deconstruction or ofjustice) becomes evident, according to Derrida, in the person of 
Mandela himself, Mandela and his people (that is, as long as Mandela remains an absent 
presence, dissident to the procedures of government). 
But he [Mandela] does not present himself in view of a justification 
which would follow his appearance. 36 
In other words, - this 
law is not an identifiable and stable 'ground' which could be called 
upon to justify Mandela's opposition to the Apartheid regime. Mandela and those he 
represents themselves serve and articulate this law - the law of deconstruction which 
requires careful reading and re-reading in the name ofjustice. 
The presentation of the self is not in the service of the law, it is not a 
means. The unfolding of this history is a justification, it is possible and 
has meaning only before the law. He is only what he is, he, Nelson 
Mandela, he and his people, he has presence only in this movement of 
justice. 37 
There is no 'hors-texte', no uninterpreted, extra-textual starting-point; no 'ground' for 
justice. What is required is a re-reading in the name ofjustice. Mandela and his people 
I represent deconstruction which, according to Derrida , 
happens', " bringing to recognition 
forgotten voices and perspectives, shaking assumptions and redirecting focus. 
34 'The Laws of Reflection', p. 26. 
35 The reference is to Derrida, Of Grammatology, Chapter 1. 
36 'The Laws of Reflection'. p. 27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 And can only happen as long as Mandela and his followers are dissident to the system - new 
difficulties arise when Mandela becomes President and is now 'hors-texte'. 
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Taking as his witness humanity as a whole, he addresses himself to the 
universal justice above his judges of one day only. 39 
In Mandela's terms,. his conscience is witness to a higher Law which, in the case of 
Apartheid, condemns statutory law. 
Mandela, says Derrida, has made of his mastery of Western law 'a weapon to turn against 
his oppressorS140through his insistence on reading and re-reading the law, exposing his 
oppressors' false guardianship of the law. According to Derrida, these false guardians 
do not finally realise, in spite of all their legal ruses, the true force of 
a law that they manipulate, violate, and betray. 41 
Derrida plays on the South African government's refusal to allow black South Afficans to 
take part in the political process and its insistence that any such political representations be 
made in writing. 
In order not to hear, not to understand, the white Government requires 
that one writes to it. But it also means thus not to answer and first of 
all not to read. 42 
For Derrida, the failure of the white government is a failure to understand writing. As we 
have seen, Apartheid relies for its justification on making texts serve its ideology. 
Apartheid is essentially 'logocentfic', since references are firmly fixed in relation to a static 
and self-serving discourse. Exchanging letters assumes a negotiation of perspectives, but 
the South Affican regime's failure to answer letters from Mandela and others is a mark of 
a more general failure to 'read' 
Not to acknowledge receipt is to betray the laws of civility but first of 
all those of civilization: a primitive behavior, a return to the state of 
nature, a presocial. phase, before the establishment of the law. Why 
does the government return to this noncivilized practice? Because it 
39 'The Laws of Reflection', p. 27. 
40 Ibid., p. 29. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 30. 
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considers the majority of the people, the "most numerous community, " 
as noncivilized, before or outside the law. Acting in this way, 
interrupting the correspondence thus in a unilateral fashion, the white 
man no longer respects his own law. 43 
Civilization - law - is sustained by writing, a community of exchange, and the scandal of 
Apartheid is that the majority of South African citizens are excluded from that law. 44 
As a 'lawyer worthy of that name, ' [Mandela] sets himself against the 
code in the code, reflects the code, but making visible thereby just 
what the code in action rendered unreadable. His reflection, once 
more, shows what phenomenality still kept in hiding. It does not re- 
produce, it produces the visible. This production of light is justice - 
moral or political. 45 
Here again Derrida reflects on the relationship between statutory law and justice. 
Whereas the phenomenon of law is in danger of assuming a self-evidence which reduces 
legal judgements to the predictability of a programme, justice makes visible the textuality 
of the law,, or new ways of reflecting on the law. 
In Derrida's terms, Mandela does not appeal to a different law to that of the whites. He 
shares with the white authorities the same law,, the same text, for there is no hors-texte. 
But Mandela reads, admires, reflects on this text,. challenging claims to the self-evidence of 
one interpretation, making the text a resource for black and white perspectives. So, in a 
chiasmas reminiscent of Christ's claim that he had come not to cancel but fulfil the Law,, 
Mandela's contempt for the laws of Apartheid represents an increase in respect for the 
Law. 
43 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
44 In The Postcard, Derrida plays on the idea of two postal systems, representing two different approaches 
to the text. The first maintains an efficient service, seeking hermeneutic control (with the law and police 
on hand if necessary), while the other opens up a realm of messages and meanings which circulate beyond 
any assurance of authorised control (7he Postcard, tr. Alan Bass, Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press, 1987). 
45 Derrida, 'For Nelson Mandela'. p. 34. 
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In Mandela's appearance before his tribunal, we see the possibility of a dynamics ofjustice. 
'His judges must represent a universal instance. 146 His judges represent justice which is 
universal,. an impossible demand that every individual receive their due, yet these judges 
are constrained by the general terms of the laws of apartheid. Tn this situation it is 
Mandela's responsibility to tell his story and that of his people. 
According to Derrida, Mandela's struggle has become a testament. 47 This prompts 
Derrida to reflect once again on the meaning and importance of memory. Mandela's task 
was to 'reinstitute the law for the future, as if, finally, it had never taken place. 48 There is 
the kind of memory that reflects an essentially dead past which has nothing to teach the 
present. There is also the kind of memory which brings to light what has not yet been 
seen in the legacy so that the past becomes an infinite resource generating ever new 
possibilities. 
Finally, according to Derrida, the law which Mandela serves implies a promise, and we 
return to Derrida's notion of the 'messianic'. I quote Derrida at length, in a passage 
which, interestingly, hardly mentions Mandela at all, only Mandela's reflection. What is at 
stake here,, it seems,, is 'Mandela' as 'trace' or trope of deconstruction* 
... [Mandela's] reflection 
lets us see, in the most singular geopolitical 
conjunction, in this extreme concentration of all human history that 
are the places or the stakes today called, for example, "South Africa, " 
or "Israel, " the promise of what has not yet ever been seen or heard, in 
a law that has not yet presented itself in the West, at the Western 
border, except briefly, before immediately disappearing. What will be 
decided in these so-called places - these are also formidable 
metonymies - would decide everything, if there were still that - 
everything. 
So the exemplary witnesses are often those who distinguish between 
law and laws, between respect for the law which speaks immediately to 
the conscience and submission to positive law (historical, national, 
46 Ibid., p. 36. 
47 Ibid., p. 37. 
48 Ibid. 
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institutional). Conscience is not only memory but promise. The 
exemplary witnesses, those who make us think about the law they 
reflect, are those who, in certain situations, do not respect laws. They 
are sometimes torn between conscience and law, they are sometimes 
condemned by the tribunals of their country. And there are some in 
every country, which proves that the place where these things occur is 
also for the law the place of the first uprooting. 49 
Mandela is witness to 'a law that has not yet presented itself in the West ... , except briefly, 
before immediately disappearing'. Mandela's law is a vision of a promise or future which 
can never be presented, or made present. This vision is perceived only to be neutralised 
as it takes linguistic form. There is no 'hors-texte', yet languages can and must be 
revivified through what Derrida here calls the laws of reflection and Hillis Nfiller would 
call the ethics of reading. Mandela, as an 'exemplary witness', 'distinguishes between 
laws and law' - that is, he perceives the difference between particular verbal expressions of 
the law and the imperative which calls for those expressions to be re-read in the interests 
ofjustice. Moreover, this is a universal imperative ('there are some in every country'), a 
universal,, linguistic and ethical demand, against the regime's failure to 'read'. 
Writing against Apartheid: Nadine Gordimer and Andre* Brink 
In a sense,, the significance of Mandela in Derrida's 1987 essay is as a fictional character, 
or a literary trope. We misunderstand the significance of the essay if we read it as 
primarily historical analysis. 'Mandela', it seems, can only represent freedom when he is 
in the position of deconstructing the situation, or the 'texts', in which he finds himself 
I Now,, of course , 
Mandela' has lost that position, as President of the South Affican 
Republic. Mandela in prison, a deconstructive symbol of absence calling into question 
present actuality, - 
becomes a symbol of presence, an hors-texte, of the new South Aftica as 
it is being realised. Mandela, one might say, has now written his own signature. 50 This is 
essentially a problem of the nature of authority, the problem explored in the previous 
49 Ibid, p. 38 
50 There is an interesting comparison here with Ghandi, who was also a lawyer who appealed to the law 
to deconstruct the law. However, Ghandi remained a dissident figure - he never wrote his own signature. 
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chapter in terms of the relationship between law and justice - how to seek realisation of a 
political vision while recognising the partiality of one's fi7ame of reference. In other 
words., how,. as an authoritative figure, to avoid becoming trapped within a self-justifying 
system? How to continue to read, or continue to be aware of our own forgetfulness - how 
to cultivate the kind of memory Lyotard commends when he speaks of 'that which 
searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable'951 'Mandela' as a fictive character,, a character 
concerned with writing, represented for apartheid, like novelists, poets and playwrights 
who fell foul of the system, a challenge to the regime's systemic logic. 
Perhaps it may be said that 'Nelson Mandela' represents fteedom% a freedom to read or to 
write,, which is no escape from Fredric Jameson's 'prison-house' of language52, but is a 
release from an ideological situation, where individuals are required to fulfil roles within a 
self-fulfilling system. Perhaps, in these terms, freedom is experienced in those moments 
when we are faced with what Austin Farrer called a 'rebirth of imageS'53 - the habitual all 
of a sudden revivified or transfigured, rendered 'unreadable', as experience overwhelms 
interpretation. 
Derrida reflects on the nature of freedom in his essay 'Force of Law'. Discussing the 
relationship between law and justice, he speaks of 'the undecideable' as that which 
... is not merely the oscillation or the tension 
between two decisions, it is 
the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the 
order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged ... to give 
itself up to 
the impossible decision while taking account of law and rules. A 
decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not 
51 Jean-FranSois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979; Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 8 1. 
52 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House ofLanguage: A Critical Account ofStructuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton, NJ, 1972). 
53 The reference is to Austin Farrer's .4 Rebirth ofImages: The Making of St. John's 
Apocalypse 
(Westrninster- Dacre Press, 1949). 
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be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or 
unfolding of a calculable process. 54 
Freedom here is expressed in negative terms, as Derrida is concerned with the 
consequences of what he calls, in the same essay, 'the fall of language into 
representation"'- the terror of a text,, such as the text of apartheid, when it is not granted 
textuality. 
The writing of Nadine Gordimer, whose life spans the rise and fall of apartheid,, is also 
much concerned with the nature of freedom and authority. Her award of the Nobel Prize 
for Literature in 1991 was an affirmation of her distinctive contribution to twentieth- 
century fiction and to the creation of a literature that challenged apartheid. In his study of 
Gordimer's novels, Dominic Head shows how her concerns are developed through 
increasing stress on the politics of textuality. 56 Her writing exhibits a performative power, 
resistant to any single interpretation. In a public address she argued, 'I remain a writer, 
not a public speaker; nothing I say here will be as true as my fiction'. 57 She attempts in all 
her work to present the many-sidedness of the social and political situations she examines. 
Judgements by the reader emerge from the often-neutral presentation of events by the 
narrative voice. For example, in her acclaimed novel ne Conservationist (1974)58, the 
constantly shifting viewpoint incorporates the thoughts and memories of the protagonist, 
attitudes of a wide range of characters, black, white and Indian, snatches of dialogue both 
remembered and direct, as well as epigraphs from a nineteenth-century treatise on the 
religious beliefs of the Zulus that bind sections of the text with a resonant yet oblique 
commentary. Such a dialogic approach, allowing voices to speak in this way, opens up a 
54 Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', op. cit., p. 24. 
55 Ibid., p. 58. 
56 See Dominic Heact Nadine Gordimer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
57 Nadine Gordimer, 'Living in the Interregnurn', in Stephen Clingman (ed. ), The Essential Gesture: 
Writing, Politics and Places (London: Cape, 1988), p. 264. 
58 Nadine Gordimer, The Conservationist (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1978). 
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horizontal plain of vision in which thought is expanded, and subverts a logic of 
hierarchy. 59 
Gordimer reflects on the role of the writer in an article of 1976, in which she argues that 
the freedom of the writer is a freedom beyond the boundaries of particular discourses -a 
writer is not in the business merely of replicating a particular oppositional stance. 
All the writer can do, as a writer, is to go on writing the truth as he 
sees it. That is what I mean by his 'private view' of events, whether 
they be the great public ones of wars and revolutions, or the 
individual and intimate ones of daily, personal life. 60 
In another essay, quoting Frank Kermode, she states that her purpose is 'to use fiction for 
its true purpose, the discovery and registration of the human world'. 61 This freedom of the 
writer's private view of life may be threatened by the very awareness of what is expected 
of him or her. The writer is often expected to conform to an orthodoxy of opposition. 62 
Gordimer quotes Philip Toynbee: 'the writer's gift to the reader is not social zest or moral 
63 improvement or love of country, but an enlargement of the reader's apprehension'. The 
writer destabilises binary oppositions such as 'orthodoxy' and 'dissent' by describing the 
truth as she sees it, often focusing on tiny droplets of human experience, and thus 
enlarging the reader's apprehension. The quotation she cites from Jean-Paul Sartre is 
reminIscent of Derrida's reflections on Nelson Mandela and the nature of freedom: 
59 See the discussion of Mikhail Bakhtin in the previous chapter. 
Similarly, in his essay 'An Act of Violence: Thoughts on the Functioning of Literature'. the South African 
writer Andre Brink argues that 'The same dangers which confront democratic processes in politics - 
intolerance, ignorance, tyranny - are at work in the reading process. It is not a one-directional and one- 
dimensional encounter but a cosmopolitan and multivocal conversation ... 
in the encounter with the literary 
text, tyranny lurks in any attempt by the text or by a critic (or a "school") to elicit a single response from 
the reader, or in any attempt by a reader to impose a single meaning on a text' (Inaugural Lecture, 
University of Capetown, 16'h October, 199 1, p. 12). 
60 Nadine Gordimer, 'A writer's freedom', in Index of Censorship, Summer 1976, Vol. 5, No. 2,53. 
61 Nadine Gordimer, Writing and Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), p. 19. 
62 Nadine Gordimer, 'A writer's freedom', op. cit., 54. 
63 Ibid. 
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He [the writer] is someone who is faithful to a political and social body 
but never stops contesting it. Of course, a contradiction may arise 
between his fidelity and his contestation, but that's a fruitful 
contradiction. If there's fidelity without contestation, that's no good: 
64 one is no longer a free man. 
Fidelity to ideals requires a refusal to rest content with current presentations of those 
ideals: like Derrida,, Gordimer argues for an ethics which continually renegotiates, rereads 
or rewntes written codes, in the pursuit of justice. 
Gordimer's novel, None to Accompany Me (1994)65 is precisely concerned with the 
relationship between 'fidelity and contestation. Like Ivan Klima's Waitingfor the Dark, 
Waitingfor the Light, Gordimer is exploring the consequences of the collapse of the 
former fe"gime. The collapse of the i(egime represents a major ethical collapse, since 
people were suddenly deprived of roles,, either within the system or in positions of 
opposition. The ideological enemy, which had been the focus of opposition and a thirst 
for justice, had been destroyed, but both Gordimer and Klima present a sense of 
disillusiom-nent, as the new liberation brings with it new and unforeseen difficulties. The 
danger seems to be that the collapse of both Apartheid and Communism brings to an end 
the restless idealism which had brought the ideological walls down. The 'beyond' of as 
yet unimaginable possibilities is closed off because freedom is thought to have arrived. 
Yet, in Marcel Proust's words,, which are an epigraph to None to Accompany Me, 'We 
must never be afraid to go too far, for truth lies beyond'. 
Gordimer is grappling with the problem of authority discussed at the beginning of this 
section. What happens when 'Nelson Mandela', a deconstructive symbol of absence 
calling into question present actuality, becomes a symbol of presence, of the new 
South 
Affica as it is being realised? None to Accompany Me shows the life of exile to 
be more 
productive of identity than the 'freedom' which follows. It proves to be 
impossible fully to 
64 Ibid. 
65 Nadine Gorditner, jVone to Accompany Me (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995). 
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realise the ideals of democracy and equality required in the post-Apartheid world and the 
danger is disillusionment or reactionary voices calling for a return to the securities of the 
old regime (as is happening in the countries of the former Eastern bloc). In this situation, 
'Nelson Mandela' as the deconstructive trope which Derrida describes,. remains all the 
more important. Each of the characters in the novel is shown to be incapable of living up 
to the ideals they represent. The protagonist, Vera Stark, like Adam in Klim'a's Judge on 
Trial, is a lawyer on trial who is found wanting in various ways. She is physically 
crippled in her pursuit ofjustice, as she is attacked on one of her visits to the townships. 
As in Judge on Trial, those who devote their lives to the legitimate pursuit ofjustice are 
not presented with an easy path but 'limp'through life. The paradox being explored in 
both novels is the necessary tension between the pursuit of the ideal and the impossibility 
of finally realising the ideal. 
The characters in the novel are people who represent reconciliation and harmony but are 
unable to live up to these ideals. For example, when liberation leaders like Vera Stark's 
.0 --- 
* 
friends, Didymus and Sibongile Maqoma, return from exile, not only are the new black 
authorities dismissive and forgetful of Didymus' past heroic actions, refusing him a place 
among those in authority, but Sibongile, who does acquire such authority, becomes 
preoccupied with the trappings of power and forgetful of the ideals which have brought 
about the new situation. It seems that no character is able either to live up to their ideals 
or to perceive the needs of the next generation, perhaps because they have anticipated the 
next generation or failed to re-apply their values to new challenges. 
The novel suggests that justice is misconceived if it is thernatised according to a binary 
logic of good and evil, guilty and innocent - such thernatisation implies that justice can 
finally be achieved - and to believe this is to grant one's own perspective a self-evidence 
that belies its textuality. The ethical possibility is continually to question particular 
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constructions of ethics. As the apartheid regime failed to make the distinction between the 
ideal and the necessary failure to realise the ideal, None to Accompany Me explores the 
failure of people, with the collapse of apartheid, to re-negotiate values in new situations 
with new demands. Justice, though unobtainable as pure presence, requires immediate 
moral engagement and imagination, even whilst one cannot hope to do justice to all our 
obligations. 
Andre Brink, A Dry White Season 
To conclude this chapter, I turn to Andre Brink's novel, A Dry White Season (1979)66, 
which explores the nature and importance of writing as testimony. 
Ben Du Toit, the protagonist, is an Afrikaner, a teacher of the 'official' history of South 
Africa. He finds his life overtaken with contemporary history when Jonathan Ngubene, 
and later Jonathan's father, Gordon, dies at the hands of the Security Police. Du Toit 
begins an investigation into how and why these men died. Shortly before he is 
I accidentally' killed in a car accident, Du Toit asks a former university fiiend, now a writer 
of romantic fiction,, to accept his notes and papers and 'use them if necessary' (p. 13). Like 
his subject, the writer is slowly drawn into the experience: he reads Du Toit's diaries and 
papers and eventually writes a book. The reader follows the writer into Du Toit's story 
and is progressively confronted by a real alternative history of South Affica in place of the 
approved official version. 
The novel is concerned with one man's crusade for Justice ,I an ordinary, good-natured, 
harmless,. unremarkable man' (p. 9) - the general, the horrors of apartheid, are explored and 
made palpable, through the particular. Ben's crusade concerns two ordinary men brutally 
66 Andre Brink, .4 Dry White Season (London: 
Nlinerva, 1992). AM page references are from this edition. 
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and unjustly killed, and this concentration on injustice towards two individuals makes the 
injustice being suffered by thousands of Africans in South Affica all the more disturbing. 
It is the plight of one family which captures Ben's imagination and the lives of these 
individuals draw Ben and the reader into a whole new world of experience. Ben reflects, 
One always reads about this sort of thing ... One hears so many things. But it remains part of a totally different world really. One never 
expects it to happen to someone you actually know (p. 56). 
As Ben is drawn into the stories of Jonathan and Gordon,, his whole sense of reality Is 
unsettled as he is forced to engage imaginatively with a form of life of which he had hardly 
been aware- 
... one can't help wondering, can one? Where is he tonight while we're 
talking here in this room? Where is he sleeping? Or isn't he sleeping 
at all? Perhaps he's standing in some office under a bare bulb, his feet 
on bricks and a weight tied to his balls. (p. 56) 
Later in the novel, Stanley, an Affican taxi driver, asks Ben why he is so concerned about 
one man's death: 
'What is it to you, lanie? ... 
This sort of thing happens all the time, 
man. Why bother about GordonT 
'Because I knew him... I don't think I ever really knew before. Or if I 
did, it didn't seem to directly concern me. It was - well, like the dark 
side of the moon. Even if one acknowledges its existence it wasn't 
really necessary to live with it ... Now people have landed there' (p. 96). 
The novel shows how apartheid gave individuals particular roles to fulfil within the 
system, which set them against others. Occupants of the white suburbs are terrified of 
Tommunists'; youths in the townships identify whites as the enemy. 
Ben's experiences explode these categories - Gordon'... was a very ordinary person. Just 
like myself or anyone else. Don't you see? That's the whole point' (p. 116). 
Ben's lover, Melanie,. replies: 'Very few people seem prepared to be simply human - and to 
take responsibility for it' (p. 116). 
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Respectable people of the white minority, like the clergyman Mr. Bester (pp. 142f ) seem 
to find no difficulty in believing in the essential goodness of the system because of the 
outward show of respectability and justice which the system uses to maintain itself - 
correct procedures, like the inquest into Gordon's death, are observed, even though they 
are carefully manipulated (as Mr. Bester argues, 'Suppose this had been Russia: what do 
you think would have happened then? Or one of the Aftican states? I can assure you it 
would never have reached the courts at all', p. 143); atýrocities are denied and plausible 
explanations fabricated; fear and self-interest are exploited with rumours of Communist 
activities in the townships. To the black majority the real situation is clear, but to the 
majority of whites , including 
initially Ben, the system is assumed to be essentially just. If 
one has doubtsl it is easier and more comfortable to convince oneself, especially as one's 
position in the system is at stake. 
As an antidote to the stereotyped behaviour required by the system, this is a novel about 
writing, and for Ben, Melanie and the narrator writing provides an important outlet. 
Melanie becomes a journalist to 'prevent myself from slipping back into that old euphoria 
again. To force me to see and to take notice of what was happening around me' (p. 13 1). 
The novel is about the nature of writing as testimony and we are aware throughout of the 
layers of interpretation which comprise Ben's story - Ben's diaries and jottings, the writer's 
reading of Ben's story and our own readings. In this way, the novel refuses any false sense 
of obJeCtiVity67 - the account could have been written in many other ways. 
We are told at 
the end of the novel that this testimony is only an inadequate construction. We are 
67 Similarly, Brink's novel The Wall of the Plague (London: Faber, 1984) appears initially to be a first- 
person narrative but the ending reveals that it is in fact a re-creation, in which the character Joubert 
endeavours to understand and to come to terms with Andrea's desertion. Here again Brink puts a 'writer' 
in his narrative as a putative 'author', displacing his own role to one further remove. The reader thus 
experiences the seeming immediacy of a first-person narrative for most of the story, only to have that 
sense of immediacy framed by Joubert's confession of authorship - and his own inability to 'explain' 
Andrea's decision. His bewilderment problematises the attempt of any person to understand or explain 
another person. 
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conscious from the first page that the story of Ben Du Toit's life is a reconstruction based 
on fragments - '-diaries, the notes, the disconnected scribblings, the old accounts paid 
and unpaid, the photographs, everything indiscriminately lumped together... ' (p. 9) 
'And the possibilities suggested by my often misused imagination' (p. 33). 
The narrator muses, 
I have to immerse myself in [Ben's story], the way he entered into it on 
that first fatal day. Except that he did not know, and had no way of 
knowing, what was lying ahead; whereas I am held back by what I 
already know. What was unfinished to him is complete to me; what 
was life to him is story to me; first-hand becomes second hand. (p. 33) 
Because the writer has an ending in view, the danger is that events are described as 
contributing towards that sense of ending, a narrative frame is imposed. 
Yet,, having reached the end of the novel, one feels compelled to start at the beginning 
again, where Ben's ftiend reflects on the events which led to his being given the task of 
reconstructing Ben's life. This circularity reinforces a sense of the novel as writing, rather 
than closed narrative, yielding new meanings and reflections on each reading, just as our 
reflections on our own lives and those of others must not come to an end., but as stories 
read and re-read. 
Brink has written that the literary text 
... 
is not a transparent glass through which a "world beyond" can be 
observed. The qualities of the glass itself - its opacity, thickness, 
coloration, convexity or concavity, its smoothness or otherwise - 
demand the attention of the spectator ... 
in the final analysis it is the 
density of the literary experience which determines our way of looking 
"through" it at the world beyond. 68 
Since we are now reading Ben's testimony, there is a sense that Ben's crusade for justice 
has not come to an end (p. 13); the reader is now somehow implicated and challenged to 
be responsible, if not for Ben's crusade, for the small every-day injustices which surround 
us and which we cause. One is reminded of the concern of the Holocaust survivor that 
68 A'ndrc'BrinkAfqpmakers: Writing in a State ofSiege (London: Faber, 1983), p. 122. 
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what happened must not be forgotten, that the Nazis' hope of obliterating the evidence of 
destruction must be frustrated; to forget is to reinforce the closed interpretation of the 
system. As Ben is handing over his testimony to his fiiend, he says- 
They've taken everything from me. Nearly everything. Not much left. 
But they won't get that. You hear me? If they get that there would have 
been no sense in it at all... That's what they're aiming for ... 
They want 
to wipe out every sign of me, as if I'd never been here. And I won't let 
them' (p. 13) 
The writer of Ben's story knows that he has to write this testimony because of his own 
realisation, having been entrusted with Ben's notes, that Ben was a total stranger. 
Significantly, the narrator has spent much of his life as a writer of romantic fiction, where 
individuals' lives are subject to predetermined narratives, offering order and shape, 
affording the reader a false sense of security and not requiring her to engage with the 
complexity of particular characters and our failure ever fully to know ourselves and others. 
The writer is paralysed by a 'vast apathy' which has been affecting him for months, a 'dry 
white season'. Importantly, the process of writing Ben's testimony offers the narrator an 
imaginative opening, a vision to pursue: '... I have to grasp at him [Ben] in an effort to 
write myself out of my own sterile patch' (p. 33). 
Like Joseph K. in Kafka's The Trial or the individuals in Klima's novels, in A Dry White 
Season Ben finds himself pitted against the irrepressible power of the State. The system 
must play out its relentless logic. When the enquiry into Gordon's death finds that he 
committed suicide, despite the strong evidence of police brutality, Melanie sees that the 
verdict could have been no different- 
'What else could they have decided? They can't admit that they are 
wrong, can they? It's the only way they can keep going' (p. 12 1). 
It is a system which cannot afford to be challenged by the demand of justice; it must 
simply replicate itself, apply its laws: 
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Again, Melanie says, 
'You've got to face it, Ben: it's not really the function of the court to 
decide on right and wrong in absolute terms. Its first duty is to apply 
the laws' (p. 12 1). 
This is the terror of a total relativism, where there is no absolute demand except for the 
self-fulfilling demand of the system - the particular is subsumed within the general. 
As one reads through the novel, there is a sense of inevitability about the events which 
unfold, especially as we already know, from the opening account, that the events will end 
with Ben's death. 
In this novel, as in Gordimer's None to Accompany Me, we are made very conscious that 
the pursuit ofjustice in a world of contingency is ambivalent but vital. By devoting his life 
to uncovering the truth about the two black detainees killed in prison, Ben destroys his life 
and those of others. The security police are forced to respond to cover their tracks by 
destroying the witnesses Ben has discovered. Ben's obsession leads to his neglecting his 
wife and bringing disgrace and discomfort to his family. There is a sense that to pursue 
one responsibility is to neglect others, that moral purity is impossible. Even the security 
police are presented with a degree of sympathy, decent family men trapped by the system, 
having convinced themselves that they are fighting a battle against 'Communists'. 69 
Significantly, Ben is a teacher of Geography and IFEstory. Apartheid South Africa is 
constituted by its particular sense of Geography and flistory, where South Africa is 
supposed to comprise separate nations allowed to develop separately and Affikaners 
possess a unique role and destiny. As Stanley remarks, 
,... you lanies keep thinking history is made right here where you are 
and noplace else. Why don't you come with me one day, I'll show you 
what history really looks like. Bare-arsed history, stinking with life. 
Over at my place. in Sofasonke City. ' (p. 86) 
69 See, for example, p. 5 9. 
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lfjustice is to be pursued, historical narratives have to be examined critically and their 
status as writing recognised. Novels,, because they bring to life individual histories, from 
particular points of view (and novels like this with a self-conscious sense of artifice) 
witness to the fact that history is never written, but that histories, many histories, must 
continue to be written. In his small way, Ben represents a deconstructive force unsettling 
the boundaries of the history and geography of apartheid, and it is for this reason that the 
system, if it is to maintain its integrity,, cannot tolerate his activities. 
In an important section of the novel (pp. 158-163), Ben reflects on these issues. The 
Afrikaner view of history which he has been teaching his pupils, the Affikaner myth reads 
as follows: 
We Afrikaners were the first freedom fighters of Africa, showing the 
way to others. And now that we have finally come to power in our own 
land, we wish to grant the same right of selffletermination to all the 
other nations around us. They must have their own separate territories. 
Peaceful coexistence. Plural development. It is an expression of our 
own sense of honour and dignity and altruism. (p. 160) 
This myth has been exploded by Ben's own experiences and this prompts a crisis of 
legitimation as he reflects on the arbitrariness of the particular cultural categories which 
have ordered his experience: 
A name painted on a white board, so many feet above sea-level, so 
many miles from Kimberley, so many from Cape Town. The pure 
senselessness of it all heightened by the fact that everything is 
recorded fastidiously. What the hell does it matter that this is the name 
of the station, or that it is so many miles away from the next? 
From a very early age one accepts, or believes, or is told, that certain 
things exist in a certain manner. For example: that society is based on 
order, on reason, on justice. And that, whenever anything goes wrong, 
one can appeal to an innate decency, or commonsense, or a notion of 
legality in people to rectify the error and offer redress. Then, without 
warning, there occurs what Melanie said and what I refused to believe: 
you discover that what you accepted as premises and basic conditions - 
what you had no choice but to accept if you wanted to survive at all - 
simply does not exist. Where you expected something solid there turns 
out to be just nothing. Behind a board stating a name and heights and 
distances there is a vacuum disguised, at most, by a little corrugated 
iron building, milk cans, a row of empty red fire-buckets. Nothing. 
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Everything one used to take for granted, with so much certainty that 
one never even bothered to enquire about it, now turns out to be 
illusion. Your certainties are proven lies. And what happens if you 
start probing? Must you learn a wholly new language first? (pp. 160- 
161) 
Ben is facing an extreme form of the crisis of legitimation which is the 'postmodem 
condition'. The question he faces, which is the crucial question of postmodernity, is What 
now? (p. 161). Having discovered that the framework he had taken for granted is without 
foundation, he craves a locus of value,, a justification for his actions. He finds that to look 
for legitimation in terms of rational justification or practical arguments is fruitless, and so 
he changes the nature of the question: 
Perhaps simply to do what one has to do, because you're you, because 
you're there (p. 162). 
No general principles can do justice to the particularity of Ben's situation, the person he is 
and the situation in which he finds himself Apartheid has fundamentally distorted the 
nature of the ethicat, constructed false divisions of race and responsibilities to one's own. 
As a discourse,, it has thus denied the ethical responsibilities of particular people to those 
they encounter day by day. Ben reflects as follows, and I quote this important passage at 
length: 
Perhaps that is part of the very choice involved: the fact that I've 
always taken 'Rv own people' so much for granted that I now have to 
start thinking from scratch. It has never been a problem to me before. 
'My own people' have always been around me and with me. On the 
hard farm where I grew up, in church on Sundays, at auctions, in 
school-, on stations and in trains or in towns; in the slums of 
Krugersdorp; in my suburb. People speaking my language, taking the 
name of my God on their lips, sharing my history. That history which 
Gie calls 'the History of European Civilisation in South Africa'. My 
people who have survived for three centuries and who have now taken 
control - and who are now threatened with Extinction. 
'My people'. And then there were the 'others'. The Jewish 
shopkeeper, the English chemist; those who found a natural habitat in 
the city. And the blacks. The boys who tended the sheep with me, and 
stole apricots with me, and scared the people at the huts With pumkin 
ghosts, and who were punished with me, yet were different. We lived 
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in a house., they in mud huts with rocks on the roof. They took over 
our discarded clothes. They had to knock on the kitchen door. They 
laid our table, brought up our children, emptied our chamber pots, 
called us Baas and Miesies. We looked after them and valued their 
services and taught them the Gospel, and helped them, knowing theirs 
was a hard life. But it remained a matter of 'us' and 'them'. It was a 
good and comfortable division; it was right that people shouldn't mix, 
that everyone should be allotted his own portion of land where he 
could act and live among his own. If it hadn't been ordained in the 
Scriptures, then certainly it was implied in the variegated creation of 
an omniscient Father, and it didn't behove us to interfere with His 
handiwork or to try and improve on His ways by bringing forth 
impossible hybrids. That was the way it had always been. 
But suddenly it is no longer adequate, it no longer works. 
Something has changed irrevocably. I stood on my knees beside the 
coffin of a friend. I spoke to a woman mourning in a kitchen the way 
my own mother might have mourned. I saw a father in search of his 
son the way I might have tried to find my own. And that morning and 
that search had been caused by 'my people'. Al 
But who are 'my people' today? To whom do I owe my loyalty? 
There must be someone, something. Or is one totally alone on that 
bare veld beside the name of a non-existent station? 
The single memory that has been with me all day, infinitely more 
real than the solid school buildings, is that distant summer Pa and I 
were left with the sheep. The drought that took everything from us, 
leaving us alone and scorched among the white skeletons. 
What had happened before that drought has never been particularly 
vivid or significant to me: that was where I first discovered myself and 
the world. And it seems to me I'm finding myself on the edge of yet 
another dry white season, perhaps worse than the one I knew as a 
child. What now? (pp. 162-163)70 
Ben's 'dry white season' signifies the realisation that his language, outlook and 
assumptions are without foundation and do not enable him to confront the injustice he 
feels so intensely, yet here he 'discovers' himself and the world. 
Brink's novel,, like None to Accompany Me, is tragic to the extent that Ben is finally 
defeated in a losing battle against overwhelming odds. However, the performative power 
of the written testimony is itself a source of hope. The process of reading such literature 
70 Brink writes in similar terms about the experience of reading: '... reading is at heart a risky occupation, 
and in order to expose ourselves to the fullness of that experience we must be prepared to confront that 
danger, to face the possible violation of whatever we have been predisposed to take for granted. It means 
abandoning the certainties of prejudgement and tradition and a readiness to revise everything, including 
our perception of ourselves and our world' ('An Act of Violence: Thoughts on the Functioning of 
Literature', op. cit., p. 12). 
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may bring us to recognition of Ben's dilemma 'What nowT - and recognition of this as a 
question which confronts us at every moment, as the obligations ofjustice are seen as 
immediate and inexhaustible. 
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CONCLUSION 
'Except the Lord of Hosts had left unto us a very small remnant, we should have been as Sodom and 
we should have been like unto Gomorrah. " 
'Democracy practises the ongoing interruption of politics by ethics, of totality by infinity., 2 
Through discussion of three twentieth-century political ideologies, we have seen the 
destructiveness of attempts to realise the Enlightenment dream of a non-aporefic 
model of ethics or political philosophy. Such an attempt is premised on an illusion of 
objectivity, the belief that a perspective, or hors-texte, may be found from which 
innocence and guilt, right and wrong may be adjudicated. Such projects fail to 
recognise writing as a condition of the Fall, positing instead an extra-linguistic 
perspective which may finally legitimate a given judgement or interpretation. 
The three ideologies considered in this study focus the issues clearly, and produce 
dissident literature, like the samizdat literature of the former Eastern bloc,, concerned 
with the plight of individuals subject to the impersonal laws of the systeM. 3 However, 
Chapters 3 and 4 end with discussion of writers who are now confronting the 
challenges presented by the collapse of the former regimes - Ivan Klima's Waitingfor 
the Dark, Waitingfor the Light and Nadine Gordimer's None to Accompany Me, as 
well as Derrida's Specters ofMarx. These works remind us of the danger that, with 
the ideological enemy vanquished, a new non-aporetic political code is assumed, that 
I Isaiah 1: 9. 
2 Simon Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1992), p. 240. 
3 Robert Detweiler argues that it is the task of the religious-reading community to locate and 
disseminate 'texts of pain'whereever they arefound. 'One suspects that such private texts of pain are 
generated daily in Lebanon, Iran. Northern Ireland, South Africa, the American ghettoes, the Amazon 
Valley; in middle-class families, penitentiaries, mental institutions, hospices and in places we cannot 
imagine, and that literary fictions seeking to amplify these witnesses already exist, unknown to the 
literary establishment' (Robert Detweiler, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary 
Fiction (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 49. 
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of Western-style liberal democracy. The collapse of the former regime deprives 
10ma's film-maker Pavel of his role as dissident and leaves issues of freedom and 
purpose unresolved -'no matter where you are, you get tangled up in some kind of 
spider's web that you can't get free of .4 In Gordimer's novel,, the guardians of post- 
Apartheid South Africa find that the collapse of the Apartheid regime represents a 
major ethical collapse, as people are deprived of roles, either within the system or in 
positions of opposition. As Derrida reminds us in Specters ofMarx, the danger in the 
current situation is that liberal democracy, as represented by Western Europe and the 
United States,, is seen as a realised ideal. The triumphalist tone of the American 
historian Francis Fukuyama, with his new gospel at the end of our millennium , is 
symptomatic of this danger. 5 
In this context, Derrida's writings on democracy, law and justice are extremely 
significant. In Ae Other Heading. Rej7ections on Today's Europe (199 1), he argues 
that what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself, 'at home' with itself 6 He 
believes that we have a duty of assuming the European heritage of the idea of 
democracy - the Enlightenment values of human rights, political liberties and 
responsibilities - while also recognising that this idea is never simply given, but 
something that remains to be thought and 'to come' (a venir), not something that is 
certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy of the future, but a democracy that 
must have the structure of a promise (the promise of what must remain without 
4 Ivan Klima, lVaitingfor the Dark-, Waitingfor the Light, tr. Paul Wilson (London: Granta Books, 
1994), p. 13 9. 
5 See also Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, tr. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael B. Naas (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). For example: '... I 
am thinking about the necessity for a new culture, one that would invent another way of reading and 
analyzing Capital, both Marx's book and capital in general; a new way of taking capital into account 
while avoiding not only the frightening totalitarian dogmatism that some of us have known how to 
resist up until now, but also, and simultaneously, the counter-dogmatism that is setting in today, (on 
the) left and (on the) right ... 
it is necessary to analyze and earnestly address - and this is the whole 
problem of ethico-political responsibility - the disparities between law., ethics, and politics, or between 
the unconditional idea of law ... and the concrete conditions of 
its implementation... ' (pp. 56-57). 
6 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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example). 7 As we saw in Derrida's discussion of Nelson Mandela, the imperative is to 
return to the discourses of human rights, to question the exemplarity of that language 
in order to encounter or experience what remains necessarily absent and unthought, 
necessarily without example, in them. 
This 'messianic' thinlýing may also inform contemporary understandings of national 
identity in a world threatened by nationalism, in which a desire to draw cultural 
boundaries may lead to fragmentation and disharmony. Such a'postmodern ethicmay 
offer a new way of conceiving universal moral agency without the homogenizing 
drives of ideology. Derrida writes, 
It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of 
a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not 
closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an 
exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the 
heading of the other, indeed toward the other of the heading, which 
would be the beyond of this modem tradition, another border 
structure. 8 
Once again, pursuing justice or democracy involves that experience of qporia,, a 
recognition and acceptance of irreconcilable responsibilities, or what Derrida calls the 
I undecidable'. It is necessary that this experience be maintained (and here, as we have 
seen, the creative writer assumes an almost prophetic role) rather than resolved or 
neutralised in theory. In the terms of Isaiah 1, it is the role of 'the remnant' to keep 
the text alive, and refuse the security of ideological closure. This should not suggest 
fatalism or moral inertia but an honest acceptance that responsibilities exceed our 
ability to act or interpret. Justice requires immediate response, yet is always 'to come'. 
With regard to European cultural identity, this must not be dispersed into a multiplicity 
of petty nationalisms, each one jealous and untranslatable. We must engage in 
7 For a discussion of the prophetic and messianic resonances in Derrida's writing, see John D. 
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofýJacques Derrida: Religion u4thout Religion (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
8 Derrida, The Other Heading, op. cit., p. 29. 
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translation and communication, even as we recognise difference and untranslatability. 
On the other hand, we must resist pressure to centralise and standardise. 
[Europe] cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing 
authority that, by means of trans-European cultural mechanisms, by 
means of publishing, journalistic, and academic concentrations - be 
they state-run or not - would control and standardize, subjecting 
artistic discourses and practices to a grid of intelligibility, to 
philosophical and aesthetic norms, to channels of immediate and 
efficient communication, to the pursuit of ratings and commercial 
profitability. For by reconstituting places of an easy consensus, places 
of a demagogical and 'salable' consensus, through mobile, 
omnipresent, and extremely rapid media networks, by thus 
immediately crossing every border, such normalization would establish 
a cultural capital at any place and at all times. 9 
It is necessary to avoid both the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and the 
homogenization of languages through the 'neutrality' of a translating medium which 
would claim to be transparent, metalinguistic, and universal. 10 These are two 
irreconcilable responsibilities but, as Derrida continually reminds us, there is no 
responsibility that is not the experience of the impossible. II 
In the final chapter of his book Modernity and Ambivalence (199 1), Zygmunt Bauman 
examines the factors which seem to have rendered Western-style liberal democracy 
immune from social critique. He argues that the privatisation of human concerns has 
been a significant factor and the fact that the free market is assumed to be inevitable, 
with its own checks and balances. 
It is not necessarily the case that the denizens of postmodern - 
privatized and commodified - society enjoy the sum-total of greater 
happiness (one would still wish to know how to measure happiness 
objectively and compare it), and that they experience their worries as 
less serious and painful; what does truly matter is that it would not 
occur to them to lay the blame for such troubles they may suffer at the 
door of the state, and even less to expect the remedies to be handed 
over through that door. Postmodern society proved to be a well-nigh 
perfect translating machine - one that interprets any extant and 
prospective social issue as private concern. 12 
9 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
10 lbicL, p. 58. 
11 Ibid., p. 4 1. 
12 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity andAmbivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 261. 
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Consumer society celebrates the 'freedom' of the individual, yet the supra-individual 
market machine has already defined the terms of that 'freedom. Bauman writes- 
Consumer freedom means orientation of life towards market-approved 
commodities and thereby precludes one crucial freedom: freedom from 
the market, freedom that means anything else but the choice between 
standard commercial products. Above all, consumer freedom 
successfully deflects aspirations of human liberty from human affairs 
and the management of collective life. 13 
In the market economy, diversity thrives, but only such diversity is allowed to thrive as 
benefits the economy. Moreover, if liberty means consumer choice, then in order to 
enjoy that liberty one must be a consumer, a condition which leaves out millions. 
We hear much of the virtue of tolerance, but,, as Bauman reminds us, tolerance does 
not necessarily encourage human solidarity. It may be that tolerance encourages an 
unconcem for others which makes cruelty easier to commit. 
In our type of society, economic and political domination may well do 
without hegemony; it found the way of reproducing itself under 
conditions of cultural variety. The new tolerance means irrelevance of 
cultural choice for the stability of domination. And irrelevance 
rebounds in indifference. Alternative forms of life arouse but spectator 
interest of the type offered by a sparkling and spicy variety show; they 
may even trigger less resentment (particularly if viewed from a safe 
distance or through the secure shield of the TV screen), but no fellow- 
feeling either; they belong to the outer world of theatre and 
entertainment not to the inner world of the politics of life. 14 
In a society dominated by the hyper-reality of media-driven consumerism, the 
importance of democracy -a democracy characterised by memory (the memory of 
what is preconceived and forgotten in the correlation of image and reference) and 
promise - is as important as ever. 
In the final chapter of Ae Ethics ofDeconstruction (1992), Simon Critchley considers 
the role of the philosopher in politics. The philosopher is not one who wishes to 
establish politics on an absolute foundation, but one who dwells in the polis and 
questions, criticises and judges. 
13 Ibid., p. 262. 
14 Ibid., p. 274. 
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Philosophy, as the wisdom of love at the service of love, is the 
discourse which, through its activity of open, agnostic critique, ensures 
that the community remains an open community, at the service of 
ethical difference. Philosophical critique, like Antigone herself, is the 
eternal irony of the community, the fact that the community is 
legitimised only by calling the legitimacy of the community into 
question. The just polity is one that can actively maintain its own 
interruption or ironization as that which sustains it. 15 
Legitimate communities are those which hold themselves in question; and to that 
extent legitimate communities are philosophical (or, one might say, legitimate 
communities are 'reading communities'). 16 According to Critchley, 'democracy 
practises the ongoing interruption of politics by ethics, of totality by infinity'17 One 
must not restrict oneself to conceiving of democracy as an existent political form but 
as a task, or project to be attempted. 
For Derrida, philosophy and the university have a crucial role to play in this process. 18 
According to Derrida, an important role of the university is to question the heritage of 
our language and thought, to be conscious of the danger of a homogeneity of 
discourse - for example, the elevation of technology and instrumental rationality, or a 
philosophical discourse which would plead for transparency, for the univocality of 
democratic discussion. The College International de Philosophie was founded in 
1984 by Derrida and others as an exemplary place for questioning the forms, structures 
and institutions of education and communication, including the university. 
In 'The Principle of Reason. The University in the Eyes of its Pupils', Derrida writes of 
the dangers of academic disciplines being subject to programming by the pressures of 
the State, or by civil society or capital interests, so that thought is appropriated by 
socio-political forces. One of the tasks of the university is therefore to study these 
15 Simon Critchley, op. cit., p. 238. 
16 lbid-, p. 239. cf. Robert Detweiler, op. cit. 
17 lbid., p. 240. 
18 See, for example, Derrida, 'The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils', in 
Diacritics 13, Fall 1983, M. 
Derrida with Geoff Bennington, 'On Colleges and Philosophy', in Lisa Appignanesi (ed. ), 
Postmodernism: IC-4 Documents (London: Free Association Books, 1989), pp. 209-228. 
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pressures. Derrida argues that there is a need to keep alive the memory of a tradition 
(for example, a philosophical tradition - hence his advocacy of Philosophy teaching in 
French schools) and make an opening beyond any programme, that is towards what he 
calls 'the future'. In other words, it is necessary both to teach the traditions of Western 
philosophy and continually to re-read these traditions - thinIcing about 'the abyss 
beneath the university'. 19 
Derrida's vision for the university is in many ways analogous to Robert Detweiler's 
understanding of what it could mean to 'read religiously'. Indeed, perhaps Detweiler's 
I reading community' provides a responsible alternative to Stanley Hauerwas' 
communitarian ethic, for whereas Hauerwas' understanding seems to rely on a shared 
interpretation of the Christian story, Detweiler celebrates an interactive response to 
1 120 texts ,a trustful exchange 
based on principles of fiiendship rather than power 
countering the privatising tendencies of our culture. 
A religious reading, therefore, might be one that finds a group of 
persons engaged in gestures of friendship with each other across the 
erotic space of the text that draws them out of their privacy and its 
21 stress on meaning and power. 
In Detweiler's view, a religious reading is one in which a reader understands him- or 
herself as part of a community engaged in simultaneously recognising, critiCising and 
reshaping the myths and rituals it lives by. Such reading is a way of responding to the 
surplus of meaning which reading supplies, an awareness that a text always offers 
more than the mind can absorb or signify. It is a celebration of the excess of 
experience over interpretation, a witness to the great ineffability of existence. 
1"XIVeligious reading is the deep play that reminds us how the text can 
never really be completed, no more than can the author or reader. The 
text as other, or other as text, refuses to be gasped conceptually, 
requires that the reader opens himself to what the text has to say. It is 
an effort which requires belief because we are always on the verge of 
being seduced by the non-vision of nothingness, the ultimate 
19 Derrida, 'The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils', op. cit., 17. 
20 Robert Detweiler, op. cit., p. 33. 
21 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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abstraction and the final goal of interpretation, and we need to recall, 
against that nihilism, the enduring inexpressibility that incessantly 
inspires our desire. 22 
The terms in which these issues are discussed, by Derrida and others, have powerful 
theological resonances ('the name, 'the ineffable', 'anamnesis', 'the mystical foundation 
of authority', justice or democracy to come', 'the fall of language into representation') 
and a number of contemporary scholars have recently explored the theological 
implications of Derrida's work. 23 I would argue that to take the 'postmodern 
condition' seriously involves seeing the discipline of theology as subject to ethics. In 
Kierkegaard's terms, the religious disturbance proceeds by way of the ethical. 
Nazism, Soviet Communism and Apartheid may all be seen as 'theology' become 
ideological. Communism was a messianic vision which, as Derrida argues in Specters 
ofMarx, lost sight of its messianism; Nazism and Apartheid sought justification 
through a 'pure' reading of scripture. Against these horrors, theology24 may be 
conceived as an obligation to write and to read, witnessing to the 'unpresentable in 
presentation itself. In this sense, for example, the burden of the Holocaust writer, to 
write against oblivion, becomes a religious vocation. 
This, too, is the significance of the so-called 'Death of Godtheology prominent in the 
1960s. God - the God of metaphysics, the God of onto-theology, is dead. After the 
death of that God, the ethical subject is able to discover the sense of transcendence 
that was lost or reified in metaphysics, so that the 'death! of God is the precondition 
for the possibility of religiosity and morality. 
22 Ibid., p. 45. 
23 See, for example, John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofJacques Derrida, op. cit; Kevin Hart, 
The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Jasper, 'From 
Theology to Theological Thinking: The Development of Critical Thought and its Consequences for 
Theology', in Literature and TheoloSýy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1995,293-305; Walter Lowe, 
Theology and Difference: The ffound ofReason (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1993). 
24 The term 'theological thinking' may avoid the implication of logocentricity. See, for example, 
David Jasper, 'From Theology to Theological Thinking', op. cit. 
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Twentieth-century theology has been struggling to respond to the breakdown of 
Enlightenment confidence and the natural theology which accompanied it, and to 
confront the reality of world war and genocide. As Walter Lowe puts it, , In the 
nineteenth century experience had become the touchstone for doing theology. With 
the twentieth century, experience became unbearable'. 25 
Yet the postmodern 'crisis' may provide an impetus for a re-visiting of theological 
categories. Derrida has written as follows: 
in general, to summarize very succinctly, the point would seem to be to 
liberate theology from what has been grafted on to it, to free it from its 
metaphysico-philosophical super ego, so as to uncover an authenticity 
of the 'gospel, of the evangelical message. And thus, from the 
perspective of faith, deconstruction can at least be a very useful 
technique ... And [the point would also seem to be] a real possibility for faith both at the margins and very close to Scripture, a faith lived in a 
venturous, dangerous, ftee way. 26 
As Walter Lowe argues, Derridean deconstruction, with its emphasis on writing as a 
condition of 'the Fall', may be read as testifying to the reality of human brokenness 
and, ., as a 
depiction of the human condition, this provides a basis for human solidarity 
and universal moral agenCy. 27 
Reading - reading 'religiously' - and recognising unreadability become a kind of 
repentance, a recognition of the fallibility of the theories, values and practices 
legitimated by our own fictional worlds. The contemporary interest in apocalyptic may 
25 Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference, , op. cit., p. 1. 26 'Deconstruction in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', ed. James Creech, Peggy Kamuf 
and Jane Todd, Critical Exchange 17 (Winter 1985), p. 12; published by The Society for Critical 
Exchange, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. 
27 Ibid., p. 12. Walter Lowe points out that what Derrida has done is to take With full seriousness the 
assertion in Heidegger's Being and Time that classical metaphysics failed because in such 
metaphysics, 'entities are grasped in their Being as "presence"; this means that they are understood 
with regard to a definite mode of time - the Present' (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM, 1962), p. 47 - quoted in Walter Lowe, Theology 
and Difference, op. cit., p. 19. 
Walter Lowe argues that the attempt, particularly in the 1960s, to develop the implications of 
Heidegger's thought for theology, never fulfilled its promise because it did not take the critique of 
presence sufficiently seriously. See Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference, pp. 18-19. 
I'M 
be seen in this perspective - the radical disturbance or revelation which exposes the 
atrocities which we mask with our systems of reality. 
The recognition of human brokenness calls for a theologY which recognises the radical 
'otherness' of God, a God who may not be represented in the discourses of theology. 
As Mark C. Taylor puts it, 'it would not be too much to suggest that deconstruction is 
the "hermeneutic" of the death of God 128 In 1960, Thomas Altizer wrote that 'Despite 
its great relevance to our situation, the faith of the radical Christian continues to 
remain largely unknown, and this is so both because that faith has never been able to 
speak in the established categories of Western thought and theology and because it has 
so seldom been given a visionary expressiod. 29 Walter Lowe argues that such 
acknowledgement of the radical otherness of God might actually have a liberating 
effect, because it allows finite difference and the richness of creation to be affirmed. 
The violence done to creation has sprung time and time again from the 
human effort to become, ourselves, the link between finite and infinite. 
We have sought to make of our own finite transcendence a bridge 
beyond-, we have tried to find in our finite reality some reassuring 
correspondence with the absolute. But no such form or 
correspondence exists. Rather that to which we are to correspond is 
our 'veritable situation, which is the absence of such a linV, an 
absence which compels humanIdnd to bow to the One who is wholly 
other. 30 The distinction remains rigorous - and therefore the creation 
is free to be what it is: various, many-faceted, a festival of innocent 
difference. Nature is released from the requirement that it deliver a 
saving presence. And we are freed to live without that anxious, 
idolatrous demand. 31 
It may be that Derridean deconstruction provides a language with which to re-visit the 
crisis theology of Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans, written in the aftermath of the 
32 First World War. For example, Walter Lowe believes that the early theology of Karl 
28 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern Altheology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984), p. 6. 
29 Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God 
(Hannondsworth, 1968), p. 182. 
30 Lowe is here alluding to Karl Barth's The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 444. 
31 Lowe, Theology and Difference, op. cit., p. 127. 
32 As well as Walter Lowe's Theology and Difference, see, for example, David E. Klemm. 'Back to 
Literature - and Theology? ', in David Jasper (ed-), Postmodernism, Literature and the Future of 
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Barth might be read, not as naively pre-Enlightenment, but as profoundly post-critical. 
Barth wrote that 'nothing is so meaningless as the attempt to construct a religion out 
of the Gospel, and to set it as one human possibility in the midst of otherS'. 33 
According to Barth, theology is the crisis of Western culture and religiosity, and the 
, veritable worship of God' requires an act of repentance. Repentance is the primary 
ethical action upon which all secondary ethical conduct depends. 34 For Barth, 'the 
power and earnestness of Christian ethics lie in its persistent asking of questions and in 
its steady refusal to provide answers to these questions'. 35 It is only as problem that 
ethics can effect or reflect the 'great disturbance'. Barth's concem here is to set aside a 
I metaphysical' conception of God, a belief that there exists a direct link between the 
creation and God, a hidden correspondence to be discovered. The word 'God' means 
the unity of things, but not a unity which can serve as the first principle of order in the 
cultural sphere. 36 
The fact that ethics constitutes a problem reminds us that the object 
about which we are conversing has no objectivity, that is to say, it is 
not a concrete world existing above or behind our world ... The 
fact 
that ethics are presented to us as a problem ... provides us with a 
guarantee that, when we repeat - sometimes tediously perhaps - the 
formula 'God himself, God alone, ' we do not mean by it some divine 
thing, or some ideal world contrasted with the visible worICL37 
A human gesture towards God which believes itself to be direct is a gesture which has 
confidence in its own sufficiency, lacking repentance; but once broken, or repentant, 
that gesture becomes a gesture towards God. 
As we have seen, this is the 'brokenness' or experience of aporia, the 'unreadable' or 
I undecidable', without which there can be no freedom but only the unfolding of a 
Theology (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 180-190; David Jasper, 'From Theology to Theological 
Thinking: The Development of Critical Thought and its Consequences for Theology'; Graham Ward, 
Barth, Derrida and the Theology ofLanguage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
33 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op. cit., p. 225. 
34 lbid., p. 436. 
35 Ibid, p. 466. 
36 One is reminded here of Derrida's notion of the 'Mystical foundation of authority'. 
37 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op. cit., pp. 424-5. 
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programme, no democracy but only ideology, no justice but only law, no theology but 
only metaphysics. 
'We ought therefore to recognise both our obligation and our inability and by that very 
recognition give God the glory'. 38 
38 Karl Barth, quoted in David Klemm, 'Back to Literature - and TheologyT, in David Jasper (ed. ), 
Postmodernhvm, Literature and the Future of Theology (London: Macmillan, 1993). p. 183. 
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